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INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that the practice of assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence is constitutionally required as a con
comitant of the Winship principle l and the presumption of inno
cence. 2 It is a presupposition of the Winship principle that no person
may be constitutionally convicted except upon sufficient proof of
guilt--evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact be
yond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the
charge. 3 Until Jackson v. Virginia,4 the concern for the enforcement
I. The term .. Winship principle" as used in this article refers to the due process
principle which protects defendants in criminal proceedings from conviction except by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crime charged. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
2. See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (citing In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970». '
3. Id at 316.
4. 443 U.S. 307 (1978).
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of this constitutional requirement focused on jury instructions that
accurately described the Winship principle. The Winship principle
had not been viewed as necessarily involving a correlative standard
of evidentiary sufficiency. The only evidentiary requirement re
garded as essential to fundamental fairness was the "no evidence"
rule of Thompson v. Louisville, 5 which served as a safeguard against
completely arbitrary convictions by requiring that some relevant evi
dence underlie each element of the crime. 6 The due process clause
was not viewed as requiring state courts to assess evidentiary suffi
ciency. Therefore it neither imposed a minimum legal standard of
sufficiency nor any strictures on whatever sufficiency assessment pro
cess a state might choose to provide.
The ruling in Jackson departed sharply from the view that the
Winship principle should be so limited. The Court recognized that to
enforce a burden of persuasion7 it is necessary to enforce a burden of
5. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
6. The holding of Thompson as refined through a series of holdings ending with
Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974), was that "a conviction based upon a
record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of a crucial element of the offense
charged" is arbitrary and violates due process. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314.
Following Winship, the Court's consideration of other burden of persuasion issues in
criminal litigation, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972), and the relation be
tween the Winship principle and the rule of jury unanimity, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 360-63 (1972), led it to intimate that the Winship principle may make eviden
tiary sufficiency a due process issue. See a/so Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111
(1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Indeed, the disputes within the Court over the proper scope and application of the
Thompson principle suggested that the "no evidence" rule necessarily involved the courts
in assessing sufficiency at some level. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478,
480 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see a/so Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212-13
(6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting).
7. As used in this article, the term "burden of persuasion" refers to the responsibil
ity imposed on a party to prove a particular issue to a specified level of certainty. The
specified level of certainty is the "standard of persuasion", e.g., beyond a reasonable
doubt. The party to whom the burden of persuasion is assigned bears a corresponding
risk of nonpersuasion-that is, losing on the issue if he or she fails to persuade the fact
finder to the specified level of certainty.
Each party has a burden of persuasion on each issue being litigated; these burdens
are reciprocal. When one party has the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt
the opposing party necessarily has a burden of persuasion to establish a reasonable
doubt.
The term "burden of production" refers to the respo~ibility of producing evidence
on a particular issue. The failure to produce evidence leads to loss on that issue. Thus
the assignment of a burden of persuasion on an issue entails imposition of a risk of loss
from nonproduction. As with the burden of persuasion, the standard of persuasion pro
vides a necessary reference point for determining whether the evidence produced is suffi
cient to satisfy the party's burden of persuasion. For example, this article deals primarily
with the prosecution's burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the defend
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production, and the only way to enforce a burden of production is to
measure the sufficiency of the evidence produced against the stan
dard of persuasion that the party having the burden of persuasion is
required to meet. 8 The Court's view that the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is necessarily incorporated by the presumption of
innocence9 established the constitutional necessity of assessing the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and doing so against a stan
dard which "gives concrete substance" to the Winship principle. IO
The trial judge's task in reviewing the sufficiency of the prosecu
tion's evidence is to insure that that evidence provides a reasonable
basis upon which a jury might reasonably convict the defendant of
the crime charged. The judge must apply the required constitutional
standard: whether the evidence being assessed is such that a reason
able juror might find that each essential element of the crime
charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this
manner, the judge safeguards the Winship principle by insuring that
if the jury's verdict is guilty it will not necessarily be unreasonable. I I
The Court in Jackson, however, did not consider the problems
of administering the sufficiency of the sufficiency assessment process
at the trial level. I2 The Court's entire discussion of the sufficiency
assessment was cast in terms of state appellate and federal habeas
corpus review, J3 which, of course, corresponds to the procedural con
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in
Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 321, 326-39 (1980); McNaughton, Burden ofProduction ofEvidence: A Function ofa
Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
8. 443 U.S. at 318-20.
9. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 558
(1898).
10. 443 U.S. at 315 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970».
II. The Jackson standard does not by itself guarantee that a verdict must be rea
sonable. The judge will find the prosecution's evidence sufficient if a reasonable convic
tion on the evidence is possible; the standard does not authorize the judge to insist that
the evideIice be so strong that an unreasonable conviction could not result. The intersti
tial protection needed to safeguard against unreasonable judgments on sufficient evi
dence is provided by proper jury instructions. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 227,
232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
12. The sufficiency assessment process, however, like the process of proof which it
parallels, is very complex and is administered by internal rules which are designed to
separate the roles and responsibilities of the judge and jury in the fact-finding process.
While these rules vary with the jurisdiction, in their general import they instruct the
judge to give the evidence the most favorable interpretation available to the prosecution
and to refrain from usurping the jury's fact-finding function. The obvious purpose of the
new standard is to impose a constitutionally required level of restraint on the jury's fact
finding discretion.
13. 443 U.S. at 313-24.
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text in which the issue had been presented. The Supreme Court ap
parently assumed that the sufficiency process already utilized in the
various state court systems could vindicate the Court's new constitu
tional concerns by simply substituting the newly articulated standard
of legal sufficiency for the state's customary standards. 14
Shortly after Jackson was decided, the new Rules of Criminal
Procedure went into effect in Massachusetts and the supreme judicial
court determined that the Massachusetts standard of sufficiency, as it
was currently articulated and administered, required no modifica
tion to comply with the Supreme Court's new mandate. IS Not sur
prisingly, the supreme judicial court did not consider whether the
usual rules governing the sufficiency process were similarly compati
ble with the principle of Jackson.
Part Two of this article is addressed to that question. It surveys
the procedures codified in Rule 25 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Criminal Procedure l6 and then examines the manner in which the
14. The Court no doubt strengthened this impression by incorporating the familiar
"prosecution's best case rule" into its statement of the sufficiency standard to be applied
at the habeas corpus level. 443 U.S. at 319 n.12. In the context of habeas corpus litiga
tion, this rule serves the "federalism" policy of insuring deference to the factual determi
nations of the state courts, and it presupposes that conviction has occurred. Id
The tension and conflict between the Jackson standard of sufficiency and the tradi
tional administrative rules of the sufficiency assessment process documented in Part I of
this article were forseeable. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its new standard
"impinges on jury discretion." 443 U.S. at 319. The chief purpose of the traditional rules
of the assessment process is to preserve jury discretion. See Curley v. United States, 160
F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). The conflict between them
is a constitutional problem which will surface frequently in state courts.
IS. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-79, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75
(1979).
16. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25 reads:
(a) Entry by Court. The judge on motion of a defendant or on his own mo
tion shall enter a finding of not guilty of the offense charged in an indictment or
complaint or any part thereof after the evidence on either side is closed if the
evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on the charge.
If a defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty is made at the close
of the Commonwealth's evidence, it shall be ruled upon at that time. If the
motion is denied or allowed only in part by the judge, the defendant may offer
evidence in his defense without having reserved that right.
(b) Jury Trials.
(I) Reservation of Oecision on Motion. If a motion for a required finding
of not guilty is made at the close of all the evidence, the judge may reserve
decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion
before the jury returns a verdict, after the jury returns a verdict of guilty, or
after the jury is discharged without having returned a verdict.
(2) Motion Ajier Oischarge 0/Jury. If the motion is denied and the case is
submitted to the jury, the motion may be renewed within five days after the jury
is discharged and may include in the alternative a motion for a new trial. If a
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sufficiency assessment process is affected by related practices that
regulate the manner in which evidential issues are raised, joined and
focused. It then examines the sufficiency assessment process step-by
step, including the manner in which that process is affected by com
monly used proof-facilitating devices. This examination demon
strates that the effectiveness of a sufficiency assessment process in
vindicating the Jackson principle is compromised by both the ad
ministrative rules that govern the process and by proof-facilitating
devices that are usually scrutinized for the constitutional impact only
as to the effect upon the jury's decisional process.
This article concludes that the "prosecution's best case" rule
and the rule prohibiting a trial judge from considering issues of cred
ibility and relative weight of the evidence in assessing the prosecu
tion's evidence are chiefly responsible for the shortcomings in the
sufficiency assessment process as it is currently administered in Mas
sachusetts. These rules do not permit the judge to protect the de
fendant from unreasonable jury judgments in areas in which the
most difficult and decisive disputes in the trial are commonly
presented: judgments involving evidentiary weight, credibility and
inference questions. Moreover, these rules may interact with the
practice of requiring the defendant to raise an elemental defense is
sue by producing evidence (either in addition to, or as an alternative
to pleading the issue) thereby relieving the prosecution of the onus of
producing evidence sufficient to meet its burden of persuasion to dis
prove the issue. By this practice, the defendant is required to defend
before the presumption of innocence has been completely dispelled.
The defendant may also lose the opportunity to have a favorable,
verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on motion set aside the verdict and
order a new trial, or order the entry of a finding of not guilty, or order the entry
of a finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense charged in the in
.
dictment or complaint.
(c) Appeal.
(I) Right of Appeal Where Motion/or Reliifunder Subdivision (b) Is Al
lowed Ajier a Jury Verdict of Guilty. The Commonwealth shall have the right to
appeal to the appropriate appellate court a decision of a judge granting relief
under the provisions of subdivisions (b)(l) and (2) of this rule on a motion for
required finding of not guilty after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty or on
an order for the entry of a finding of guilt of any offense included in the offense
charged in the indictment or complaint.
(2) Costs upon Appeal. If an appeal is taken by the Commonwealth, the
appellate court, upon the written motion of the defendant supported by affida
vit, may determine and approve the payment to the defendant of his costs of
appeal together with reasonable attorney's fees, if any, to be paid on the order
of the trial court upon the entry of the rescript.
Id
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final sufficiency determination made before being required to submit
to the risk of an unreasonable conviction if the judge reserves ruling
on the matter until after the jury has returned a verdict. Similarly,
the use of presumptions, inferences and other proof-facilitating de
vices to satisfy the prosecution's burden of production on an issue,
operating singly or in combination, may exempt the prosecution's
evidence from the sufficiency assessment on that issue.
The use of these practices, rules and devices often compromises
the effectiveness of the sufficiency assessment process on key issues,
leaving open and sometimes promoting the possibility that the jury's
decision on such an issue will not be reasonably founded on evi
dence presented to it. Thus, the Jackson principle seems to demand
that the customary sufficiency assessment process be revised in order
to make it compatible with the new constitutional standard of suffi
ciency. Part Two proposes specific modifications in the structure of
the process and its administrative rules designed to make it more
compatible with the Jackson principles and legal standard of
sufficiency.
The provisions of Rule 25 also establish a postconviction mech
anism and review authority which is designed to serve as a safeguard
against unjust convictions. The second sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) au
thorizes the judge to review the evidence and either revise the verdict
or order a new trial if it appears that justice has not been served. 17
Moreover, when exercising this authority the judge is permitted to
weigh the evidence and otherwise review the jury's exercise of its
fact-finding discretion. IS It is possible, then, to view Rule 25 as pro
viding two complementary mechanisms designed to equip the trial
judge with a mechanism to regulate the quality of the evidence, to
safeguard against the injustice of an unfounded conviction and to
avoid the reproach that justice may not have been done.
Part Three considers the trial judge's post conviction authority
to revise a jury's guilty verdict. The history and purposes of the
supreme judicial court's analogous statutory powers under Massa
chusetts General Laws, Chapter 278, Section 33E are examined. 19 A
proposed system of standards is presented in this article for deter
mining when it is appropriate to exercise this authority and what
form of relief will best serve the ends of justice. Finally, it is pro
17. Id. 2S(b)(2).
18. See id.
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). These statutory powers
are hereinafter referred to as the section 33E powers.
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posed that this verdict-revising authority be used as a vehicle for
supplementing the sufficiency assessment process in order to cure the
shortcomings and inconsistencies in the sufficiency assessment pro
cess which are discussed in Part Two.
I.

RULE

25

PROCEDURES

Rule 25 of the new Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure
establishes five points in the trial process at which the adequacy of
the evidence of guilt may be placed in issue. 2o In addition to estab
lishing procedures under which an accused's claim for requiring
findings of not guilty are to be evaluated, the rule enlarges upon and
transfers to trial judges a very broad discretionary authority under
which they may evaluate the justice of a jury's guilty verdict by con
sidering, among other factors, the weight of the evidence. 21 The rule
itself addresses only points of procedure. 22 The standards to be em
ployed in making the various decisions Rule 25 authorizes must be
derived from other sources.
This section surveys and explores the procedural applications of
Rule 25 and the variations in extent of authority as well as standards
of decision that are employed at various points in the process. This
section also inquires whether discernible patterns can be identified in
the types of factual and legal issues that can be raised under Rule 25.
A brief discussion of the sufficiency assessment process will set the
stage.
A.

The Process of Assessing the Sufficiency of the Evidence

In practice, the sufficiency judgment frequently cannot be iso
lated from other issues. Pretrial disputes over such matters as the
sufficiency or multiplicity of the charging papers, the constitutional
ity of the prosecution or the admissibility of evidence may resurface
20. See supra note 16. The phrase "adequacy of the evidence" will be used in this
paper generically to include the concepts of legal sufficiency defined in Jackson v. Vir
ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676
79, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75 (1979), and of satisfactory weight "consonant with justice."
Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982); Common
wealth v. Gaulden, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1123, 1136-38,420 N.E.2d 905, 912-13; if. Com
monwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,7,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (1980); Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 416, 378 N.E.2d 429, 432-33 (1978). Depending on when the
issue is raised, the evidence evaluated may be limited to the prosecution's evidence or it
may include all of the evidence. See, Commonwealth v. Kelley, infra note 29.
2l. See supra note 16. This power was formerly exercised only by the supreme
judicial court.
22. Id.
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in view of the prosecution's evidence. Other similar issues such as
variances between the charge and the evidence or the adequacy of
the prosecution's efforts to "connect up" evidence admitted de bene
may have to be resolved as a preliminary step to determining the
sufficiency of the evidence. Disputes may surface over the proper
definition of statutory terms. The injection of "affirmative defenses"
through pleadings or evidence may lead to disputes about which is
sues the defendant is entitled to challenge on sufficiency grounds.
The prosecution's partial or complete reliance on presumptions or
inferences to satisfy its burden of production may raise thorny dis
putes on constitutional due process issues. 23
In this section each of these issues is mentioned in the sequence
in which it is likely to arise: preliminary "clean up" issues, definition
of statutory terms, allocation of the burden of production and identi
fication of the issues on which the defendant is entitled to a suffi
ciency determination, and assessment of the permissible impact of
presumption. The presupposition of this scheme of organization is
that typically the judge will structure the sufficiency assessment by
first surveying the elements of the charge, then surveying the evi
dence being considered, applying the "prosecutions best case role"
and the remoteness limitation on inferences to clarify the facts, and
then applying the rational fact finder and reasonable doubt stan
dards to reach a conclusion.
The logical first step in evaluating a sufficiency claim is to sur
vey the elements of the offense charged, at least to the extent the
evidence directed to the proof of certain element is disputed. 24 It is
important for several reasons that the reference sources for this in
quiry include both the charging document-indictment or com
plaint-and statutory or case law definitions of the nominal
offense. 25
For one, the indictment must state a triable offense and estab
lish the jurisdiction of the court over the offense stated. If the indict
ment fails to allege facts constituting each essential element of the
23. The fact that these disputes will arise while the trial is in process makes it even
more important for counsel and the judge to try to identify them in advance.
24. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264
Mass. 368, 371-72, 162 N.E. 729, 731-32 (1928).
25. It is the substance of the allegations in the charging document rather than the
statutory definition of the offense it refers to that determines the charge to be tried. Com
monwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 396, 372 N.E.2d 282, 283 (1978). Generally, an
offense must be tried as charged. Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863,434 N.E.2d
633 (1982).
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offense it is subject to dismissal at any time. 26 Challenges to the ju
risdiction of the court may be founded on statutory limitations of the
court's authority to try only specified offenses27 or specified defend
ants,28 or on statute of limitations grounds. The courts are generally
in agreement that such defects in the charging document do not form
the basis for a double jeopardy bar to retrial,29 Even so, such claims
are generally best raised as early as possible to avoid subjecting the
defendant to the functional equivalent of double jeopardy in the
form of a trial which must be repeated if a valid judgment is to be
obtained.
In contrast, a directed verdict may result when the prosecution's
evidence varies materially from the offense charged in the indict
ment. 30 This possibility arises from the fact that a statute may define
more than one offense and from the fact that the drafter of a charg
ing document may allege an offense which does not suit the prosecu
tion's evidence as it develops at trial,31
Simlarly, in most cases the constitutionality of a prosecution
under a statute thought to be vague or overbroad is initially a pre
trial issue. But even where a claim that the statute is unconstitu
tional on its face fails, presentation of the case may establish grounds
for challenging the impact of the statute as applied to the
defendant.32
The motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of
the prosecution's case may also mark the occasion for reconsidera
26.

Commonwealth v. Bums, 8 Mass. App. 194, 392 N.E.2d 865 (1979).
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 26 (West 1983) (limiting jurisdiction of
district courts); see Commonwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 372 N.E.2d 782 (1978).
28. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 52-63 (West 1978) (defining jurisdic
tion of juvenile courts); see Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100, 105, 202 N.E.2d
300,303 (1964).
29. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 381 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lovett,
374 Mass. 394, 397, 372 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chase, 348 Mass. 100,
104,202 N.E.2d 300,302 (1964). But see Culberson v. Wainwright, 453 F.2d 1219, 1220
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied407 U.S. 914 (1972); Robinson v. Neil, 366 F. Supp. 924, 928
29 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
30. A variation is material when it substantively alters the grand jury's accusation
so as to prove an offense different from that alleged in the indictment (the latter em
braces, of course, lesser included offenses). Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863,
866, 434 N.E.2d 633, 635 (1983); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 381 Mass. 420, 424, 409
N.E.2d 776, 778 (1978). A variation which is not material in the sense of proving a
different offense may nevertheless be prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Ohanian, 373
Mass. 839, 841, 370 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1978). The remedy is new trial.
31. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 9 Mass. App. 813,398 N.E.2d 504 (1980). Seealso
Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978); Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1948).
32. See, e.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
27.
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tion of important contested ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
It is particularly important, of course, that the trial judge consider at
this point whether the prosecution has "connected up" all evidence
admitted de bene, such as hearsay statements of persons alleged to
have been the defendant's co-conspirators. 33 Evidence which has
not been satisfactorily connected should be stricken and not consid
ered in evaluating the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. Sim
ilarly, events following a trail judge's initial decison to admit
testimony (or following the direct examination of a witness whose
competency is not in dispute) may establish grounds for a motion to
strike testimony or evidence. 34 All such exclusionary issues should
be considered and decided before the sufficiency evaluation is made.
Other problems with the statement of the offense in the indict
ment may arise at this point either because they were overlooked by
counsel before trial, or because the prosecution's evidence revealed
the problem for the first time or brought it into sharper focus. In a
variety of situations questions may arise concerning the number of
offenses established by the prosecution's proof. A defendant charged
with participating in multiple, closely-related conspiracies should
frame a challenge to the prosecution's definition of the proper "units
of prosecution" in terms of sufficiency of the evidence. 35 One benefit
of dealing with problems of duplicity and multiplicity in indictments
at the directed verdict stage is the double jeopardy impact of the
ruling.
B.

Motions for Required Finding ofNot Guilty

Although the opportunity to move for a required finding of not
guilty does not arise until the close of the prosecution's case-in
chief,36 counsel for both parties must consider sufficiency issues and
arguments before trial. In district court trials, uniform jury instruc
33. P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 442 (5th Ed. 1980).
34. See Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981); Commonwealth v. Funches,
379 Mass. 283, 397 N.E.2d 1097 (1979).
35. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 40, 54 (1978) (judgment of acquittal
entered at close of government's evidence on indictment erroneously interpreted by trial
judge bars retrial on related charge found to have been included in multiplications
indictment).
36. Unlike some jurisdictions, Massachusetts does not permit defense counsel to
move for a required finding of not guilty on the basis of the prosecutor's opening state
ment. Commonwealth v. Brattman, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 580, 410 N.E.2d 720, 722
(1980). But see Commonwealth v. Clark, 393 Mass. 361, - N.E.2d - (1984) (sufficiency
of contemplated evidence may be assessed where affidavits or stipulations place prosecu"
tions entire case before the court). Compare Brooks v. United States, 396 A.2d 200, 206
07 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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tions provide useful guidance to the elementary issues of proof in a
caseY While uniform instructions are not available in Massachu
setts superior courts, it may be possible to determine in advance a
particular judge's standard instructions. In either court, the charging
papers identify the elements which the prosecution's evidence must
establish. 38
1.

Required Finding of Not Guilty After the Evidence on
Either Side is Closed

Rule 25(a) requires that the trial judge enter a finding of not
guilty after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence at the
time the matter is considered is insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a conviction. 39 The use of the mandatory "shall" makes the
remedy-a finding of not guilty-nondiscretionary when insuffi
ciencyappears.4o Absent a defense motion, however, the sufficiency
assessment is discretionary; the judge may, but is not required to,
consider the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte. 41
The second sentence of Rule 25(a) provides that if the defend
ant moves for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the
37. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, DEP'T. OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES TRIED IN THE DISTRICT
COURT DEPARTMENT (1980).
38. It is preferable to prepare a written motion for a required finding of not guilty
in advance and when possible to prepare a brief written memorandum in support. Some
revision of the motion may be necessary to include unanticipated evidentiary develop
ments in the prosecution's case-in-chief; the judge may be willing to grant a mid-day or
overnight continuance to permit counsel to present more exact claims. See Common
wealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 597, 266 N.E.2d 314, 317 (1971) (supreme judicial
court refused to consider on appeal an insufficiency theory not presented to the trial
court). The motion should be presented at the close of the prosecution's evidence, at the
close of the defendant's evidence, and at the close of the prosecution's rebuttal, if any.
The motion should be renewed post-trial if it has been reserved and then denied. See
supra note 16.
The defendant's right to present evidence is not compromised by a motion for a
required finding of not guilty, so there is nothing to be lost in making an unsuccessful
motion. Moreover, so long as it is made before a guilty verdict is returned, a finding of
not guilty bars both appellate review and retrial on double jeopardy principles. See
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,575-76 (1977) (directed verdict
after jury deadlocked and mistrial declared barred appeal and retrial).
39. See supra note 16.
40. In Commonwealth v. Cote, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 238-42, 444 N.E.2d 1282,
1288-90, appeal denied, 388 Mass. 1104,448 N.E.2d 766 (1983), the appeals court ruled
that this provision does not abridge the trial judge's discretion to permit the prosecution
to reopen its case to cure insufficiency. See also Commonwealth v. Ierardi, 17 Mass.
App. Ct. 297, 303, 457 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (1983), appeal denied, 391 Mass. 1102, 459
N.E.2d 826 (1984).
41. See supra note 16.
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Commonwealth's evidence, it shall be ruled upon at that time. 42
42. Id. In Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), the
defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the prosecution's
case. The trial judge allowed the motion as to the charge of first degree murder, took the
balance of the motion under advisement and then denied it "during the course of trial."
Id. at 315, 431 N.E.2d at 916. This procedure was improper, but the supreme judicial
court merely described it without comment, possibly because the defendant did not make
a claim of error on appeal on this point. The plain language of the rule requires a ruling
on the entire motion before the trial may proceed. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a); see supra
note 16. This requirement had earlier been imposed by the supreme judicial court in
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368, 370 n.1 (1976). The
Reporter's Notes to the rule state that the rule adopted the Kelley requirement. MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 25 Reporter's Notes; see also Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 407 n.4,
348 N.E.2d 794, 798 n.4 (1976).
The court in Kelley suggested that "as a practical matter it makes no difference. . .
whether the defendant's rights are assessed at the earlier time when he filed his motions
or the later time [at the close of all the evidence) since the Commonwealth's position as to
proof clearly did not improve with the presentation of the defendant's case." 370 Mass.
at 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.l. There are two serious objections to accepting this
approach as a general practice. First, it ignores a basic due process right guaranteed the
defendant. Through the operation of the presumption of innocence and the burden of
production imposed on the prosecution by that presumption, the defendant is protected
from being required to make a defense until the prosecution has met its burden to pro
duce evidence sufficient to convict him. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12
(1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Second, as a
practical matter it is not generally true that the Commonwealth's position as to proof will
not improve during the defendant's case. See Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401,
408,348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976) (testimony of the defense witnesses provided compelling
support to the prosecution's case.). Nor can the trial judge reasonably expect to be able
to accurately determine, without the aid of a verbatim transcript, whether the defense
evidence enhanced the Commonwealth's case. The trial judge is simply not in the posi
tion to make this assessment the wayan appellate court can. The requirement of the
rules that the sufficiency determination be made before further proceedings are held
should be scrupulously followed.
The appeals court has taken the view that the "no-reservation" provision of Rule
25(a) does not abridge the trial judge's discretion to permit the prosecution to reopen its
case and introduce evidence needed to meet its burden of production where inadvertence
or "some other compelling circumstances" justify the reopening, and the defendant will
not suffer substantial prejudice. Commonwealth v. Cote, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 241-43,
444 N.E.2d 1282, 1290-91 (1983). The trial judge had not ruled on the defendant's mo
tion. The court found that the prosecution's mistake of law that the defendant had the
burden of production on the elemental issue in question (nonconsent) justified the re
opening and that the defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy, presumably
because the motion had not been granted. Id. at 241, 444 N.E.2d at 1290. It was error,
the court found, to require the defendant to present.his defense before the prosecution
completed its case and the defendant's motion was ruled. The error was considered
harmless because the defendant defended on a claim of ignorance rather than consent.
Id. at 243 n.ll, 444 N.E.2d at 1291 n.ll. The best procedure, the court advised, is to
require the prosecution to complete its case, rule on the motion and then permit the
defendant to go forward. Id. The appeals court eroded the protections of Rule 25(a) and
the presumption of innocence further in Commonwealth v. Ierardi, 17 Mass. App. Ct.
297,303,457 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (1983) where it ruled that the trial judge acted permissi
bly in permitting the prosecution to reopen its case after having rested without offering
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This second sentence renders explicit what the "reservation of deci
sion" provisions in other jurisdictions merely imply.43 When no de
fense motion is made at this juncture, Rule 25(b)(I) authorizes the
judge to reserve ruling on the sufficiency issue and submit the case to
the jury.44 In contrast, because it must be ruled upon before the trial
can proceed, the defense motion made at this point invokes a "no
reservation" rule which secures important, practical, and constitu
tionally guaranteed interests of the defendant. The defendant's
practical interest is in taking advantage of bringing the proceedings
to a final conclusion without being required to defend the charges or
run the risk of conviction that attends the submission of the case to
the jury. The constitutional protection of these interests is derived
from established due process and double jeopardy principles.
In Jackson v. Virginia,45 the Supreme Court held that a defend
ant is protected by due process principles from being convicted ex
cept upon evidence that persuades a jury that each element of the
crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 It is the
trial judge's duty to insure that, as far as possible, this burden and
standard of proof are "given concrete substance."47 The Court's
view of the "concrete substance" of the Winship principle is essen
tially that developed by Professor J. Thayer in his Preliminary Trea
tise on Evidence. 48 Professor Thayer reasoned that the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt formula was a com
pound of the presumption of innocence and a standard of persuasion
which together emphasize the weight of evidence and strength of
persuasion necessary to make out proof in a criminal case:
[T]he rule includes two things: First, the presumption; and sec
ond, a supplementary proposition as to the weight of evidence
which is required to overcome it; the whole doctrine when drawn
out being, first, that a person who is charged with crime must be
proved guilty; that, according to the ordinary rule of procedure
evidence on an essential element. The defendant had moved under Rule 25(a) and the
judge had allowed the motion (the opinion does not say whether a finding of not guilty
had been entered). The appeals court ruled that the defendant's double jeopardy rights
were not violated. Id at 303, 457 N.E.2d at 1131.
43. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); UNIFORM R. CRIM. P. 522 (1975). Contra
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 4.5(6) comment at 108-09 (Approved
Draft 1968) (generally the same as the reservation of decision provisions).
44. See supra note 16.
45. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
46. Idat319.
47. Id at 315.
48. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW, 551-76 app. (1898).
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and of legal reasoning, presumiturpro reo, i.e., neganti, so that the
accused stands innocent until he is proved guilty; and, second, that
this proof of guilt must displace all reasonable doubt. 49

The Winship formula thus expresses both a rule of procedure and a
standard of persuasion for overcoming the presumption of
mnocence.
A necessary corollary to Winship is that the prosecution is not
entitled to have its case decided by a jury; it must earn its audience
with that body by producing evidence sufficient to overcome the pre
sumption of innocence. 50 The constitutional office of the judge in
determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is to insure
that a case is not submitted to the jury if the evidence cannot meet
the Winship standard. 51 Thus, one of the due process rights accorded
an accused by the presumption of innocence is the right not to de
fend unless the prosecution has presented a prima fade case. This
right was articulated in Taylor v. Kentucky.52
It is now generally recognized that the "presumption of inno
cence" is an inaccurate, shorthand description of the right of the
accused to "remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has
taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persua
sion; i.e., to say in this case, as in any other, that the opponent of a
claim or charge is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another
form that the proponent of the claim or charge must evidence
it."53

In short, the presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to
produce evidence sufficient to establish the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 54 Until this has been done-that is, until the pros
ecution has presented a primafade case-the defendant may not be
required to defend.
The initial assessment of sufficiency may result in a finding of
49. Id. at 558.
50. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1978); if. Curley v. United States,
160 F.2d 229, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
51. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-18; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,68 (1965).
52. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
53. Id. at 484 n.12 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1940». See a/so,
Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 321 n.2, - N.E.2d - n.2 (1984) (The purpose
of the rule is to protect a defendant's right to insist that the Commonwealth prove every
element of the crime charged before he decides to rest.)
54. J. THAYER, supra note 9, at 560-63; see a/so Commonwealth v. Madieros, 255
Mass. 304, 315-16,151 N.E. 297, 300 (1926). For a definition of the term "prima facie"
case and a discussion ·of the prosecution's burden of persuasion, see Commonwealth v.
Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 331 N.E.2d 901 (1975).
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not guilty on all or part of the charge. While such a finding is not
appealable by the prosecution,55 the defendant may appeal a deci
sion to permit further proceedings on the remaining charge if the
trial results in a conviction. 56 Before making the motion for a re
quired finding of not guilty, the defendant need not reserve the right
to present a defense and the evidence presented by the defendant
may not be considered by an appellate court reviewing the correct
ness of the initial sufficiency ruling. 57 In short, the defendant's right
to an acquittal if the evidence at this point is insufficient as a matter
of law is fixed and the defendant's position on this issue cannot dete
riorate thereafter, even on appeal.
The defendant's right to some of these considerable benefits of
Rule 25(a) may depend upon defense counsel's having made a
timely motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the
prosecution's case. While such a motion may be filed later, the judge
need not rule upon it before submitting the case to the jury; when the
ruling is made, it will be on the state of the evidence at the time the
motion was made. 58 If a ruling favorable to the defendant is made
before a verdict is returned it is not appealable; if a verdict preceeds
the ruling, the prosecution may appeal,59 Thus, the failure to move
at the close of the prosecution's case deprives the defendant of the
valuable right to have sufficiency determined at that time on the
prosecution's evidence alone thereby possibly bringing the matter to
a final close. 60 Defense counsel, therefore, should file a written mo
55. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
56. See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50 & n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368,
370 & n.1 (1976); Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 407 n.4, 348 N.E.2d 794, 798
n.4 (1976).
57. See cases cited supra note 50.
58. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50 & n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368, 370 &
n.1 (1976).
59. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(c)(I); see Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 543,
535,420 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (1981); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1977).
60. The failure to make this motion would almost certainly constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel if the evidence at that point was in fact insufficient, particularly if
the shortcoming was subsequently cured. But see Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass.
283, 296-97, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979) (counsel's failure to appeal denial of motion
for directed verdict created substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where prose
cution's evidence was insufficient; defendant therefore entitled to acquittal). Compare
Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,7, 10,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1103, 1104 (1980) (appel
late counsel raised sufficiency issue as weight of the evidence issue by appealing denial of
motion for new trial rather than denial of motion for directed verdict; court intimated
that evidence was insufficient, granted new trial rather than acquittal); Commonwealth v.
DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 596-97, 266 N.E.2d 315, 316-17 (1971) (court will not address
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tion for a required finding of not guilty as provided in Rule 25(a) in
every case in which a serious claim of insufficiency can be made re
garding any issue that the prosecution must prove to convict.
2.

Required Finding of Not Guilty at the Close of All the
Evidence

Depending upon whether the defendant presents evidence and
if so, whether the prosecution presents rebuttal evidence, the "close
of all the evidence" may arrive at any time after the prosecution's
case-in-chief has been completed. The sufficiency of the evidence
may be raised at this point by the judge sua sponte or on the defend
ant's motion, whether or not the issue was raised or considered at the
close of the prosecution's evidence. At this juncture, the judge may
rule immediately or, in his or her discretion, reserve ruling and sub
mit the case to the jury. The judge may rule on the reserved motion
at virtually any time thereafter before the jury returns a verdict, after
it is discharged without returning a verdict or after it returns a guilty
verdict.
In providing that the judge "on his own motion shall enter a
finding of not guilty. . . after the evidence on either side is closed if
the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law," Rule 25(a) suggests
that the judge should make the determination again at the close of
the defendant's case whether or not the defendant requests it. 61 The
defendant is entitled to move for a required finding of not guilty
after presenting his or her evidence even if no motion was made at
the close of the prosecution's case. 62 Without addressing the point
directly, the rule also suggests that the judge's ruling upon a defend
ant's motion for a required finding of not guilty, made at the close of
the defendant's evidence, may be reserved and the case submitted to
the jury.63 This suggestion arises from the fact that in many cases a
motion made at this point constitutes a motion at the close of all the
evidence. Rule 25(b)(1) expressly permits the judge to reserve ruling
on such amotion. 64
theory of insufficiency on appeal which differs from theory of insufficiency asserted in
trial court).
61. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). The judge's obligation to insure that a case is not
presented to a jury on insufficient evidence rests on a responsibility that serves a greater
purpose than the protection of an individual defendant's rights; it is an indispensible
component of a fair trial in the adversary system of adjudication. See Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 316.
62. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
63. See id
64. Id 25(c)(l); see supra note 16.
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The defendant's position is usually weakened in several respects
at the close of all the evidence. Because the standard applied to the
judgment remains the same as applied at the close of the prosecu
tion's case, the judge will view all the evidence in terms most
favorable to the prosecution. If a sufficiency judgment was made at
the close of the prosecution's case, the defendant's position cannot
deteriorate in the eyes of the judge; that is, an incorrect ruling cannot
be cured by virtue of the fact that the defendant's evidence may have
filled in gaps in the prosecution's case. 65 If a sufficiency judgment
was not made at the close of the prosecution's case, the sufficiency
judgment at the close of all the evidence will be made upon the view
of all the evidence and the defendant's evidence may have strength
ened the prosecution's case so as to meet the sufficiency standard. 66
Thus, the defendant whose counsel delays moving for a required
finding of not guilty until all the evidence is closed loses the valuable
right to have a sufficiency determination made on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence alone and foregoes the opportunity to avoid
having to present a defense to the charge being tried.
A second major danger to the defendant at this stage arises
when the trial judge reserves ruling on the sufficiency motion and
submits the case to the jury. The defendant loses a measure of
double jeopardy protection because the prosecution may appeal a
favorable sufficiency ruling made after the jury's guilty verdict. 67 If
a motion for a required finding of not guilty is granted before a jury
verdict, the prosecution cannot appea1. 68 By foregoing the right to
65. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149-50,346 N.E.2d 368, 370 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976). This principle
is, obviously, one governing appellate review since it describes a situation unlikely to
occur at trial. But see Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 77-78 (1978); Common
wealth v. Corridori, II Mass. App. Ct. 469, 470-71, 417 N.E.2d 969, 970-71 (1981).
66. See Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976).
The prosecution's case may, at least in theory, have deteriorated since it closed its case,
and the court should determine whether that has occurred. Commonwealth v. Basch,
386 Mass. 620, 622 n.2, 437 N.E.2d 200, 203 n.2 (1982); Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375
Mass. 73, 83, 375 N.E.2d 693,700 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150
n.l, 346 N.E.2d 368,370 n.1 (1976). This might occur where the defendant has effectively
injected an affirmative defense other than lack of criminal responsibility into the case
and the prosecution has not countered with sufficient rebuttal evidence to disprove the
issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
67. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)(I); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53
(1975); Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 531, 420 N.E.2d 897, 898 (1981). If
the appellate court disagrees with the trial judge it can reinstate the guilty verdict. Ther
rien, 383 Mass. at 532, 420 N.E.2d at 899.
68. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, II (1978); see Commonwealth v. Therrien,
383 Mass. 529, 535-36, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1981); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass.
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move for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the prosecu
tion's case, then, a defendant may have lost the opportunity to obtain
an acquittal from the trial judge that is final.
The question of what factors should guide the judge's discre
tionary decision to reserve ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence at
the close of all the evidence involves several important considera
tions. Because the question is, in effect, whether to submit the case
to the jury, the decision ought to be carefully weighed. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court have suggested that it is preferable to reserve ruling and
submit the case to the jury when the question of sufficiency appears
close. 69 If the jury acquits, the issue is moot. If there is a conviction,
the judge may allow the motion without depriving the prosecution of
an opportunity to appea1.7° The principal flaw in this approach is
the risk it creates that the protective functions of the sufficiency de
termination will be defeated or diluted. The defendant's interest in
the pre-verdict sufficiency determination includes finality, which is
secured by the double jeopardy prohibition. Where the defendant
has been unable to secure a Rule 25(a) determination because of the
operation of a proof-facilitating device,71 the practice of reserving
the ruling on the motion may deprive the defendant of the opportu
nity to secure a pre-verdict sufficiency determination. 72 Finally, the
pre-verdict determination conserves judicial resources by insuring
that unwarranted prosecutions are terminated as early as possible.
The judge should consider these factors when deciding whether to
reserve ruling on a motion made at the close of all the evidence.
If the trial judge does reserve ruling on the motion as provided
for in Rule 25(b)(l), the finality of a ruling favorable to the defend
ant will probably depend in large part upon precisely when it is
made, although the law on this point is not settled. At any time
before a jury verdict is returned, entry of a required finding of not
(5 Gray) 185,207-08 (1855); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 212, 214
(1849); see also Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,69 (1978); Fong Foo v. United

States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1961).
69. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ther
rien, 383 Mass. 529, 531, 420 N.E.2d 897, 898 (1981).
70. See cases cited supra notes 55-56.
71. See infra notes 178-220 and accompanying text.
72. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(I); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 149
51,346 N.E.2d 368, 370-71 (1976). The "no-reservation" policy emphasizes and secures
the importance of this opportunity.
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guilty is final and not reviewable on appeaP3 If the jury is dis
charged without having returned a verdict, the judge is empowered
nevertheless to enter a required finding of not guilty. This ruling,
too, is an unreviewable acquittaP4 After the jury returns a guilty
verdict, the judge still, pursuant to Rule 25(b)(l), may enter a re
quired finding of not guilty on the basis of the insufficiency of the
evidence. 75 Defense counsel should be sure to secure an express rul
ing on a reserved motion, if possible before a verdict is returned, but
at least before judgment is entered because this ruling will be
appealable. 76
If a motion based on insufficiency is made and denied at the
close of all the evidence, and the case is submitted to the jury, the
motion may be renewed within five days after the jury is discharged
and may include an alternative motion for a new trial. 77 This is the
equivalent of a request for a judgment non obstante verdicto and the
ruling upon it is not precisely the same as a ruling on a reserved
motion. Read literally, the first sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) does not
authorize the renewal of a reserved motion nor does it authorize the
alternative relief of a new trial to a defendant whose reserved motion
has been denied. 78 The trial judge's ruling on a reserved motion con
73. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); Common
wealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 535-36, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1981).
74. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977).
75. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(I); see supra note 16. This ruling is distinct from one
made pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2). See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
76. Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 531,420 N.E.2d 897,898 (1981).
77. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2).
78. ld.; see supra note 16. That is not to say that the courts will interpret Rule 25 so
literally. In Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), the judge
had reserved and then denied the defendant's Rule 25(b)(1) motion made at the close of
all the evidence. The defendant later moved pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2) for a required
finding of not guilty and pursuant to Rule 30(b) for a new trial. Still later he moved
pursuant to Rule 25(b)(2) for a new trial and a reduced verdict. The supreme judicial
court in its opinion drew a clear distinction between Rule 25(b)(I) and 25(b)(2) (first
sentence) motions on one hand and 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motions on the other.
Although the point was not discussed, the court appeared to take the view that Rule
25(b)(l) relief was available to the defendant. ld. at 317-18, 431 N.E.2d at 917. The
court's view of Rules 30(b) and 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motions for new trial narrows
the importance of this distinction to the continued availability of "sufficiency" relief
where the Rule 25(b)(1) motion has been reserved and denied after the jury is dis
charged, as in Keough. If no verdict was returned and a mistrial was declared, the judge
acting under 25(b)(2) (first sentence) can enter an unreviewable finding of not guilty. See
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977). The second sen
tence does not authorize this form of relief regardless of whether a verdict was entered.
A defendant whose motion is reserved and denied after a mistrial is declared cannot
renew it under the first sentence of 25(b)(2) and so can obtain no further trial court
review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
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stitutes the last occasion authorized by Rule 25 for considering the
sujJiciency of the Commonwealth's case. If the defendant's motion at
the close of all the evidence is denied rather than reserved, Rule
25(b )(2) allows the motion to be renewed, thus affording the defend
ant one further opportunity to contest the sufficiency issue. 79
In some cases, the grounds for asserting the insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence may crystallize for the first time after the jury
has been instructed. This occurred in Commonwealth v. Sherry,80 a
case in which three co-defendants were each charged with three
counts of rape. The Commonwealth submitted evidence sufficient to
show that each had raped the victim once and that each rape was
accomplished with the aid of the other two defendants. The prose
cution did not request, and the trial judge did not give, instructions
regarding the liability of accessories before the fact, so the verdicts
convicting each defendant of three charges could not stand on this
ground. 81 Arguably, each of the defendants could have moved for
required findings of not guilty on two of the rape indictments against
him after the instructions had been given, but the remedy of required
findings of not guilty was not available until after the verdicts had
been returned. 82
3.

Appellate Review

A convicted defendant's right to appellate review of an insuffi
ciency claim is dependent upon having properly presented the issue
to the trialjudge. 83 The defendant who has moved at the close of the
prosecution's case is entitled to appellate review of that evidence
standing alone. 84 The sufficiency ruling is reviewed as one that is a
question of law and thus, in effect, is reviewed de novo. The failure
79. The defendant may also request a new trial. The supreme judicial court sug
gests this be sought by separate motion. Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 317,
431 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1982).
80. 386 Mass. 682, 699-700, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234 (1982).
81. ld at 700 n.9, 437 N.E.2d at 234 n.9.
82. ld Until that time, supplemental instructions could have remedied the
problem.
83. Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 597, 266 N.E.2d 314, 316-17
(1971) (supreme judicial court refused to consider a theory of insufficiency not presented
to trial judge, although general claim of insufficiency had been presented). The defend
ant need not have refiled or renewed the motion at any later point in the trial. Common
wealth v. DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 725, 297 N.E.2d 496, 501-02 (1973); 30A MASS.
PRACTICE § 1916 (K. Smith 2d ed. 1983).
84. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 676, 677-78, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374
(1979). The same standard of sufficiency is applied at trial and on appeal. Common
wealth v. Nickerson, 388 Mass. 246, 251-52,446 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1983).
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to raise the issue at trial constitutes a procedural default that de
prives the defendant of appellate review under this standard as a
matter of right. Notice will be taken of the claim, either by collateral
attack or on direct appeal, only if necessary to prevent "a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice."85 The supreme judicial court has
not been consistent in the form of relief granted under the "miscar
riage ofjustice" standard: It ordered an acquittal on direct review in
one case 86 and a new trial on collateral review in another. 87
From 1974 through 1980, the supreme judicial court made its
sufficiency review on the state of the evidence as it would have been
had the trial judge correctly ruled on the evidentiary issues raised by
the defendant. 88 That is, if the court concluded that the trial court
had incorrectly admitted prosecution evidence, the appellate court
disregarded that evidence in reviewing the sufficiency of the evi
dence. 89 If the court concluded the trial court had incorrectly admit
ted prosecution evidence, it disregarded that evidence in reviewing
the trial judge's sufficiency determination. 90 In 1981, the court began
modifying that approach to permit retrial if the court found the evi
dence insufficient by virtue of an appellate evidentiary ruling, unless
it found that the prosecution would be unable to present sufficient
admissible evidence if afforded another tria1. 91
C.

Relieffrom Unjust Verdicts

The remaining provisions of Rule 25 empower the trial judge to
exercise an authority which, until the enactment of the rules, had
been reserved to the supreme judicial court as part of its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review convictions in first degree murder
cases.92 Under the rules, if the jury returns a guilty verdict, the trial
85. Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1,2,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (1980) (ap
pellate review of motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 294
n.14, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 n.14 (1979) (direct appeal); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352
Mass. 556, 564, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1967).
86. Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 297, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979).
87. Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 11,413 N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (1980).
88. Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 296-97 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 410-11, 318 N.E.2d 895, 901 (1974). The
Supreme Court has reserved ruling on whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires this
approach. Green v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 26 (1978).
.
89. See cases cited supra note 88.
90. Id
91. Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 608-09, 451 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1983)
(retrial permitted).
92. Between 1962 and 1979 the supreme judicial court exercised exclusive appel
late jurisdiction over all cases in which the indictment charged first degree murder. In
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judge is empowered to set the verdict aside on motion and to grant
anyone of three forms of relief: a new trial; an acquittal (finding of
not guilty); or a finding of guilty of "any offense included in the
offense charged in the indictment or complaint."93 The defendant
need not have made any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
as a prerequisite to seeking the relief.94 In Commonwealth v.
Gaulden9 5 and two subsequent cases,96 the supreme judicial court
commented briefly upon the scope of two aspects of this unusual re
medial power of the trial courts, the manner in which it should be
invoked by defendants and exercised by trial judges, and the nature
of the appellate review to be conducted of decisions made in reliance
on it. 97
In Gaulden and Commonwealth v. Keough98 the trial judges had
reduced the juries' second degree murder verdicts to manslaughter
and resentenced the defendants. 99 The prosecution's evidence in
each case was determined to have been sufficient to support the
jury's verdict. lOo In Gaulden, the prosecution argued that because
the evidence was sufficient, the trial judge could do no more than
grant a new trial. The prosecution's procedural argument was that
because the rule tied the judge's post-verdict powers to an initial mo
1979 the legislature restricted the scope of this jurisdiction to convictions for first degree
murder. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981); Commonwealth v.
Davis, 380 Mass. I, 12-13,401 N.E.2d 811, 818-19 (1980).
93. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) (second sentence); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 11 (West 1981).
94. See Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 552, 420 N.E.2d 905, 911 n.6
(1981). BUI see Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 687, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234
(1982).
95. 383 Mass. 543, 420 N.E.2d 905 (1981).
96. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682,437 N.E.2d 234 (1982); Common
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 431 N.E.2d 915 (1982).
97. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13; Commonwealth v.
Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 316-21, 431 N.E.2d 915,917-20 (1982).
98. 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982).
99. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 544, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Keough, 385 Mass. at 316, 431
N.E.2d at 917.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (West 1970), mandates the imposition of a life
sentence on one convicted of second degree murder. The convict is eligible for parole
after serving 15 years of this sentence. fd ch. 127, § 133A (West 1974 & Supp. 1983
1984). Section 13 authorizes a sentence of 20 years for a manslaughter conviction. fd
ch. 265, § 13 (West 1970). Generally, the convict so sentenced will be eligible for parole
after serving two-thirds of this sentence. fd ch. 127, § 133 (West Supp. 1983-1984). The
Parole Board occasionally exercises its discretion to grant parole after one-third or more
of the sentence has been served. See MASS. BD. OF PAROLE POLICY, PROCEDURES AND
GUIDELINES 10-14 (1978).
100. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 544, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Keough, 385 Mass. at 319, 431
N.E.2d at 919.
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tion for a required finding of not guilty, a reduced verdict could be
ordered only when the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict. 101 The court rejected both the argument and its procedural
premise. 102 Conceding that Massachusetts General Laws ch. 278,
§ II could be read to support the prosecution argument, the court
distinguished the authority granted to the trial court in the first sen
tence of Rule 25(b)(2) from that authority granted in the second sen
tence. The former, to the court, was invoked by a renewed motion
for a required finding of not guilty but the latter-the power to set
the verdict aside-was not. 103
Drawing upon the Reporter's Notes to Rule 25 and the legisla
ture's modification of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 278 § 33E,
the court found that the 1979 rule and statutory revisions had ef
fected a significant redistribution of authority to grant post-convic
tion relief from a jury's verdict from the supreme judicial court to
the trial judges. 104 Section 33E had previously authorized the
supreme judicial court to conduct a plenary review of the justice of
jury verdicts in cases tried on first degree murder indictments result
ing in either first or second degree verdicts. This authority was nar
rowed by the 1979 amendment which made the review applicable
only where first degree murder verdicts were returned. lOS Rule
25(b)(2) (second sentence) authorized trial judges to exercise a simi
lar power to enter a finding of guilty on any lesser included offense
in all cases. 106 The supreme judicial court has exercised its section
33E authority in cases in which the evidence was sufficient to support
the verdict, when the court concluded that justice required the entry
of a lesser verdict. 107 The trial judge is to exercise the Rule 25(b)(2)
(second sentence) authority to reduce a verdict similarly and so is
101.

Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 552, 420 N.E.2d at 910-11.
Id. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 553-54, 420 N.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
107. Both the reporter's notes and the court's discussion in Gaulden indicate that
this grant of authority to trial judges is to be exercised both in the interest of distributive
justice for individual defendants and the interest of judicial economy. See MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 25 reporters notes at 503; Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13.
In granting relief where the evidence is not legally sufficient, a judge will avoid the need
for a new trial. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55 n.8, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.8. In granting a
reduced verdict where the evidence is sufficient, an appeal of the conviction may be
avoided, although it is clear that such an appeal is still possible. The existence of this
authority also opens up post-trial plea bargaining possibilities. See id. at 552 n.5, 420
N.E.2d at 910 n.5.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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free to grant relief under this provision even when the evidence is
legally sufficient. los
Some of the discussion in Gaulden regarding the trial judges'
new powers suggests that these new powers might be exercised a lit
tle more liberally than the supreme judicial court has exercised its
section 33E authority to modify verdicts. 109 Because it considers the
weight rather than sufficiency of the evidence, the supreme judicial
court has not been bound by the formal strictures that govern the
sufficiency determination-the rational factfinder and the prosecu
tion's best case rules. The trial court, in exercising its relief-from
verdict powers, also considers the weight of the evidence and is free
to make credibility judgments based upon its opportunity to hear
and observe the witnesses. The supreme judicial court's ability to
determine credibility is limited because its review is upon a written
record. Institutional constraints aside, the trial judge considering a
motion for relief from a verdict is in as good a position to judge
credibility, weigh evidence and draw inferences as is the jury.110 In
exercising this power the trial judge should have in mind the dual
objectives of individual justice and uniformity of treatment for simi
larly blameworthy conduct. 111
The appellate court's role in this scheme is to regulate the trial
court's exercise of discretion in the interest of uniformity. In
Gaulden, the court ruled that the Commonwealth could appeal an
order granting a verdict reduction, commenting only that it per
ceived no distinction between such an appeal and the prosecutorial
appeal of a trial judge's order to enter a required finding of not
guilty on a reserved motion under Rule 25(b)(1).1l2 The court stated
explicitly that it would not engage in a de novo review of a request
for a verdict reduction but would consider only whether the trial
court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. ll3 To facil
108. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 553, 420 N.E.2d at 911.
109. See id at 553-54, 420 N.E.2d at 913.
110. See id
Ill. Id at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 913.
112. Id at 550, 420 N.E.2d at 909. In Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529,
420 N.E.2d 897 (1981), the court ruled that such an appeal did not violate double jeop
ardy principles. Id at 531-32, 420 N.E.2d at 898 (relying on United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975); and Jenkins v. United States, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975».
113. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 557, 420 N.E.2d at 913. The standard of review for
abuse of discretion is whether a conscientious judge could reasonably have acted as the
judge whose ruling is being reviewed acted. The court affirmed the trial judge's action in
Gaulden, stating "we accept the reasonableness of the judge's decision to order the entry
of a finding of guilty of manslaughter." Id at 558, 420 N.E.2d at 914.
Review ofthe trial judge's decision on a Rule 25(b)(2) reduction of verdict motion is
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itate this review, the trial judge must state the reasons for his or her
action in terms consistent with the supreme judicial court's exercise
of its section 33E powers.
II.

THE LEGAL STANDARD OF SUFFICIENCY

A premise of the Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson v. Vir
ginia l14 is that the Winship principle and the presumption of inno
cence cannot be adequately enforced through jury instructions
alone. 115 The Constitution imposes the further duty upon the trial
judge to assess the prosecution's evidence to insure that it is sufficient
to establish "the essential elements of the crime" beyond a reason
able doubt. I 16 The task of identifying the "essential elements" of the
crime charged is the task of identifying the factual issues. The pre
sumption of innocence requires the prosecution to satisfy a burden
of production or suffer a required finding of not guilty on such is
sues. The logical first step in the sufficiency assessment, then, is to
identify the "essential elements" of the crime charged. Within broad
due process limits, the power to define crimes is reserved to the
states. This includes the power to eliminate issues relevant to guilt
from the definition of the offense, designate them as "affirmative"
defenses, and assign to the defendant the burden of production and/
or the burden of persuasion on them. ll7 In Massachusetts, the bur
dens of production and persuasion on "affirmative" defenses are
commonly divided between the parties, with the burden of produc
tion assigned to the defendant and the burden of persuasion assigned
to the prosecution, regardless of whether the claim contests an essen
tial element of the crime charged. I 18 Because the burden of persua
distinct from the supreme judicial court's obligation under section 33E to review a mur
der conviction under that statute. The trial judge's decision to reduce such a verdict, if
affirmed on appeal, removes the case from the supreme judicial court's section 33E re
view. Id at 558 n.ll, 420 N.E.2d at 914 n.ll. If the trial judge denied relief; that ruling
would likewise be reviewed for an abuse of discretion in all cases. If the case was also
subject to section 33E review, the supreme judicial court would independently determine
whether to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial. Id at 557 n.lO, 420 N.E.2d at 913
n.lO.
114. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
1\5. See id at 318. An excellent presumption of innocence jury instruction is
found in Commonwealth v. Drayton, 386 Mass. 39,45-47,434 N.E.2d 997, 1003 (1983).
116. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
117. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977).
118. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-89, 352 N.E.2d
203,205-06 (1976) (defendant has burden of producing sufficient evidence to put claim of
self-defense in issue; prosecution then has burden of disproving self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt because claim of self-defense contests essential element of unlawfulness
of killing); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406-09, 361 N.E.2d \308, 1311-13
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sion remains with the prosecution on all defense claims, there are,
properly speaking, no "affirmative" defenses in Massachusetts. 119
The impact upon the defendant's due process protections of as
signing the burden of production to him or her is, however, function
ally similar to that of an affirmative defense. Accordingly, because
the constitutionality of assigning the burden of production to the de
fendant depends upon whether the issue could be treated legiti
mately as an affirmative defense, the due process limitations on this
practice will be addressed in both contexts. First, however, it is nec
essary to establish how, under state law, the essential elements of a
crime are identified.
A.

Jdenttfying the Essential Elements

of the

Crime Charged

Under Massachusetts law, the essential elements of the crime
consist of "every material fact or ingredient, which the law requires
in order to constitute the offense."120 Ordinarily the task of indenti
fying these essential elements is relatively simple. From the applica
ble statute, as modified by judicial interpretation, one identifies the
conduct (act or omission, together with mens rea, if any), attendant
circumstances or result of such conduct that is described in the defi
nition of the offense, or which negates an excuse or justification for
the forbidden conduct; or negates a statute of limitations defense; or
establishes jurisdiction. l2l However, case law and statute may re
quire different treatment of some defensive issues which could other
wise be considered elemental.
For example, Massachusets General Laws chapter 278, section 7
provides:
A defendant in a criminal prosecution, relying upon a license, ap
pointment, admission to practice as an attorney at law, shall prove
the same; and, until so proved, the presumption shall be that he is
(1977) (claim of license to carry firearm is an affirmative defense and absent sufficient
evidence of possession of license by defendant, neither prosecution nor jury need address
issue; once issue of license raised by evidence, prosecution must prove absence of license
beyond reasonable doubt even though absence of license is not an essential element of
the crime).
119. An affirmative defense is an issue upon which the defendant bears the burden
of persuasion. The Model Penal Code endorses the Massachusetts practice of defining as
affirmative defenses those issues on which the defendant has the burden of production
and the prosecution the burden of persuasion. Allen, supra note 7, at 27; W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 152 (1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2)(3) (Proposed Offi
cial Draft 1962).
120. Commonwealth v. McKie, 67 Mass. (l Gray) 61, 62 (1854).
121. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980).
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not so authorized. 122

The effect of this statute must be independently accounted for be
cause it may work to change what appears to be an element of an
offense into an affirmative defense. 123 For example in Common
wealth v. Jones,124 the supreme judicial court affirmed its earlier
holding that the absence of a license was not an element of the of
fense of unlawfully carrying a firearm, despite the terms of the stat
ute which provided for the punishment of one who "except as
provided by law, carries on his person ... a firearm ..." or coming
within the scope of exempted persons or uses.t25 Under the Model
Penal Code approach, the possession of a license is a justification for
the otherwise prohibited conduct of knowingly carrying a firearm.
Accordingly, the absence of a firearm would be an essential element
of the offense, but for the effect of chapter 278 section 7. Before
considering the due process limitations on designating as "affirma
tive defenses" such issues that are relevant to guilt or degree of guilt,
it is appropriate to consider whether-and if so, when-the burden
of producing evidence may be assigned to a defendant on a defense
claim which contests an essential element of the crime.

B.

The Presumption
Elemental Issues

of Innocence and the Burden ofProduction on

The necessity of limiting the power to shift to the defendant the
burden of production on an elemental issue was recognized by the
supreme judicial court as early as 1854, when the court ruled in
Commonwealth v. McKie 126 that the presumption of innocence, to
gether with "the form of the issue" (the use of a general denial to
join the issues in a criminal case) "necessarily imposes on the gov
ernment the burden of showing affirmatively the existence of every
material fact or ingredient, which the law requires in order to consti
tute an offense."127 The defendant in McKie was charged with as
sault and battery and defended on the ground of justification. 128
122. Id.
123. Redefinition of an offense to effect a reallocation of the burden of persuasion
on an issue was approved in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,2\0 (1977).
124. 372 Mass. 403, 361 N.E.2d 1308 (1977).
125. Id. at 405-06, 361 N.E.2d at 1310 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269,
§ \O(a) (West 1975)).
126. 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 61 (1854).
127. Id. at 62.
128. Although the adequacy of this justification was not contested in the trial
court, the supreme judicial court clearly stated that it did not constitute a recognized
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The trial judge had instructed the jury that if the prosecution had
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McKie had struck the victim,
the burden was then on McKie to prove his justification. 129 The
supreme judicial court reversed, noting that, under Massachusetts
law, "assault and battery consists in the unlawful a~d unjustified use
of force and violence upon the person of another, however slight." 130
Thus, one of the essential elements of assault and battery is the de
fendant's unjustifiable, unlawful intent and if the evidence "fails to
show the act to have been unjustifiable, or leaves the question in
doubt, the criminal act is not proved, and the party charged is enti
tled to an acquittal."131
The court's ruling on this point is simply an early application, as
a matter of state law, of the familiar Winship principle that the prose
cution bears the burden of persuasion on each essential element of
the crime.132 The court continued, however, to consider the impact
of the presumption of innocence and the burden of persuasion on the
prosecution's burden of production: so long as the contested issues
relate "solely to the original transaction constituting the alleged
criminal act, and forming part of the res gestae," the prosecution's
evidence must negate any defense which contests an essential ele
ment of the crime. 133 On a charge of assault and battery, for exam
ple, the prosecution's evidence must be sufficient to support a
conclusion that the physical contact was not accidental. 134 This evi
defense. Because the adequacy of the defense was not material to the issue raised, the
court addressed the merits anyway. Id. at 62.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 63.
131. Id.
132. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
133. McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) at 64.
134. Id. at 64.
If therefore the evidence fails to show the act to have been unjustifiable, or
leaves that question in doubt, the criminal act is not proved, and the party
charged is entitled to an acquittal. To illustrate this; it is clearly settled, that
when an injury to the person is accidental, and the party defendant is without
fault, it will not amount to an assault and battery. . . . Now in a case of this
sort, if the evidence offered by the government leaves it doubtful whether the
injury was the result of accident or design, there can be no question of the right
of the defendant to an acquittal, because it is left doubtful whether any criminal
act was committed. But can the government, in such a case, on proving simply
the injury to the person, rest their case, and call on the defendant to assume the
burden of proof and satisfy the jury that it was accidental, or else submit to a
conviction? If so, then a criminal charge can always be shown by providing
part of a transaction, and the burden of proof can be shifted upon the defend
ant, by a careful management of the case on the part of the government, so as to
withhold that part of the proof which may bear in his favor.
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dence must be presented in the case~in~chief, or the prosecution has
not satisfied its burden of production. 135 In contrast, the burden of
proof (production and persuasion) on a defensive claim, which de
pends upon proof of facts separate and independent of the alleged
criminal transaction, may be imposed on the defendant. 136
The McKie principle, that the defendant may not be required to
assume the burden of producing evidence of a defensive claim which
contests an essential element of the crime charged, is a necessary co
rollary to the Jackson requirement that the prosecution produce suf
ficient evidence to prove each essential element of the crime. As the
McKie opinion implies, imposing a burden of production upon the
defendant imposes a burden of persuasion upon him or her as
well.137 Although the standard of persuasion-the level of certainty
which the proponent must meet to satisfy the burden-is lower, the
assignment of a burden of production may be decisive on the issue
for which the burden was imposed. Imposing the burden of produc
tion upon the defendant shifts, from the prosecution to the defend
ant, the duty to present evidence and persuade the judge that that
evidence is sufficient to support a favorable decision by the jury on
Id
135.

Id
Suppose a case, where all the testimony comes from the side of the prose
cution. The defendant has a right to say that upon the proof, so introduced, no
case is made against him, because there is left in doubt one of the essential
elements of the offense charged, namely, the wrongful, unjustifiable, unlawful
intent. The same rule must apply where the evidence comes from both sides,
but relates solely to the original transaction constituting the alleged criminal
act, and forming part of the res gesta.
Id at 64.
136. Id at 65.
There may be cases, where a defendant relies on some distinct, substantive
ground of defence [sic) to a criminal charge, not necessarily connected with the
transaction on which the indictment is founded, (such as insanity, for instance,)
in which the burden of proof is shifted upon the defendant. But in cases like
the present, (and we do not intend to express an opinion beyond the precise case
before us,) where the defendant sets up no separate independent fact in answer
to a criminal charge, but confines his defence [sic) to the original transaction
charged as criminal, with its accompanying circumstances, the burden of proof
does not change, but remains upon the government to satisfy the jury that the
act was unjustifiable and unlawful.
Id
137. Imposing a burden of production on the defendant need not entail a shift in
the burden of persuasion. The practice in Massachusetts is to impose the burden of per
suasion on the prosecution even on issues which constitutionally could be left to the
defendant to prove, such as license and criminal responsibility. See Commonwealth v.
Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370
Mass. 516, 532, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976).
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that issue. On this issue, under Massachusetts procedure, the de
fendant is thereby deprived of the right to a sufficiency assessment
based solely on the prosecution's evidence, before the case is submit
ted to a jury. Consequently, the defendant is also deprived of the
opportunity to win an unappealable insufficiency ruling on that is
sue. 138 If the judge determines that the defendant has not satisfied
the burden of production on a particular issue, the judge will not
instruct the jury on that issue in effect, directing a verdict against the
defendant. The prosecution will be relieved of its constitutional duty
to disprove the claim to the jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt. 139
The practice of imposing on the defendant a burden of produc
ing evidence on a defensive issue which contests an essential element
of the crime will frequently be inconsistent with the rulings and ra
tionales of McKie and Jackson. This is, nonetheless, the current
Massachusetts practice. l40 The Supreme Court's earlier comments
on this issue are consistent with an interpretation of Jackson which
would prohibit shifting the burden of producing evidence on an ele
mental defense unless the evidence presented by the prosecution in
its case-in-chief would support a finding by the factfinder that the
issue (e.g., self-defense) has been disproved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
138. The only opportunity afforded the defendant by Rule 25 to have the suffi
ciency of the prosecution's evidence assessed standing alone is that provided at the close
of the prosecution's case under Rule 25(a). If the burden of production is on the defend
ant, the "prosecution's best case" rule will foreclose consideration of the defendant's evi
dence on that issue even if the defendant succeeded in satisfying the burden of
production through cross-examination. If the defendant satisfies the burden of produc
tion and the prosecution presents rebuttal evidence, the sufficiency issue will be deter
mined on all the evidence, but the defendant's evidence will be considered in the light
most favorable to the prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676
78, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-75 (1979).
Similarly, on the defendant's motion, the judge is required to assess the sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence at the close of its case-in-chief before the case can proceed.
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). On a motion at any later point in the process, the judge has the
discretion to reserve ruling until after the jury returns a verdict. lei. 25(b)(1). A required
finding of not guilty entered before a verdict is fin~l; such a ruling after a verdict is
appealable. Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 532-33, 420 N.E.2d 897, 899-900
(1981).
139. The foregoing analysis of the effect of shifting the burden of production to the
defendant draws heavily on Allen, supra note 7, and McNaughton, supra note 7.
140. See, e.g., Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 790-91, 400 N.E.2d 862,
865 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687-88, 352 N.E.2d 203, 205-06
(1976) (self-defense); Commonwealth v. Leaster, 362 Mass. 407, 416-17, 287 N.E.2d 122,
128 (1972) (alibi).
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The Court's dictum in Mullaney v. Wilbur l41 is not to the con
trary. The Court stated that its holding that the Winship principle
did not permit the state to shift the burden of persuasion to the de
fendant on an elemental defense was not intended to affect the com
mon practice of assigning the defendant a burden of production on
such issues. 142 The Court also acknowledged that its earlier deci
sions had established the proposition that procedural devices that
shifted the burden of production to the defendant must satisfy cer
tain procedural safeguards. 143 In one of those earlier decisions,
Barnes v. United States, 144 the Court acknowledged that the prosecu
tion must first produce sufficient evidence to establish a "rational
connection" between its evidence and the fact upon which the de
fendant would be required to produce evidence. 145 That "rational
connection" was satisfied in Barnes because the prosecution's evi
dence was sufficient to prove the issue beyond a reasonable doubt. 146
In the other early case, Turner v. United States,147 the Court re
fused to approve a shift in the burden of production to the defendant
on the elemental issue when the government's evidence at the time of
the shift was not sufficient to convict on that issue. 148
The difficulties with the suggested approach are obvious: if
the Government proves only possession and if possession is itself
insufficient evidence of either importation or knowledge, but the
statute nevertheless permits conviction where the defendant
chooses not to explain, the Government is clearly relieved of its
obligation to prove its case, unaided by the defendant, and the
defendant is made to understand that if he fails to explain he can
be convicted on less than sufficient evidence to constitute a prima
facie case. 149

Barnes and Turner teach that there is a necessary prerequisite to us
ing a procedural and evidentiary device which indirectly gives the
defendant the burden of producing evidence on an elementary issue:
141. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
142. Id at 701 n.38.
143. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 702 n.31; see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846
n.1l (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 406 n.6 (1970).
144. 412 U.s. 837 (1973).
145. Id at 843.
146. Id at 845.
147. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
148. Id at 423.
149. 396 U.S. at 408 n.8 (citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943».
The Court noted that it had ruled similarly in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33-34
(1969).
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the prosecution's evidence must be "rationally connected" to the ele~
ment to be proved. The holdings of McKie and Jackson support the
proposition that this rational connection must be strong enough to
support a conviction without artificial assistance. Similarly, the bur~
den of production on an elemental issue also cannot be directly as~
signed to the defendant until the prosecution has satisfied its
constitutional burden of production as to that element. The princi~
pIe of Jackson v. Virginia lSo imposes the same limitation. lsl
The practice of imposing the burden of production on a defend~
ant who wishes to defend upon grounds that negate an essential ele~
ment of the prosecution's case does not serve any legitimate purpose
that would not be served by another readily available device. The
principal purposes of imposing this burden upon the defendant are
twofold: to notify the prosecution that the issue is being contested,
and to relieve the prosecution of the onus of proving unknown nega~
tives. To the extent the practice is used to assess the sufficiency of
the defendant's evidence, the due process principle of Jackson is of
fended by any standard more demanding than that which questions
whether the evidence might raise a reasonable doubt on some ele
ment of the defense. ls2 The notice and issue-narrowing functions
served by the practice of imposing defensive burdens of production
on an elemental issue can be served by slightly enlarging the scope of
the notice requirements of Rule 14(b)(2) to include all affirmative
defenses. ls3 In the case in which the defendant has notified the pros
ecution that an elemental issue will be contested by a claim ofjustifi
cation or excuse, there usually will be no reason why the prosecution
should not be required to offer its evidence on that issue as part of its
150. 443 U.S. 307 (1979); see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
151. The supreme judicial court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass.
286, 292-99, 331 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1975), is based on reasoning consistent with this con
clusion, but its finding that the evidence in that case satisfied the standards articulated is
dubious in the extreme. See id. at 288-89, 292 n.7, 331 N.E.2d at 903-04,905 n.7.
152. This is a logical application of the principle that a burden of production is a
function of the corresponding burden of persuasion. Allen, supra note 7, at 329; Mc
Naughton, mpra note 7, at 1390.
The allocation of the burden of producing evidence is best understood as in alloca
tion of the risk of non-persuasion of the judge. McNaughton, mpra, at 1383-84;
J.THAYER, supra note 9, at 355 (1898); see a/so, Bailey v. United States, 444 U.S. 339, 415
(1980). When the prosecution's burden of persuasion on an issue is beyond a reasonable
doubt the defendant's burden of persuasion is to raise a reasonable doubt. If the defend
ant's evidence is sufficient to do so, he or she is entitled to have the jury hear it and
decide the issue because the jury could reasonably acquit.
153. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(2) provides that notice be given of the intent to assert
the following "defenses": insanity, license, alibi.
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case-in-chief.154 This practice will facilitate a more orderly and ef
fective sufficiency assessment by increasing the likelihood that the
issues will have been joined on a factual level rather than simply on
the more abstract "elemental" level. I55 Such an approach will make
it more likely that the court will be able to determine whether the
prosecution's evidence furnishes a rational factual basis upon which
the defendant might be convicted. Finally, this practice would elimi
nate the possibility that the defendant would have the burden of pro
duction on an issue that might lead the jury to infer that the
defendant also bears a burden of persuasion greater than of estab
lishing a reasonable doubt on that issue. 156 These relatively minor
changes in the proof process are necessary to render the sufficiency
assessment process capable of fully protecting the due process pro
tections guaranteed criminal defendants through the presumption of
innocence and the Winship principle.
154. In Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 677 n.7, 405 N.E.2d 927, 903 n.7
(1980), the supreme judicial court noted that "as a matter of discretion" the trial judge,
on the defendant's motion, required the prosecution to present affirmative evidence of
criminal responsibility in its case-in-chief after the defendant had complied with the no
tice requirement of Rule 14(b)(2).
Generally, evidence raising an issue of self-defense or accident may be introduced
by either party. The defense may unavoidably inject the issue through the victim's testi
mony, Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 8 Mass. App. 228, 234-35, 392 N.E.2d 1207, 1211
12 (1979), or pretrial statements of the defendant, Commonwealth v. Dilone, 385 Mass.
281,283,431 N.E.2d 576,578 (1982); Commonwealth v. Fluker, 377 Mass. 123, 127,385
N.E.2d 256, 259 (1979); Commonwealth v. Houston, 332 Mass. 687, 689-90, 127 N.E.2d
294,295 (1955). The defendant may testify to the facts, Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379
Mass. 786, 787,400 N.E.2d 862, 863 (1980); Connolly v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527,
528-29,387 N.E.2d 519, 521 (1979); Commonwealth v. Collins, 374 Mass. 596, 598, 373
N.E.2d 969, 971 (1978); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583,586-87,374 N.E.2d 87,
90-91 (1978); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 686, 352 N.E.2d 203, 204
(1976); Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 643, 341 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1976); Com
monwealth v. Lacasse, 365 Mass. 271, 272, 310 N.E.2d 605, 606 (1974), or eyewitness
testimony may provide the evidence, Commonwealth v. Lowe, 15 Mass. App. 262, 263,
444 N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (1983); Rodrigues, 370 Mass. at 686,352 N.E.2d at 204; Martin,
369 Mass. at 643, 341 N.E.2d at 888; Houston, 332 Mass. at 687, 127 N.E.2d at 295.
155. In Jackson, the Court retreated from its articulation of the Winship principle
in terms of the "facts necessary to constitute the crime" to the "essential elements of the
crime." Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) with Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316.
This shift in emphasis may have been necessary in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977), to facilitate the resolution ofjury instruction issues which arose from the decision
in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1978). In the sufficiency context, consequence of
stating the legal standard in terms of elements rather than facts is that the impetus to
assess the issues factually is deflected and the judge's scrutiny of the prosecution's case
will not be as exacting as it should be.
156. The possibility of this type of confusion entering the case by the manner in
which the issue is injected and presented is most acute in self-defense cases because ofthe
difficulty of instructing the jury on the elaborate criteria and structure of this issue with
out creating the impression that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
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The Burden of Production and Sufficiency of the Evidence on
Affirmative Defense Issues

In Massachusetts, an affirmative defense practice is a claim that
raises issues not generated by the charge; that is, a claim recognized
in law as exculpatory but raising matters that are not placed in issue
by any element of the crime. In the absence of evidence sufficient to
put the matter in contest, it will not be an issue in the case. IS7 The
sufficiency assessment on such an issue stands on different constitu
tional footing than it does when an elemental issue is addressed. By
definition, the presumption of innocence is not implicated because
due process principles would not be offended by a conviction that
does not include consideration of the issue. But the sufficiency pro
cess also protects the integrity of the burden of persuasion by insur
ing that the jury has sufficient evidence to support a finding on the
issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process requires that jury de
cisions on affirmative defense issues rest upon sufficient evidence
and not on speculation, bias or other non-evidentiary bases. ISS The
sufficiency process is an essential guardian of this policy. In addi
tion, the no-reservation policy of Rule 25(a)-which applies only to
the assessment made at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief
secures an important double jeopardy protection: It guarantees a fi
nal decision favorable to the defendant when made at that point.
Two questions arise with regard to affirmative defenses, then: what
due process principles limit the state's authority to treat an issue rele
vant to guilt or punishment as an affirmative defense; and how
should the process of assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence on these issues be structured?
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court have held that Morrison v. California (Mor
rison lI)1s9 articulates the due process limitations on the state's
157. q: Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977) (An "affirmative de
fense. . . does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in
order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is
required to carry the burden of persuasion . . . ."); see also Allen, supra note 7, at 327.
As noted earlier, Massachusetts law imposes only a burden of production on the defend
ant; the prosecution is required to disprove properly raised affirmative defenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1311
(1977).
158. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-20; Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810,
816, 822-23, 323 N.E.2d 294, 297-98, 301-02 (1975). The fact that the prosecution must
prove an issue beyond a reasonable doubt does not by itself make that issue an essential
element of the crime. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 & n.20 (1982).
159. 291 U.S. 82 (1934) (hereinafter cited as Morrison II).
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power to reallocate burdens of persuasion (and therefore production)
by treating factors relevant to guilt as affirmative defenses. 160 Morri
son II condemned the use of statutory presumption in prosecutions
under a California law which prohibited the use of real property
within the state by one who was both a non-citizen and ineligible by
race for United States citizenship.161 The statute required the state
to charge the defendant with being an ineligible non-citizen but per
mitted the jury to convict upon proof that the defendant was a land
user.162 The defendant was required to prove his eligibility or citi
zenship to the jury's satisfaction. 163 Writing for the Court, Justice
Cardozo contrasted this statutory scheme to the one approved the
previous term in Morrison v. California (Morrison 1).164 The statute
in Morrison I created a similar presumption of ineligibility and non
citizenship but was triggered upon proof by the prosecution that the
defendant was a land-user and a member of an ineligible race. That
is, the defendant was required to prove that he or she was exempt
from the general prohibition. 165
Because the Supreme Court in both Morrison cases was dealing
with the permissibility of shifting the burden of production to the
defendant upon elemental issues, its classic statement of the limits of
reason and fairness that regulate the practice must be read with the
Winship principle in mind as a qualifier. 166 The burden of produc
tion on an issue considered determinative of guilt or degree of guilt
may be assigned to the defendant only when the elements upon

a

160. Id. at 88-89. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,203 n.9 (1977); Com
monwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 408, 361 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (1977); see also Rossi v.
United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933); United States v. Chodar, 479 F.2d 661, 663 (1st
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973) (state is not required to allocate to it~e1f the
burden of producing evidence that would tend to disprove an affirmative defense not
established by the defendant).
As late as 1950, the Morrison II doctrine was applied to burden of persuasion issues.
See Fleischman v. United States, 339 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1950); see also id. at 376-77
(Black, J., dissenting) (relying in part on Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943». After
Winship and Mullaney, of course, Morrison II cannot be applied to elemental burden of
persuasion issues.
161. 291 U.S. at 96.
162. Id. at 84.
163. Id. at 84, 88. This statute clearly illustrates the manner in which a statutory
presumption or inference shifts to the defendant the burden of producing evidence on the
issue it addressed. See Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 292-99, 331 N.E.2d 901,
905-09 (1975), for an exposition on the supreme judicial court's views on this issue.
164. 288 U.S. 591 (1933) (hereinafter cited as Morrison 1).
165. See Morrison II, 291 U.S. at 84.
166. The Court, however, approved the Morrison II principles without qualifica
tion in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,203 n.9 (1977).
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which the prosecution bears the Winship burden of proof "make it
just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved
with excuse or explanation . . . ."167 This test is most clearly met in
cases like Commonwealth v. Jones l68 where the statute created a gen
eral prohibition subject to authorized exceptions. 169 Under such
statutes, the Morrison II is most likely to be met: either the defend
ant enjoys an advantage over the prosecution in possession of, or
access to, the information l70 needed to prove the issue or shifting the
burden will aid the prosecution without subjecting the defendant to
hardship or oppression. l7l The likelihood of such a problem arising
in Massachusetts, on any matter outside the reach of Massachusetts
General Laws, ch. 278, § 7 is remote, given this jurisdiction's policy
of requiring the prosecution to assume the burden of persuasion be
yond a reasonable doubt to disprove matters of justification, mitiga
tion and excuse.172 Because only the burden of production is shifted
on affirmative defenses, the possibility that a defendant will be seri
ously disadvantaged by the rule is likely to appear only in cases in
which he or she must testify in order to place that matter in issue.
The effect on the sufficiency assessment of assigning the burden
of production to the defendant is not entirely clear. Rule 25(a) re
quires the trial judge to determine whether the evidence, under con
sideration at the time a motion for a required finding of not guilty is
made, "is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on
the charge."173 The standards of legal sufficiency in Jackson and
Commonwealth v. Latimorel74 are articulated in terms of "the essen
tial elements of the crime."175 Arguably, if the scope of the required
sufficiency assessment is limited to elemental issues, a defendant is
not entitled to the assessment on any issue that is legitimately char
167. Morrison If, 291 U.S. at 88-89.
168. 372 Mass. 403, 361 N.E.2d \308 (1977).
169. fd at 405-07, 361 N.E.2d at \310-11. This test generally validates the applica
tion of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 7 (West 1981).
170. This is not so where the privilege against self-incrimination would be compro
mised. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pauley,
368 Mass. 286, 297-98, 331 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1975).
171. In this respect it is relevant to consider that the Morrison principles applied to
the practice of shifting the entire burden of proof, both production and persuasion, to the
defendant. The fact that the prosecution has the burden of persuasion might be relevant
to whether it is unfair to assign the defendant the burden of production.
172. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thurber, 383 Mass. 328, 331, 418 N.E.2d 1253,
1256 (1981) (defense of necessity to charge of prison escape).
173. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
174. 378 Mass. 671, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979).
175. Jackson, 443 U,S. at 319; Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-77, 393 N,E.2d at 374.
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acterized as an affirmative defense. That literal reading of Jackson
and Latimore, however, is inimical to the underlying rationale of
each case, which is to insure that jury verdicts are reasonably sup
ported by persuasive evidence. 176 The practice of assuring the suffi
ciency of the evidence also serves to safeguard the integrity of the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of persuasion. Finally, the suf
ficiency judgment plays an indispensable role in securing important
double jeopardy interests for defendants. 177 Although the reasons for
allowing the defendant to satisfy the burden of production on an
affirmative defense by pleading it under Rule l4(b) are not as com
pelling as they are in the case of elemental issues, such a practice
would promote consistency and eliminate unneeded complications
in the sufficiency assessment process.
D.

The Use of Proof-Facilitating J)evices to Satisfy the
Prosecution -s Burdens of Production and Persuasion

Statutory and common law devices called presumptions, prima
facie cases and inferences are commonly used in Massachusetts to
facilitate the proof of difficult issues by clarifying or declaring the
relationships commonly perceived to exist between proven facts and
legal conclusions. These devices are ordinarily introduced into the
proof process through the judge's instructions to the juryl78 and con
sist of a predicate (the facts which trigger the presumption or infer
ence, or establish the prima facie case) and a conclusion. 179 The
176. This concern has long been considered integral to the mission of the Massa
chusetts courts to see that justice is done. See Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682,
687, 437 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1982); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 488, 265
N.E.2d 496, 499 (1970); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 812,323 N.E.2d 294,
295 (1975).
.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).
178. While all three of these devices are nominally used in Massachusetts criminal
cases, after Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and Ulster County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), each has been modified to eliminate any mandatory effect it
might have on the fact-finder's reasoning process and none is given artificial evidential
value. P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETfS EVIDENCE 53-59 (5th ed. 1981). Pre
sumptions such as that created by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 7 (West 1981),
which assign the initial burden of production to the defendant, are not applied to ele
mental issues. Bul see Commonwealth v. Jones, 362 Mass. 83, 89, 283 N.E.2d 840, 845
(1972).
In short, such devices must leave the fact-finding process to the jury, which may
draw inferences from the evidence as suggested by the device used, provided the jury is
satisfied of the existence of the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. P. LIACOS,
supra, at 59.
179. An example of an inference which does not directly address an essential ele
ment ofa crime is found in Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513, 404 N.E.2d 643
(1980). There, the court stated:

1984)

MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE

955

object of the device is to delineate an acceptable path by which the
jury may find that an important fact, usually but not necessarily an
essential element of proof, has been established.
The impact of such proof-facilitating devices on the sufficiency
assessment process may be direct or indirect, but, in any event, will
shift the burden of production of evidence to the defendant on the
issue in question. This in turn will deprive the defendant of the one
mandatory review-guaranteed by the "no-reservation" provision of
Rule 25(a)--of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence on the
facts relevant to that issue. The sufficiency assessment on this issue
will be deflected from specific factual issues to the more general ele
mental issues and the prosecution will be afforded the strategic ad
vantage of being permitted to present its primary case on the issue as
rebuttal to the defendant's evidence. In effect, this shift in the bur
den of production creates the appearance, jury instructions to the
contrary notwithstanding, that the defendant bears the burden of
persuasion on that issue.
The burden-shifting effect of the use of a presumption or rule of
prima jacie evidence is illustrated by the facts in the case of Com
monwealth v. Pauley.180 Pauley was charged with being the driver of
a motor vehicle who used the Callahan Tunnel and deposited a cop
per slug in a meter at the end of the tunnel, with intent to evade
payment of the toll. By stipulation, only the identity of the driver
was contested. The prosecution's evidence was that the complaining
officer had heard the meter signal a false deposit and noted the li
cense plate number of the car. He had only a momentary side and
rear view of the operator whom, he observed, had shoulder length
hair and wore glasses. No arrest was made; the charge was brought
on a complaint against Pauley, to whom the car was registered. At
the bench trial, Pauley appeared with short hair and without glasses;
he presented no evidence. The following provision was invoked to
establish that Pauley was the operator of the car: "If a vehicle is
Now, as to the matter of a witness by the name of Raymond Bednarz, a poten
tial witness in this case not appearing and testifying. You may draw a negative
inference adverse to the defendant from the defendant's failure to call Ray
mond Bednarz as a witness for the defense. You are not compelled to do so.
You may and that is for you to say, and by that I mean it's an inference that if
Raymond Bednarz did testify, then he would testify adversely to the defendant.
Id at 523-24, 404 N.E.2d at 649. A serious flaw in this particular instruction was the trial
judge's failure to tell the jury that the inference must be based on predicate facts, and to
identify what those must be. That is, the jury should have been told: "If you find X then
you may conclude Y."
180. 368 Mass. 286, 331 N.E.2d 901 (1975).
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operated within tunnel property in violation of any provision of
these rules and regulations and the identity of the operator of such
vehicle cannot be determined, the person in whose name such vehi
cle is registered shall be deemed prima facie responsible for such
violation." 181
The supreme judicial court construed this device as authorizing,
but not requiring, the factfinder to infer from the fact that Pauley
was the registered owner-"nothing else appearing"-that he was
responsible for the violation. 182 A /ortioran: the evidence that
Pauley was the registered owner would have been legally sufficient
to require denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty
made at the close of the prosecution's evidence. 183 The burden of
producing evidence that he was not the operator was thereby shifted
to Pauley.
The effect of a formal common law or statutory inference is sim
ilar. The facts of Commonwealth v. Johnson 184 illustrate how the
common law inference permitting the jury in a homicide case to in
fer malice solely from the fact that the defendant used a deadly
weapon to cause the decedent's death operates like an affirmative
defense designation, relieving the prosecution of its burden of pro
ducing actual evidence of malice and deflects the inquiry from the
facts to the abstract elements of the offense.
Several preliminary points must be made. First, under Massa
chusetts law, a homicide is punishable as murder or manslaughter
only if it is unlawful. I85 Malice distinguishes murder from man
slaughter in an unlawful homicide. 186 Ordinarily the jury will decide
whether a killing was malicious, and therefore murder, by consider
ing the circumstances to determine what they disclose about the
killer's frame of mind; for example, whether the circumstances show
that the fatal blow was purposefully and wrongfully inflicted or
181. Id at 289, 331 N.E.2d at 903-04.
182. Id at 291, 331 N.E.2d at 905.
183. The evidence that the officer's description of the driver did not match the
defendant's appearance was considered only to establish the first predicate needed to
trigger the prima facie evidence device: that the identity of the operator cannot be deter
mined. Id at 289, 231 N.E.2d at 903. In short, when the prosecution did not have suffi
cient evidence of this essential element, the device made proof of another fact
registration-sufficient unless the defendant produced evidence that he was not the oper
ator. As Professor Allen observes, another effect of this kind of device (presumptions
work similarly) is to artificially increase the weight of the prosecution's evidence. Allen,
supra note 7, at 322.
184. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1975).
185. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 688, 352 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1976).
186. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 380 Mass. 858, 865,406 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (1980).
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rather the result of chance or human frailty.'87 If the defendant
claims that the killing occurred in circumstances that show sudden
combat, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
they did not. 188 Second, the presumption of innocence and the "no
reservation" provision of Rule 25(a) combine to provide a defendant
a fundamental set of protections against a conviction on insufficient
evidence. The "presumption of innocence" is a term used to de
scribe the defendant's fundamental due process right to
remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its
burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion; i.e., to say
in this case, as in any other, that the opponent of a claim or charge
is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another form that the
proponent of the claim or charge must evidence it. 189
The defendant thus is entitled not to be required to defend until the
prosecution has satisfied its burden of production. This right is se
cured by the requirement of Rule 25(a) that the trial judge rule on a
motion for a required finding of not guilty made at the close of the
prosecution's case before proceeding further.
The facts of Johnson illustrate the purposes of these protections
and how the use of inferences can jeopardize their effectiveness. The
prosecution's case-in-chief consisted primarily of a transcribed state
ment taken by the police from the defendant shortly after the victim
was killed. In the statement, Johnson admitted killing the victim,
but claimed he did so in self defense. Johnson explained that the
victim had attacked and stabbed him with a knife. Johnson then
stabbed the victim, using either the victim's weapon or one handed
to him by bystanders. The other evidence offered by the prosecution
was consistent with this account and to some degree corroborated it
(a police officer testified they found Johnson by following a trail of
blood from his wounded hand).'90 The trial judge denied of the de
fendant's motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge, but the
187. "Manslaughter under circumstances of sudden combat is not committed as
the result of a deliberated act, but is homicide in the heat of blood, a perturbation of
mind palliating the intent to inflict injury." Id
188. An intentional killing in self-defense is not unlawful; such a killing in sudden
combat is unlawful, but not malicious, and therefore constitutes manslaughter rather
than murder. Compare Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 689, 352 N.E.2d
203, 206 (1976), with Commonwealth v. Hodge, 380 Mass. 858, 865, 406 N.E.2d 1015,
1020 (1980).
189. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (quoting H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2511 (3rd Ed. 1940». Accord J. THAYER, supra note 7, at 552.
190. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227, 326 N.E.2d at 356.
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appeals court reversed. 191
The appeals court viewed the issue as being unprecedented in
Massachusetts: whether the defendant is entitled to a directed ver
dict where the evidence adduced to establish the predicate for the
inference of malice 192 shows the intentional killing to have been
without malice. 193 The court reasoned that the only evidence ad
duced by the prosecution demonstrated that the killing occurred in
circumstances which showed at least a sudden fight in which the de
cedent was the aggressor and in which the defendant's intention to
kill was formed "in the heat of sudden combat."194 Ordinarily, of
course, the jury would be free to accept or reject whatever parts of
the defendant's statements they chose, but in this case the appeals
court saw no basis (such as inconsistency or implausibility) upon
which the jury might reasonably have accepted the portion of the
transcribed statement which discriminated rationally between the in
criminating and mitigating portions of the statement. In these cir
cumstances, the court ruled, the prosecution failed to meet its burden
of production on the issue of malice; it made out no more than
manslaughter. 195
A preferable basis for the appeals court's ruling might be that
191. ld at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360. This ruling was not appealed to the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court.
192. Malice may ordinarily be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly
weapon. Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809, 323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975).
"[R]educed to its lowest terms, malice in murder means knowledge of such circumstances
that according to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death
will follow the contemplated act, coupled perhaps with an implied negation of any ex
cuse or justification." Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245,252,54 N.E. 551, 554
(1899).
193. Johnson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 232, 326 N.E.2d at 359-60.
194. ld at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360.
195. ld The court also commented that Johnson's statement did not make out a
claim of self defense because it did not show that Johnson had no avenue 'Of escape or
that he availed himself of all proper means to avoid combat or that he used no more
force than necessary to defend himself. ld
This ruling demonstrates the effect of imposing on the defendant the burden of pro
ducing evidence of an elemental exculpatory issue. Under the rule of Commonwealth v.
McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 61 (1854), if the prosecution's evidence left the issue in doubt,
it failed to prove the unlawfulness of the killing. See id at 64. The statement itself was
sufficient to put the prosecution on notice that self-defense might be an issue. The prose
cution's evidence was that Johnson had been attacked by an armed man. It offered no
evidence that he had a safe avenue of retreat, was able to avoid the fight or could have
defended himself without killing the decedent. By offering sufficient evidence to prove
anyone of these propositions beyond a reasonable doubt the prosecution could have
satisfied its burden of production on the issue of unlawfulness.
It is interesting to note that Johnson was confined in a mental institution from the
date of his arrest until the day of trial, and that the prosecution failed to produce one
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the prosecution's evidence did not reasonably support an inference
that the killing was malicious. 196 Where the inference is directed to
an essential element of the crime, it cannot be employed to satisfy
the prosecution's burden of persuasion unless the facts upon which it
is based (the predicate) provide sufficient evidence to support a jury's
conclusion that the inferred fact has been established beyond a rea
sonable doubt. 197 An inference of malice, based solely on the de
fendant's intentional use of a deadly weapon to cause death, cannot
rationally be drawn from the Johnson facts.
Malice is demonstrated by circumstances that reasonably sup
port an inference that the defendant was aware that his actions were
likely to kill and was acting without excuse, justification or mitiga
tion. The circumstances of the Johnson killing presented by the
prosecution could be parsed, and facts isolated to support a conceiv
able predicate from which malice might reasonably be inferred. For
example, that Johnson had started the fatal encounter or had venge
fully killed the victim after disarming him. From what the opinions
reveal about the record, and what both the appeals court and
supreme judicial court accepted as given, the prosecution's substan
tive evidence was the defendant's written confession. 198 There was
no factual basis disclosed upon which the jury could discriminate
and sort out those parts of the statements it wished to believe or dis
believe. On the facts known to the jury, the two actual inferences
suggested above are speculative, based on surmise. The prosecu
tion's case must be judged on the res gestae l99 and if the issue of
unlawfulness or malice is "left in doubt," the evidence is insuffi
cient. 2°O The jury may not be instructed that it might rely on the
inference alone to convict; it must be instructed to consider all the
witness to the stabbing, although numerous bystanders were present when the police
arrived. 3 Mass. App. at 227 n.l, 326 N .E.2d at 356 n.l.
196. In the course of explicitly repudiating the appeals court's ruling, in Johnson,
the supreme judicial court stated: "Evidence of an intentional killing by the defendant,
absent any evidence of justification, is sufficient to permit the jury to infer that it was a
killing with malice-i.e., murder in the second degree." Commonwealth v. McInerney,
373 Mass. 136, 146,365 N.E.2d 815, 821 (1977) (emphasis added).
197. In United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), the Court held that statutes
which make proof of specified facts sufficient evidence to authorize a conviction "author
ize but do not require the trial judge to submit the case to the jury when the Government
relies on [the predicate facts) alone, authorize but do not require an instruction to the
jury based on the statute, and authorize but do not require the jury to convict based on
[the predicate facts) alone." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398,406 n.6 (1970); Com
monwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 293-94 n.lO, 331 N.E.2d 901, 906 n.1O (1975).
198. Johnson, 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 228, 326 N.E.2d at 357.
199. McKie, 67 Mass. (I Gray) at 63.
200. In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the Supreme Court observed
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circumstances surrounding the killing in determining whether the
defendant acted maliciously.20I Such narrowly-drawn inferences are
likely to promote irrationality in decision-making;202 they are inimi
cal to the constitutional office of the sufficiency assessment which is
to help insure that convictions will be rationally supported by
evidence. 203
Similarly, the effect of the malice inference was to shift the focus
of the sufficiency of the evidence from a factual level to an abstract
"elemental" level. The factual shortcomings of the prosecution's
case were ignored through resort to an abstract proposition which
was anchored to an isolated fact considered out of context. The de
fendant was thus required to defend even though the sufficiency of
the prosecution's evidence was never actually scrutinized. 204
The Winship principle requires that the trial judge instruct the
jury that the inferences it draws be reasonably supported by the evi
dence. 205 In most situations, one or more reasonable inferences will
be available from the evidence. Unless such a basis is presented
(and that is part of the prosecution's burden of production), the pros
ecution's evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. 206
that juries cannot be instructed that it is permissible to infer intent from an isolated fact.
Id. at 523.
201. See Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200-01, 207 N.E.2d 276, 280
(1965) (where the prosecution's evidence leaves the jury with no basis other than specula
tion for choosing between equally supported inferences of guilt or innocence, the prose
cution has not proven its case supports this conclusion).
202. See Allen, supra note 7, at 332-36.
203. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-18.
204. There were a number of witnesses to the killing in Johnson. The defendant in
his statement gave the police the names and addresses of witnesses who, he said, would
corroborate his account of the event. The record indicated that the police had talked to
some of the people who were at the scene when they arrived. The prosecution produced
documentary evidence of one of these witnesses at trial, which occurred almost precisely
one year after the killing. A police officer indicated no others could be found. 3 Mass.
App. Ct. at 227 n.I, 326 N .E.2d at 356 n.1.
The defendant testified at trial that he had not made the statements attributed to him
and asserted that he had not killed the decedent. He claimed he had been cut breaking
up a fight between the decedent and two other men. He had, however, developed such
severe psychiatric problems shortly after his arrest that he was hospitalized for a compe
tency evaluation. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227 n.2, 326 N.E.2d at 356 n.2. While his bizarre
testimony may account for the jury's verdict, it is irrelevant to the issue of the sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence of murder.
205. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) .
206. Both Massachusetts courts which discussed Johnson viewed the issue as one of
credibility. The appeals court found that there was no reasonable basis on which the jury
could believe the part of Johnson's confession that he killed the victim and disbelieve his
account of the circumstances in which it had occurred. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 233, 326
N.E.2d at 360. Therefore the prosecution had failed to prove malice. The court's sugges
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The Use ofProof-facilitating Devices to Satisfy the
Prosecution -s Burden ofPersuasion on Affirmative Defenses

The practice of imposing a burden of production on the party
having the burden of persuasion protects the presumption of inno
cence by insuring that the prosecution's case rests on evidence. A
burden of production gives the standard of persuasion "concrete
meaning" when it requires that the weight of the prosecution's evi
dence be sufficient to rationally satisfy that standard. A standard of
persuasion which is not accompanied by a burden of production will
be reduced in practice to a meaningless, unenforceable form of
words. The Massachusetts experience with its efforts to moderate the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of persuasion in insanity
cases by dispensing with a corresponding burden of production of
fers a clear demonstration of the unworkability of any scheme which
ignores this necessary relationship.
Long before Winship was decided it had been the Massachusetts
practice to dilute the prosecution's burden of persuasion on the issue
of insanity by giving it the benefit of a presumption of sanity. This
practice was challenged as being inconsistent with Winship in Com
monwealth v. Kostka,207 the defense arguing that the prosecution
tion that self defense was disproved, however, indicates that it imposed a burden of pro
duction-the risk of nonproduction---on the defendant on both issues. See id. Because
the prosecution's evidence established the predicate for the mitigating factor of sudden
combat, the prosecution had to offer sufficient evidence to disprove that possibility be
yond a reasonable doubt. Because the prosecution's evidence did not offer evidence to
place each criterion of the self defense claim in issue, the prosecution did not have to
offer sufficient evidence to disprove self-defense.
In rejecting the appeals court's reasoning on the credibility issue in Johnson the
supreme judicial court stated flatly "the jury have the sole power to believe or disbelieve
any or all such evidence (as Johnson's confession)." Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373
Mass. 136, 145, 365 N.E.2d 815, 821 (1975). This apparent rejection of the idea that the
jury's credibility judgments must have a rational factual basis is inconsistent with the
Jackson principle that the courts must insure that some reasonable factual basis is
presented for the conclusions (inferences) the prosecution asks the jury to draw in order
to convict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
207. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536-37, 350 N.E.2d 444, 458 (1976).
The defense had presented the testimony of two experts (psychiatrists); one testified that
the defendant was insane at the time the crimes were committed. The prosecution
presented no countervailing expert opinion, relying instead on cross-examination of the
defense experts, the testimony of witnesses depicting the defendant's conduct before, dur
ing and after the killing as deliberate and planned, and the presumption of sanity. Id. at
522-23,350 N.E.2d at 449. The court ruled that, with the evidence in this posture, it was
exclusively the jury's province to decide what relative weight to give the expert's testi
mony against the circumstances shown by the prosecution. Id. at 538-39, 350 N.E.2d at
459; see also Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 577-83, 350 N.E.2d 678, 698-700
(1976).
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constitutionally could not rely, in whole or in part, upon the "pre
sumption of sanity" to satisfy its burden of proving sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. The defense argument was that the due process
principles derived from Winship prohibited the prosecution from re
lying upon any presumption or inference to meet its burden of per
suasion unless it could be said with a reasonable degree of assurance
that the fact inferred (sanity) flowed logically from the facts upon
which it was based. 208 The supreme judicial court responded that
such a requirement was imposed only when the inference or pre
sumption was utilized to assist the prosecution in proving an element
of any given crime;209 the issue did not bear "any necessary relation
ship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental ele
ments" of any offense in Massachusetts law. 210 Rather, insanity is an
affirmative defense which must be pleaded. 2l1 Even when pleaded it
does not become an issue until some evidence of lack of criminal
responsibility is adduced. 212
208. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 526, 350 N.E.2d 444, 451 (1976).
The defense relied on Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Kostka, 370
Mass. at 533, 350 N.E.2d at 455. In each case the Supreme Court held that the inferred
fact must "more likely than not" flow from the predicate facts and implied that the re
quired relationship might be beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 843; Tur
ner, 396 U.S. at 405; Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. In Leary the inference failed the more likely
than not standard. 395 U.S. at 52-513. In Barnes and Turner the predicate facts alone
were sufficient to support the inferred conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes,
412 U.S. at 845; Turner, 396 U.S. at 417. Hence the issue of which standard was mini
mally required was left open. The supreme judicial court's interpretation of the due
process requirements of these cases is set out in Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286,
331 N.E.2d 901 (1975).
209. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 532, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976).
This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling on the Winship limitation on
the designation of affirmative defenses in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977),
and with its discussion in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), regarding states' freedom to
assume the burden of persuasion on an issue without necessarily making it an element of
the offense by operation of due process law.
2\0. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 533, 350 N.E.2d 444, 455 (1976).
After Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), and Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. \07
(1982), it may be that the question of whether a particular relevant circumstance must be
considered an element of the crime charged is not its logical relevance to an established
element but: (1) whether the state legislature intended that it be elemental; and
(2) whether that legislative judgment is reasonable in Morrison II terms. See supra notes
157-65 and accompanying text.
211. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(2).
212. Rule 14(b)(2) imposes the pleading requirement. Id The supreme judicial
court has not determined how much evidence the defendant must produce to activate the
issue, though it has noted that such evidence may be introduced during the prosecution's
case in chief and that, in the majority of jurisdictions in which criminal responsibility is
considered a "Winship fact" the defendant must raise a reasonable doubt on the issue in
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The presumption of sanity, employed in Massachusetts has pro
cedural qualities and is given an evidentiary impact which collec
tively prevent effective sufficiency review of the issue. 213
Procedurally, the presumption withholds the issue from controversy
in cases in which it is not raised; that is, it places a burden to produce
evidence of insanity on the defendant. In addition, where the issue
has been raised, the presumption gives evidentiary weight to what is
most accurately described as an assumption or premise, "'the fact
that a great majority of [people] are [criminally responsible]' " and a
possible inference which might be drawn from that premise: "'the
probability [is] that any particular [person] is [criminally responsi
ble].' "214 The presumption is not weighed as evidence itself; how
ever, "facts" that are not in evidence are nonetheless considered to
be before the jury: "the jury's 'common experience that most people
... are sane.' "215 The supreme judicial court has held that the pre
sumption alone affords a sufficient basis for submitting the issue to
order to overcome the presumption of criminal responsibility (at which point the pre
sumption disappears from the case and the issue is decided on evidence). Common
wealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 527 n.7, 528 n.ll, 350 N.E.2d 444, 452 n.7, 453 n.ll
(1976).
Under the procedure described in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 677 n.7,
405 N.E.2d 927, 930 n.7 (1980), the trial judge may discretionarily require the prosecu
tion to assume its burden of persuasion in its case-in-chief where the issue of sanity has
been pleaded.
213. The supreme judicial court has reasoned that, although the term "presump
tion" is used for convenience to describe the unique procedural-evidentiary device em
ployed in structuring criminal responsibility in Massachusetts, it is not a true
presumption but a hybrid one because it "shares but is not limited to, the characteristics
of both presumptions and inferences." Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530-31,
350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976). Many devices called presumptions both operate procedur
ally (burden-allocating) and have an evidential impact, to the extent they rest on proof of
facts offered in evidence. See, Allan, supra note 7, at 325-26; Jeffries & Stephan, 88 YALE
L.J. 1325, 1335-38 (1979); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
A distinguishing, but not unique, feature of the device used in Massachusetts is the
nature of its foundation, which is described as factual but is not evidential; that is, it need
not consist of evidence presented to the jury from which the inference of criminal respon
sibility is drawn. Kostka, 370 Mass. at 530-31, 350 N.E.2d at 454.
214. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530-31, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E. 641, 645 (1935».
215. Id. (quoting United States v. Dube, 520 F ..2d 250, 255 (1st Cir. 1975». Then
Judge Burger described the presumptive device utilized in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in similar terms:
The presumption of sanity, whatever may be its evidentiary value and weight,
does not banish from the case, as [defendant) would have it. That presumption
is grounded on the premise that the generality of mankind is made up of per
sons within the range of 'normal,' rational beings and can be said to be account
able or responsible for their conduct; this premise is rooted in centuries of
experience, has not been undermined by contemporary medical knowledge, and
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the jury.216 Thus, the presumption eliminates the power of a trial
judge to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence of criminal
responsibility.
In rejecting a defendant's due process challenge to the constitu
tionality of this presumption, the court gave three "fundamentally
sound reasons" justifying the practice: First, the presumption pro
tects the jury's factfinding discretion to decide the credibility of ex
pert testimony on the subject and to determine the weight, if any, to
give such testimony; second, because the facts underlying the pre
sumption are within the jury's common sense and knowledge, it
would be inappropriate and artificial to forbid the jurors to rely, at
least in part, upon their common experience; and third, the require
ment that the prosecution prove criminal responsibility beyond a
reasonable doubt provides an adequate safeguard against erroneous
convictions. 217 It is evident that one consequence of this practice is
to render the Rule 25 sufficiency evaluation superfluous on all sanity
fact issues; correspondingly, any judicial concern regarding the perjustifies the continuance of the presumption after introduction of evidence of
insanity.
Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965).
216. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 536, 350 N.E.2d 444, 457-58 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 179,258 N.E.2d 13,20 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E. 641, 645 (1935).
217. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 535-36, 350 N.E.2d 444, 457-58
(1976).
Although an in-depth critique of this practice is not within the scope of this article, it
is pertinent to note that the first and third of these reasons run directly counter to the
Winsh¥,-based constitutional policies of Jackson and the second, as expressed, is based
on a non sequitur.
The first is faulty because it is inconsistent with the due process requirement that a
jury decide Winship fact issues exclusively on evidence presented to them. The jurors'
common knowledge and experience, which they can properly rely on in judging credibil
ity, making weight determinations and drawing inferences, are not evidence and cannot
constitutionally be given evidentiary force. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. The third reason is
directly repudiated in Jackson, in which the Court offered as a justification for its higher
standard of sufficiency the danger that juries, even when properly instructed on the Win
ship burden of proof, may nevertheless convict on insufficient evidence. Id at 317.
Finally, the second reason is faulty in two respects. First, it simply does not logically
follow that abandonment of the evidential impact of the presumption would prevent
jurors from drawing on their common knowledge and experience. It would confine use
of these resources to their proper sphere, to be used as decisional tools rather than evi
dence. It is the office of the sufficiency of evidence evaluation to enforce such limitations
on the jury's fact-finding discretion. Id at 319. The propositions on which the presump
tion is based could be made the subject of proof through evidence, e.g., by expert testi
mony. In fact, the need to rely on the presumption arises in cases in which the
prosecution, inexplicably, has not produced expert testimony on the criminal responsibil
ity issue. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1983); Com
monwealth V. Robinson, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 441 N.E.2d 553 (1982).
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suasive force of the prosecution's actual evidence of criminal respon
sibility must be treated as a weight of the evidence issue under the
provisions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence).218
The current Massachusetts practice for litigating the issue of
sanity, then, is to impose a beyond a reasonable doubt burden of
persuasion on the prosecution while relieving that party of any re
sponsibility to present evidence on the issue. With this arrangement,
the burden of persuasion is reduced to a form of words conveyed to
the jury in instructions.
The Supreme Judicial Court has grappled with but not yet accu
rately perceived this problem in reviewing several first degree mur
der convictions in which the presumption of sanity apparently
carried the day for the prosecution. 219 In these cases the prosecution
presented neither expert evidence nor circumstantial evidence such
as apparently rational, discriminating conduct by the defendant at or
near the time of the crime. Juries nevertheless found the defendants
criminally responsible beyond a reasonable doubt. Such clear evi
dence of extra-legal decision making by the jury has troubled the
Court sufficiently to persuade it of the necessity of a new trial in each
such case, but has not shaken the Court's commitment to the pre
sumption of sanity. Indeed, the Court has not discussed the problem
in terms of whether enforcing a burden of production is indispen
sible to enforcing a burden of persuasion. In fact, the Massachusetts
presumption of sanity not only dispenses with the prosecution's bur
den to produce evidence, it virtually invites a conviction based on no
evidence at all. If the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can be
met without evidence its effect on jury decisions will depend entirely
on the jury's inclination and ability to honor it.
Thus, regardless of whether the initial burden of producing evi
dence is imposed, the prosecution must be held to a standard of evi
dentiary sufficiency if the burden of persuasion is expected to playa
realistic part in assuring jury verdicts are rationally supported by ev
idence. While the problem may be particularly acute in the sanity
issue because jurors may resist the idea of such a defense and be
cause of the unusual features of the presumption of sanity, the prin
ciple holds true for all instances where the prosecution is permitted
to rely upon one or more proof-facilitating devices to satisfy its bur
den of disproving an affirmative defense. Any failure to insure that
218. See infra text accompanying notes 484-97.
219. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976); Common
wealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1983).
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the prosecution produce evidence sufficient to satisfy its burden of
persuasion will work to increase the risk of irrationality in the
verdict.
In sum, it is both practical and a wise policy to require that the
prosecution be required to produce, in its case-in-chief, evidence suf
ficient to satisfy its burden of persuasion on each issue in litigation,
whether or not the issue is "elemental." The prosecution's interest in
not being required to prove irrelevant negatives is satisfied by requir
ing the defendant to plead the claim sufficiently in advance of trial to
permit the prosecution to meet it. This practice further secures the
defendant's important interest in having the sufficiency of the prose:
cution's case evaluated exclusively on the prosecution's evidence,
and simultaneously assists the trial judge by simplifying the tasks of
applying the rational fact-finder and prosecution's best case rules.
Similarly, the defendant's fundamental interest in not being required
to defend inadequately founded charges is better secured by this
practice and the policy of fixing the defendant's double jeopardy po
sition at the close of the prosecution's case is facilitated. This prac
tice is equally felicitous when applied to non-elemental issues that
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 220 The logi
cal contradiction of severing the burden of production from the bur
den of persuasion is avoided and the defendant's interests, secured
by this practice, are functionally, if not constitutionally, indistin
guishable from those associated with elemental issues. The cost of
this practice would be negligible.
F.

Evaluating the Evidence: the Trial Judge's J)ilemma

Having resolved preliminary issues affecting the scope of the
charge and the evidence, defined critical statutory terms and identi
fied the issues-both elemental and affirmative-upon which the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence must be assessed, the trial
judge then must evaluate the potential persuasive force of the body
of evidence under consideration. The question is whether the evi
dence and the inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom (provided
they are not too remote according to the usual course. of events) are
of sufficient force to bring minds of ordinary intelligence and sagac
ity to the persuasion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 221 The con
220. This is illustrated by the trial court's practice in Commonwealth v. Gould, 380
Mass. 672,405 N.E.2d 927 (1980).
221. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-77, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374
(1979) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928);
and Commonwealth v. Clark, 378 Mass. 392,403-04,393 N.E.2d 296, 303 (1979».
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stitutional duty to assess the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence
may press the conscientious trial judge against certain pre- Winship
limitations imposed upon judges for the purpose of preventing them
from infringing upon the jury's fact-finding prerogatives. 222 The
traditional approach has been to distinguish between the activity of
assessing the sufficiency of evidence on the one hand and weighing
evidence on the other. On this view, the task of assessing the suffi
ciency of the evidence requires nothing more than an evaluation of
the potential persuasive force of the evidence, while weighing the evi
dence involves judging credibility, drawing justifiable inferences and
comparing the relative force of conflicting evidence. 223 The judge
may assess sufficiency but may not weigh evidence in deciding a mo
tion for a required finding of not guilty. The rationale of Jackson,
however, is that it is the trial judge's constitutional function in as
sessing evidentiary sufficiency to insure that a case is not submitted
to a jury unless the evidence presents facts upon which a jury might
reasonably find guilt, even if the jury's factfinding prerogatives are
limited in the process. 224 Implicitly, on a motion for a required find
ing of not guilty, the judge must insure that the evidence presents
some reasonable basis for making the credibility and weight judg
ments and drawing the inferences necessary to a finding of guilt.
Such a motion invokes fundamental constitutional rights which
it is the trial judge's duty to assiduously protect: the right to not be
required to defend unfounded charges225 and the right not to be ar
bitrarily convicted. 226 To discharge this duty the judge must under
take the difficult task of reviewing the prosecution's evidence and
testing its logical strength in the mind of the hypothetical reasonable
juror without assuming, to an unwarranted degree, the jury's fact
finding role of deciding what evidence to accept as true, what rela
tive weight to give to conflicting sources of information or what in
ferences to draw from the evidence presented.
222. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368,373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928)
(" 'we cannot consider any question of the weight of the evidence' ") (quoting Common
wealth v. Asherowski, 196 Mass. 342, 348, 82 N.E. 13, 15 (1907»; see also Curley v.
United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
223. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-77,
393 N.E.2d 370, 374 (1979).
224. 443 U.S. at 319. The Court acknowledged that every sufficiency assessment
will limit the jury's fact-finding discretion to some degree. Id at 319 n.13; see also Curley
v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (It is the function of the judge to
deny the jury any opportunity to operate beyond its province.).
225. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 n.12 (1978); United States v. Mar
tin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977).
226. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-14.
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To assist the judge in restraining his or her critical judgment at
this stage the law instructs the judge to interpret the evidence in
terms most favorable to the prosecution's case; the "prosecution's
best case" rule. While the interest nominally protected by this form
ofjudicial restraint is the jury's fact-finding discretion, the actual in
terest affected, in adversarial terms, is the prosecution's opportunity
to have the case submitted to the jury and to persuade the jury to
convict. 227 The structural rules to be applied by the trial judge in
this setting, then, reflect a resolution of two conflicting interests. To
protect the defendant's right to terminate unwarranted proceedings
at the earliest point possible, the judge must determine whether the
prosecution's evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable fact
finder that every element of the offense has been established beyond
a reasonable doubt. To protect the prosecution's interest in having
an opportunity to persuade the jury, the judge is required to view the
evidence in terms most favorable to the prosecution. It is clear that
these two rules-each supposedly describing the same boundary
(distribution of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury)
from opposing perspectives-will not always be congruent. More
over, because of the nature of the directed verdict inquiry, the suffi
ciency issue frequently raises other difficult issues of fact and law,
many of which add to the difficulty of adhering to these role-defining
rules.
Another set of problems which the trial judge must face in eval
uating a motion for a required finding of not guilty during trial is
that both the standard of decision and the structure of the inquiry
have been fashioned by appellate courts and generally, are not sensi
tive to important differences in the trial judge's position and perspec
tive. Appellate courts enjoy the benefits of knowing what the jury's
decision was, having the assistance of transcripts of testimony and
written arguments by counsel and having ample time to reflect and
make a carefully-reasoned decision. The trial judge, in contrast,
must rule at the close of the prosecution's case if the defendant
moves at that time. Acquittal by the jury is still a possibility, in most
cases a transcript of testimony has not been prepared, and because
the decision cannot be postponed and the need for continuity and
dispatch in the trial process are fairly pressing, the trial judge gener
ally feels pressured to act upon the motion quickly. These consider
ations suggest the need for appellate court development of a
227. This interest is entitled to no independent protection; the prosecution'S case
must stand or fall on its merits.
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standards of decision and mode of procedure designed to serve the
needs of the trial judge.
The standard of decision should allow the trial judge fo be less
circumspect with regard to the jury's fact-finding discretion. The
appellate standard of review incorporates the principle of deference
to the jury's verdict in two ways. The evidence is viewed in its light
most favorable to the government and in addition, the "rational fact
finder" standard instructs the court to determine whether a hypothet
ical fact-finder, acting reasonably, could have found each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of these requirements,
in effect, creates a presumption that the jury's guilty verdict is
valid. 228 A trial judge, determining whether to submit a case to the
jury, need not be so deferential. The task is not the relatively simple
one of determining whether the jury has acted outside the proper
scope of its authority. The trial judge must determine instead
whether a properly-instructed jury might reasonably conclude that
the evidence, permissibly interpreted, establishes each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The task of forecasting how a
jury might permissibly reason, without the benefit of being able to
reconstruct the line of reasoning probably followed in light of the
verdict, cannot be accomplished without giving some consideration
to the weight of the evidence. 229
Moreover, the justification for deference before the case is sub
mitted to the jury is less compelling than it is in the case in which the
jury has found the defendant guilty. Courts have found the govern
ment's interest in protecting a conviction sufficiently strong to allow
the prosecution to seek appellate review of a later decision that sets
aside or reduces the verdict. 230 The prosecution's interest in having
its case submitted to a jury, however, is not comparable. The gov
ernment's interest, for example, is not considered sufficiently strong
to permit appeal of a directed verdict improperly granted in the de
fendant's favor, even if founded upon an erroneous legal ruling. 231
228. See Comment, The Jackson v. Virginia Standardfor Sufficiency of the Evi
dence, 65 IOWA L. REV. 799, 807 (1979). This standard is virtually identical, both in
substance and in effect, to the standard employed by Massachusetts appellate courts in
reviewing the exercise of discretionary authority by trial judges.
229. Id Even reviewing courts applying the pre-Jackson "no evidence" standard
occasionally acknowledged the necessity of weighing evidence. See, e.g., Speigner v.
Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1210-12 (6th Cir. 1979). Compare Cunha v. Brewer, 511 F.2d 894,
898 (8th Cir. 1975). The same necessity persists under the Jackson standard.
230. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 344, 353 (1975); see Common
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 315 n.l, 431 N.E.2d 915,916 n.1 (1982).
231. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 78 (1978); United States v. Martin
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To the extent the rule of deference protects the jury's verdict from a
judge's inclination to second-guess the fact-finder, it is inapplicable
to the trial judge's pre-submission sufficiency determination. In
other words, the prosecution is not entitled to an opportunity to per
suade the jury unless it produces sufficient evidence to reasonably
support a conviction.
The trial judge, having heard and observed the demeanor of the
witnesses, is in a better position than an appellate judge to judge
credibility and weight issues. 232 The judge will have had considera
ble experience in exercising this critical judgment in bench trials and
in addition will have made preliminary findings of fact on issues
such as witness competency, admissibility of evidence and the per
missibility of relying on some types of inferences. Additionally, the
judge will have expertise in interacting with the jury on fact-finding
issues by means of instructions, particularly those describing permit
ted methods of reasoning, which frequently constitute indirect com
ments on credibility and weight of the evidence. 233
Finally, the general nature of most jury verdicts lends a genuine
air of mystery and potential irrationality which further inhibits ap
pellate judges by lending strength to the suggestion that any disa
greement the appellate court might have with the jury's verdict must
necessarily be the product of second-guessing. This is strengthened
by the common failure of appellate courts to draw an explicit dis
tinction, in practice, between the trial judge's initial judgment (which
is reviewed only if adverse to the defendant), the trial judge'S review
of sufficiency after a guilty verdict, appellate review of the correct
ness of either of these rulings by the trial judge and appellate review
of the reasonableness of the jury's verdict.
These considerations, it is submitted, suggest the need for and
usefulness of such distinctions, and for development of a standard of
decision applicable to sufficiency determinations by trial judges
before submitting a case to a jury. Such a standard must acknowl
edge the necessity and desirability of allowing the judge greater leeLinen Supply Co., 436 U.S. 564, 576 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143
(1962).
232. This superiority in the trial judge'S position compared to the appellate court's
is acknowledged and forms part of the basis for extending the section 33E powers found
in Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) to trial judges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keough,
385 Mass. 314, 317-18,431 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1982). Consideration of whether to permit
the trial judge to act on these observations in determining sufficiency questions should
tum solely on notions of the proper allocation of responsibility between trial judge and
JUry.
233. Allen, supra note 7, at 332-39.
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way to critically evaluate the quality of the prosecution's case than is
permitted in reviewing the reasonableness of a jury's verdict. 234
Trial judges must and do consider issues of credibility, weigh
conflicting testimony and evaluate the reasonableness of inferences
in assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. To the ex
tent the legal rules regulating the sufficiency assessment process in
struct judges to refrain from making these types of critical
judgments, they should be modified. The principle of Jackson v. Vir
gini02 35 requires that the judge restrict the jury's fact-finding discre
tion to the realm of reasonable judgments by insuring that the jury is
presented with sufficient evidence to provide them with a basis for
exercising their discretion reasonably.236 This protection can be af
forded simply by recognizing that judges routinely assess evidence in
this fashion when making sufficiency assessments and in other con
texts, as will be demonstrated below. To formalize these practices as
a required part of the sufficiency assessment process, courts need
simply to modify the "prosecution's best case" rule as follows:
In assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence the court
shall view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu
tion where it appears that the inferences, weight of the evidence
and credibility judgments needed to reach a finding of guilt are
reasonably supported by evidence.

This modification would not significantly alter the present divi
sion of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury except as
to credibility judgments: Numerous judicial duties presently require
judges to screen evidence which restricts the jury's discretion to draw
inferences and weigh evidence. Consider the role of the trial judge
m the pre-indictment bind over hearing. The judge's task is to
234. The Honorable Mel Greenberg, a Massachusetts trial judge, has suggested in
a recent article that the distinction between weight and sufficiency has little impact in
practice:
Some judges assigned to the jury session will always have a different prescrip
tive vision of whether the bench trial judge acted properly on the weight and
sufficiency ofthe evidence presented at the bench trial. These matters are rarely
capable of exact quantification. Sufficiency of evidence review then will always
depend, to some extent, on who is assigned to the jury session. . . . In cases
where specific elements of the offenses will be lacking in proof, the task is rela
tively simple. In reviewing matters where the decision hinges on credibility,
circumstantial evidence, and inferences as factors which enter into the judg
mental process, it is more difficult to attain uniformity.
Greenberg, Double Jeopardy and Trial DeNovo: The Dilemma in Ihe Slale's Dislriel
Courls, 68 MASS. L. REV. 50, 59 (1983).
235. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
236. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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screen out unwarranted prosecutions by determining whether the
Commonwealth has presented sufficient admissible evidence to es
tablish probable cause to believe that the offense was committed by
the defendant. In some cases, it is appropriate for the judge to assess
the credibility of the prosecution's evidence and to weigh the defend
ant's evidence against the prosecution's. The probable cause stan
dard to be employed is whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
verdict.237
Later, in the course of a trial, the judge will make a variety of
rulings based on an assessment of the weight of particular evidence.
It is common for judges, in instructing a jury, to suggest possible
inferences, identify commonly-accepted considerations in making
credibility judgments, and comment on the evidence, thus influenc
ing the jury's exercise of its exclusive fact-finding discretion. 238
Moreover, to determine whether such instructions are consistent
with Winshp-based principles, the judge must weigh the predicate
evidence. 239 In determining whether a proposed proof-facilitating
device can be allowed to assist the prosecution in satisfying its bur
den of production, the judge, to observe due process limitations,
must assess the weight of the predicate evidence. 240
In carrying out their responsibility of determining the admissi
bility of evidence, trial judges routinely assess the potential or actual
weight of evidence.241 The judge routinely determines the relevancy
of proffered evidence. Relevant evidence is generally admissible; to
be relevant, evidence must be both probative and material. The evi
dence must have some tendency in logic, common sense or experi
237. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843,298 N.E.2d 819 (1973).
238. Sometimes the judge's decision whether to give such instructions requires a
preliminary assessment of the evidence of guilt. For example, in Commonwealth v. Nizi
olek, 380 Mass. 513, 404 N .E.2d 643 (1980) the court ruled that a trial judge may instruct
the jury that it may consider the defendant's failure to present an available witness and
infer that the witness, if presented, would have testified adversely to the defense. Id at
523, 404 N.E.2d at 649. The judge must first determine whether "the evidence against
[the defendant) is so strong that, if innocent, he would be expected to call [the missing
witness)." Id at 519-20, 404 N.E.2d at 647. Thus the judge must detennine the probable
guilt of the defendant in determining whether to give the instruction. Clearly this deter
mination will include credibility and weight judgments; in Niziolek the defendant and
the prosecution's key witness had directly contradicted each other's testimony regarding
an agreement the defendant allegedly made with the missing witness. Id at 516-17, 404
N.E.2d at 645-46.
239. "Predicate evidence" is the evidence offered as the foundation for triggering a
presumption, an inference or establishing a "prima facie case."
240. See generally Allen, supra note 7, at 348-54.
241. See generally P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK ON MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE 407-11
(5th Ed. 1981).
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ence, to make the existence some fact of consequence to the case
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 242 That
is, evidence is probative if, taken alone or in connection with other
evidence, it tends to help establish or refute the proposition for
which it is offered as proof. If this relationship cannot be estab
lished, the evidence is too "remote" to be considered relevant,243 It is
necessary, but not sufficient, that evidence be probative to be rele
vant; it must also be material. Evidence is material when it tends to
establish or refute any fact that is of consequence to the determina
tion of the case. 244 Determinations of materiality may involve com
parative judgments balancing the degree to which evidence is
probative against the likelihood that the evidence will cause confu
sion, unfair surprise or lead to the creation of collateral disputes. 245
These judgments involve assessing the weight of the particular
evidence in that its logical impact on an issue in the case must be
evaluated, either with or without reference to its relation to other
evidence. The trial judge's responsibility of assessing the weight of
evidence is clearer when the danger appears that relevant evidence
might affect the jury's judgment in an improper manner. In this cir
cumstance, the inquiry is whether the evidence is more prejudicial
than probative. The decision turns upon whether, in the trial judge's
discretion, the jury is so likely to be improperly influenced by the
evidence that its probative value is outweighed by this danger. 246
Thus, a trial judge's relevancy determinations involve a blend of as
sessments of probative worth, materiality and the discretionary ap
plication of safeguards based upon a weighing of the evidence in the
context in which it is offered. These judgments are no different in
242. FED. R. EVID. 401; PROPOSED MASS R. EVID. 401. Similar statements to this
effect are found in Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 59, 337 N.E.2d 691, 699 (1975); and
Commonwealth v. Fillippini, I Mass. App. Ct. 606, 611, 304 N.E.2d 581, 584-85 (1973).
243. Commonwealth v. Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 523, 296 N.E.2d 207, 213 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Machado, 339 Mass. 713, 715, 162 N.E.2d 71, 73 (1959); Common
wealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521,533-34, 159 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1959).
244. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
434 (2d ed. 1972).
245. Id. at 438-39.
246. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, 692, 369 N.E.2d 996, 1006
(1977); Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 344 Mass. 276, 279, 182 N.E.2d 133, 135, cerro
denied, 371 U.S. 852 (1962). This concern also arises when the pseudo-scientific nature of
the prosecution's proffered evidence creates a risk that the jury might give it undeserved
weight. A similar concern underlies the constitutional requirement that identification
evidence developed by unnecessarily suggestive means must be excluded if it creates a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. See Neil V. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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kind from those that must be made as a practical matter in the
course of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.
l.

The Judge Must Determine the Permissibility of
Suggested Inferences

The trial judge's decision whether to give a particular instruc
tion is based upon an assessment of the evidence. This assessment is
indistinguishable from a sufficiency determination. 247 In making a
sufficiency determination, the judge is required to survey possible
inferences and determine whether they are sufficiently supported by
the prosecution's evidence so as to permit the jury to rely upon them
in deciding the issue of guilt. The question is whether a possible
inference is "forbidden by some special rule of law, or is declared
unwarranted because too remote according to the ordinary course of
events."248 The nature of the trial judge's assessment of the evidence
for this purpose is worth consideration. On one hand, examination
of the terminology used to describe the nature of the inquiry demon
strates the discretionary and necessarily ad hoc quality of it. On the
other hand, examination of the assessment process will demonstrate
the extent to which this responsibility casts the trial judge in the role
of preliminary fact-finder.
A variety of terms have been used to describe the threshold
quality that an inference must have if it is to aid the prosecution in
satisfying its burden of production. In addition to Justice Holmes'
description of an appropriate inference as one that is not "too re
mote,"249 the following are common and appear to be regarded as
synonymous: "possible and reasonable,"250 "probable but not neces
247. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 499-501, 436 N.E.2d~, 405-06
(1982).
248. Commonwealth v. Ashemowski, 196 Mass. 342, 347, 82 N.E. 13, 14 (1907)
(quoting Holmes, J. in Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 137 Mass. 245, 247 (1884»; see a/so
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676,393 N.E.2d 370, 373-74 (1979). Unwar
ranted inferences to be guarded against include those which might be drawn from
prosecutorial reference to, or use of, material or facts not actually offered in evidence.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass. 179, 187 n.8, 439 N.E.2d 257, 262 n.8
(1982) (repeated use of document never offered in evidence to "refresh" recollection of
witness); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 487, 265 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1970) (un
substantiated claim made in opening statement); see a/so Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415,416-17 (1965) (facts similar to Amado).
.
249. Commonwealth v. Ashemowski, 196 Mass. 342, 347, 82 N.E. 13, 14 (1907).
250. Commonwealth v. Earltop, 372 Mass. 199, 201, 361 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1977);
see Commonwealth v. Wilbome, 382 Mass. 241, 244-45, 415 N.E.2d 192, 195-96 (1981).
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sary or compelling,"251 reasonable, warranted,252 and "relevant."253
"Remoteness" commonly is used as a criterion of admissibility to
describe an element of relevance. It is used to assess the need to
exclude relevant evidence because of a danger of unwarranted em
phasis by the jury.254 It is not necessary to distinguish between the
relevancy of an inference and its sufficiency unless the inference is
being used as the sole evidence available to establish the prosecu
tion's case on an essential element of the crime. In such circum
stances, the need to assess the extent to which the evidence supports
conflicting inferences may force the judge to weigh the relative per
suasive force of the possible inferences in view of the available
evidence.
Consider the dispute in Commonwealth v. Howard 255 over
whether the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the
251. E.g., Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 463, 416 N.E.2d 944, 953
(1981).
252. E.g., Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 500, 350 N.E.2d 436, 443
(1976).
253. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 244-45, 415 N.E.2d 192,
195-96 (1981).
254. In Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959), evidence
had been admitted that the defendant had been engaged in an extramarital affair which
had been discovered and thwarted by the defendant's wife (the murder victim) seven
months before the killing. Id at 533-34, 159 N.E.2d at 864. Conceding that the evidence
supported an inference of hostility on the defendant's part toward his wife, the court
noted that it also tended to prove other crimes (presumably adultery and/or fornication)
and ruled that it was inadmissible as being too remote in time. Id at 534, 159 N.E.2d at
864.
The danger of overemphasis is more acute where the reasonableness of single-factor
inferences are involved. The commonly used inference permitting the jury to find that
one who possesses recently stolen goods knew the goods were stolen, presents an espe
cially acute problem of remoteness because of its great potential for distortion. This
potential is found in its implied suggestion that knowledge of the stolen character of the
goods can be inferred from a single fact rather than from an assessment of all of the
circumstances under which the property was received. It is exacerbated by the tenuous
relevance of the single predicate fact: the length of the interval between the theft and the
time of receipt. Although it articulated extremely loose standards, the supreme judicial
court in Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 335 N.E.2d 903 (1975), ruled that the
remoteness of this inference was, at the extremes, an issue for the trial judge to decide
and, between those extremes, an issue for the jury to decide. Id at 744, 335 N.E.2d at
913. As to property stolen 13 months before the defendant received it, the trial judge had
directed the jury that it was not recently stolen and could not be considered as a basis for
the inference of knowledge. Id at 742,335 N.E.2d at 912. The court's suggestion that, as
to very short intervals, the trial judge might permissibly have directed the jury that it
must consider the property to have been recently stolen, id at 742, 744, 335 N.E.2d at
913, obviously raises due process issues which were not carefully considered. See United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); .Commonwealth v.
Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185,302-03 (1855).
255. 386 Mass. 607,436 N.E.2d 1211 (1982).
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defendant was armed when he robbed the victim. 256 . The only evi
dence available on this elemental issue was presented by the prose
cution. The defendant approached the victim with his hand in his
pocket, saying: "Walk straight, look down and don't try anything
foolish or I'll pull the trigger."257 The police arrived while the rob
bery was in progress; the defendant was unarmed when arrested and
no gun was found in the vicinity. The victim did not see a
weapon. 258
The defendant's statement to the victim implying that he was
armed might support an inference that he was actually armed, but
the fact that he was not armed when arrested in the course of the
robbery suggests an inference to the contrary. During the robbery,
the defendant had taken the victim into an apartment building
(where he took her purse) and then into an alley, where he required
her to empty her pockets (he was arrested in or near the alley; the
victim was still with him).259 There had been some opportunity for
the defendant to dispose of a weapon, if he had one. 260 Thus the
following chain of "possible" inferences might be constructed: the
defendant implied that he was armed, acted as if he was armed and
may have had some opportunity to dispose of a weapon. 261 The rea
sonableness of inferring beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend
ant was armed without considering and weighing the other possible
inferences is questionable. The defendant's statement to the victim
could have been a bluff and the inference that it was a bluff is rein
forced by the facts that (1) the victim did not see a weapon; (2) the
defendant was unarmed when arrested at the scene; and (3) an im
mediate search of the vicinity for a weapon was fruitless. 262 The
"prosecution's best case"263 rule might lead a trial judge to conclude
that he is required to consider the prosecution's proposed inference
in isolation, and determine whether the inference is not too remote
256. The court in Howard suggested that because the statutory range of potential
sentences for unarmed robbery is the same as for armed robbery, the defendant's interest
in this issue was "largely academic." fd. at 608-09 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 1212 n.2. Sentenc
ing guidelines indicate, however, that the sentence for unarmed robbery is likely to be
substantially less harsh than for armed robbery. See Massachusetts Superior Court De
partment Sentencing Guidelines, (May 15, I 980-Nov. 15, 1980) (unpublished). Simi
larly, the parole board views the offenses differently.
257. 386 Mass. at 607,436 N.E.2d at 1211.
258. fd. at 609, 436 N.E.2d at 1212.
259. fd.
260. fd. at 619, 436 N.E.2d at 1217 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
261. fd.
262. fd. at 612-13, 436 N.E.2d at 1214 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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in the ordinary course of events. The actual reasonableness of the
prosecution's suggested inference cannot be judged fairly out of con
text, that is, without considering each step in the suggested reasoning
process. 264 The defendant's statement and conduct during the rob
bery without more, would not support beyond a reasonable doubt a
conclusion that he was actually armed because he was not armed
when arrested. The strongest inference based on this evidence is that
the defendant was not armed at any time during the robbery. The
additional evidence of an opportunity to dispose of the weapon
could be construed as further support for the "armed" inference but
this is equally consistent with the "unarmed" inference. 265 The evi
dence that the victim did not see a weapon is, at best, neutral. The
final state of the evidence, assessed in this step-by-step manner, does
not reasonably support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the inference
that the defendant was armed.
The process of assessing the permissibility of the prosecution's
suggested infrences, then, necessarily requires the judge to weigh
ambiguous evidence-evidence which supports conflicting, incrimi
nating and exculpatory inferences. The inquiry is whether the evi
dence provides a reasonable basis upon which the jury could prefer
the incriminating inference. This approach provides a basis for
resolving the conflict recently aired in Commonwealth v. Nelson,266 a
conflict between two apparently irreconcilable sets of evaluative
principles to be applied in evaluating ambiguous evidence. 267 The
Nelson majority applied principles which allowed the evidence to be
sufficient if it permits a guilty inference even if it does not require
that inference. 268 In dissent, Chief Justice Hennessey argued that
two additional principles should be applied: First, if the evidence
leaves the question of guilt to "conjecture or surmise" and does not
provide a "solid foundation in established fact" for the guilty infer
ence, it is insufficient; and second, if the evidence "tends equally to
sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can
264. The process followed in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in Common
wealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 491-500, 350 N.E.2d 436, 438-43 (1976), illustrates this
step-by-step approach.
265. From this Justice O'Connor argues that the evidence of opportunity was not
relevant to the prosecution's proposed inference. 386 Mass. at 613, 436 N.E.2d at 1214
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
266. 370 Mass. 192,346 N.E.2d 839 (1976).
267. See id at 201-03, 346 N.E.2d at 845-46; id at 206-08, 346 N.E.2d at 847-49
(Hennessey, c.J., dissenting).
268. Id at 203, 436 N.E.2d at 845.
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be said to have been established by legitimate proof."269
A quick reconsideration of the Howard facts demonstrates that
Justice Hennessey's principles are applicable when the evidence of
fers no reasonable basis for selecting the incriminating inference
over the exculpatory one. In Howard, the inference that the defend
ant had actually had and disposed of a weapon only could be based
on conjecture and surmise; nothing in the evidence supported that
conclusion as a probability. There was no "solid foundation in es
tablished fact" for that conclusion. Because the prosecution's evi
dence (at best) tended to sustain either inference equally neither was
established by legitimate proof. Thus the practice of weighing con
flicting inferences based upon ambiguous evidence to determine
whether the prosecution's suggested inference is permissible, and its
evidence accordingly sufficient, is one firmly established in Massa
chusetts practice.
2.

The Judge Must Determine Whether Necessary
Credibility Judgments are Reasonably Supported
by Evidence

Credibility judgments are the aspect of fact-finding most un
equivocally reserved as the jury's exclusive province. 270 Yet the
principle of Jackson v. Virginkj271-that it is the trial judge's consti
tutional duty to insure that a case is not submitted to the jury unless
the prosecution has presented reasonable evidentiary basis to sup
port each essential element of the crime272-logically applies to cred
ibility issues. The case in which the prosecution's evidence does not
provide a reasonable basis for making a credibility judgment needed
to support a finding of guilt will be rare. In most cases, the reason
able basis for discrimination will appear simply from the fact that
the evidence to be evaluated has been presented through witness tes
timony. The jury's opportunity to observe and listen to the witness
will furnish a reasonable basis for its credibility judgments.
The exceptional case will be similar to Commonwealth v. John
73
son2 in which the key evidence of guilt presented by the prosecu
tion was the defendant's written confession and the needed
269. Id. at 206, 436 N.E.2d at 847 (Hennessey, C.]., dissenting).
270. See Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass. 136, 145-47, 365 N.E.2d 815,
821 (1977) ("the jury have the sole power to believe or disbelieve any or all such
evidence").
271. 443 U.S. 307 (1977).
272. Id. at 315-16.
273. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1975).
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incriminating inferences could be drawn only if the jury chose to
believe the incriminating portions of the statement and disbelieve
the exculpatory portions. 274 The prosecution presented no evidence
which the jury could use as a basis for reasonably discriminating
between the defendant's admission that he had killed the victim with
a knife and his assertion that the victim had first attacked him with
the knife. 275 If no reasonable evidentiary basis for the jury's credi
bility judgments is discernible from the prosecution's evidence, then
the defendant is exposed to the risk of either being arbitrarily con
victed or of being required to provide the essential credibility evi
dence in his or her own case. 276
A more difficult case is presented when the defendant's evidence
casts such serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's testi
monial evidence on an essential element of the crime that the prose
cution's evidence cannot reasonably be believed. Ordinarily, no
sufficiency issue is presented because the operation of prosecution's
best case rule and the exclusive fact-finding prerogative of the jury
combine to shield the problem from the judge's scrutiny in the suffi
ciency process. Nevertheless, the supreme judicial court has indi
cated that such a situation may present a sufficiency of the evidence
issue.
When a defense includes an alibi, the prosecution's best case
rule presents difficult obstacles to an effective assessment of the suffi
ciency of the prosecution's identification evidence, particularly when
the evidence consists principally of solely or eyewitness identifica
tion. The chief difficulties are illustrated by the recent case of Com
274. Id. at 232, 326 N.E.2d at 359.
275. Id. at 232-33, 326 N.E.2d at 360. The appeals court ruled that there was no
basis, even internal inconsistency or implausibility, on which the jury might have relied
to reasonably believe one part of the transcribed statement and disbelieve the remainder.
Id. at 233, 326 N.E.2d at 360.
In Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass. 136, 365 N.E.2d 815 (1977), the
supreme judicial court explicitly repudiated the appeals court's reasoning on this point,
asserting in effect that a jury's credibility judgments need not be reasonable, or, to the
same effect, cannot be regulated to assure reasonableness. Id. at 142,365 N.E.2d at 819;
see supra notes 184-206 and accompanying text.
.
276. In Johnson the defendant testified at trial that he had not made the statements
attributed to him and asserted that he had not killed the decedent. He claimed he had
been cut breaking up a fight between the decedent and two other men. He had, however,
developed such severe psychiatric problems shortly after his arrest that he was hospital
ized for a competency evaluation. 3 Mass. App. Ct. at 227-28, 365 N.E.2d at 356-57.
While his bizarre testimony may account for the jury's verdict, it is irrelevant to the issue
of the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case. See Common
wealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 408, 348 N.E.2d 794, 799 (1976).
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monwealth v. Woods,277 in which the supreme judicial court
intimated that it might relax or modify the usual restrictions imposed
upon the trial judge's view of the evidence in such cases. 278 The
Woods case is worth discussing in some detail because it demon
strates a number of points regarding the influence of preliminary
proceedings on the sufficiency assessment in addition to demonstrat
ing why the trial judge must have the discretion to consider weight
and credibility in assessing sufficiency.
The defendant was charged with a rape which had occurred,
according to the indictment, in Boston near a MBTA station at 7:00
A.M. on September 23, 1975. 279 The first effort to try the case ended
in a mistrial on the prosecutor's opening statement; the trial resulting
in defendant Woods' conviction occurred in October, 1978. In re
sponse to the prosecution's pretrial demand for disclosure of alibi,280
the defense gave notice of its intent to show, through the record
keeper of the Suffolk County House of Correction at Deer Island,
that the defendant had been imprisoned continuously there between
December 19, 1974, and October 9, 1975, serving a sentence. 281 In
stitutional records indicated that Woods had been furloughed sev
eral times for short periods in September 1975 but had been
continuously confined from 10:30 A.M. on September 19 through
3:30 P.M. on September 26, 1975. He had been in Boston on a fur
lough from noon on September 18 until 10:30 A.M. September 19
and had returned to Deer Island on the latter date via the MBTA
277. 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980).
278. See id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. But see Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass.
179,181 n.l, 439 N.E.2d 257, 258 n.l (1983), where the court stated that alibi evidence is
not to be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence either at the close of the
prosecution's case or at the close of all the evidence.
279. 382 Mass. at 2, 413 N.E.2d at 1100. The indictments were returned in June,
1977. The victim had been unable to identify her assailant until she saw the defendant's
photograph in a two-page spread she was examining after having reported a burglary of
her apartment in March, 1977. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7.
The time of 7 A.M. is from the victim's trial testimony rather than the indictment,
which specified the date only. The early morniiJ.g hour of the rape was never in doubt.
Considerable circumstantial evidence supported the grand jury's specification of Septem
ber 23 as the correct date. See id. at 2-3, 413 N.E.2d at 1100-01. In addition, the victim's
contemporaneous reports to her roommates and parents and testimony at her probable
cause hearing and before the grand jury all pointed to that date. Finally, her belated
reports to a hospital on October I, 1975 and to the police on November 8, 1975 identified
September 23 as the date of the rape. Id. at 4,413 N.E.2d at 1101.
280. The trial occurred before July I, 1979, the effective date of the Massachusetts
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 14(b)(I) would have required disclosure of the alibi
and its evidentiary basis had the trial occurred after the rules took effect. See MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 14(b)(I).
281. Woods, 382 Mass. at 5, 413 N.E.2d at 1102.
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train system. 282
At the outset of the first trial, the prosecution was permitted,
over objection, to amend the indictment to allege that the rape oc
curred "on or about" rather than "on" September 23, 1975. 283 In the
second trial, the victim identified Woods in the courtroom as her
assailant and testified that the rape had occurred "in the latter part
of September."284 In short, the prosecution's case-in-chief consisted
of a dubious identification bolstered by the inferences it could mus
ter by exploiting the ambiguity of the amended accusatlon and the
uncertainties in its own witnesses' recollections. 285 As the supreme
judicial court noted, the prosecution's case created the distinct im
pression that it had been fashioned to fit the only possible opening in
the defendant's otherwise unimpeachable alibi evidence. 286
Although the supreme judicial court treated Woods as a special
case justifying remedial action to "avoid the reproach that justice
may have miscarried," the lower courts had treated the case as rou
tine. 287 The trial judge denied the defendant's motions for required
findings of not guilty at the close of all the evidence and for a new
trial, commenting that the case was tried to a jury on fact issues upon
which the trial judge could not substitute his own judgment-the
trial was fair and justice was done. 288 The appeals court summarily
affirmed the conviction in a rescrip opinion. 289 The supreme judicial
court hinted that it would have found the evidence insufficient and
reversed the trial judge's decision to submit the case to the jury, had
282. Id.
283. Id. at 10, 413 N.E.2d at 1104-05.
284. Id. at 2, 413 N.E.2d at 1100. The victim had initially described the rapist to
the police (November 8, 1975) "as black, young, under six feet tali, of medium build,
wearing short Afro-style hair." Id. at 3, 413 N.E.2d at 1101. In June 1977, having made
an initial photographic identification that March, she chanced to see Woods alone be
hind an enclosure in the court room as she waited to testify at the probable cause hear
ing. No lineup or other comparative identification procedure was conducted. Id. at 4,7,
413 N.E.2d at 1101, 1103.
285. The victim had identified the date as September 23, a Tuesday (as September
23 was; September 19 was a Friday) and as the day after a holiday. Neither September
18 nor 22 was a holiday. The only Monday holidays in September 1975 were the 1st
(Labor Day) and the 15th (Yom Kippur). Id. at 4, 413 N.E.2d at 1102. Jail records
showed that Woods was released on a furlough at 10:10 A.M. on September 2 and incar
cerated on September 16. Id. at 5, 413 N.E.2d at 1102.
286. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7.
287. Id. at 8-10, 413 N.E.2d at 1103-04.
288. Commonwealth v. Woods, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816, 397 N.E.2d 1302, 1302
(1980).
289. Commonwealth v. Woods, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 406 N.E.2d 1054 (1980).
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the defendant pressed this claim on appeal.290
The trial judge had grounded his sufficiency ruling on the vic
tim's testimony.291 Acknowledging this, the court intimated that the
sufficiency of the prosecution's identification evidence presented a
close question. 292 But the prosecution's evidence in its case-in-chief,
interpreted in its most favorable light, was clearly sufficient to sup
port a finding that Woods was the rapist, with the only doubts at this
point arising from the victim's credibility, an issue reserved for the
jury.293 Whether the evidence tending to show that the rape oc
curred September 19 was sufficient to prove that the crime was com
mitted "on or about September 23" addresses the weight of the
evidence, and is similarly shielded from judicial scrutiny.294 Because
the precise date and time of the offense become material only in light
of the defendant's alibi evidence, a judge has no occasion to consider
the feebleness of the evidence on this point at the close of the prose
cution's case. At the close of the defense evidence, all doubts about
the evidence fall under the rubric of credibility and weight and must
290. See 382 Mass. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103.
291. Id. This testimony was not uncorroborated except on the point of identifica
tion. She had made contemporaneous reports of the rape to her roommates and parents.
Id. at 3, 413 N.E.2d at 1101. Her in-court identification of the defendant was unequivo
cal. Id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103. Ifbelieved, her testimony offered sufficient support for
the conviction. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 38 (1982).
292. See 382 Mass. at 10-11, 413 N.E.2d at 1105.
The judge denied directed verdicts at the close of all the evidence, resting the
denial on the testimony of the victim. On this appeal, the defendant has pre
ferred not to press his exception to the ruling. However, "to sustain the denial
of a directed verdict, it is not enough for the appellate court to find that there
was some record evidence, however slight, to support each essential element of
the offense; it must find that there was enough evidence that could have satisfied
a rational trier of fact of each such element beyond a reasonable doubt" . . .
including here the proposition that it was this defendant who was the assailant.
In this aspect the denial of the direct verdict motions could not be accounted an
easy decision.
Id. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103.
293. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370, 373-74
(1979).
294. Ordinarily, an indictment must be proved as charged. But variations are per
mitted between indictment and proof so long as the variation is neither material (e.g.,
changes the offense charged or otherwise alters the work of the grand jury) nor prejudi
cial to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Ohanian, 373 Mass. 839, 843, 370 N.E.2d 695,
697 (1977). In an alibi case, a variation in date and time might be considered prejudicial
to the defense. The court did not address this issue in Woods. The permissibility of an
amendment is governed by essentially the same considerations as govern the permissibil
ity of a variation. See Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 869-70, 434 N.E.2d 633,
639 (1982).
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be left to the jury.295
The need to permit the trial judge to assess the credibility and
weight of the prosecution's identification evidence in determining its
sufficiency appears clearly in the Woods case. The supreme judicial
court's comments regarding sufficiency intimate that there is room
for such an assessment in the requirement that the trial judge" 'find
that there is enough evidence that could have satisfied a reasonable
trier of fact ... beyond a reasonable doubt.' "296 The suggestion
that the victim's identification was not sufficiently firm or positive to
satisfy that standard is based on an assessment of the weight-and
perhaps credibility-of that witness' testimony. The strength of
Woods' alibi and the direct quote from People v. McGee2 97 indicate
that the assessment includes weighing the identification evidence
against the alibi evidence. Such a judgment is clearly inconsistent
with the pre-Jackson restrictions but is consistent with the proposal
advanced here that it is the trial judge's responsibility to insure that
the evidence presents a reasonable basis for the weight and credibil
ity judgments needed to infer guilt. 298
The Woods procedural facts also highlight the manner in which
pretrial proceedings will often directly affect the trial judge's ability
to effectively assess sufficiency at a factual level. Clearly the practice
of requiring the defense to plead defensive claims before trial creates
a need for judges to be alert to the possibility that the prosecution's
evidence will be manipulated to meet the contours of the defendant's
295. The rule of Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147,346 N.E.2d 368 (1976),
requires reconsideration of the prosecution's case on the defendant's motion at the close
of all the evidence to determine whether the prosecution's case has deteriorated. Id at
150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.!. While it might be interpreted as applying to elemental
defensive issues on which the defense has met its burden of production, the defendant's
evidence cannot cause the prosecution's position to deteriorate simply by contradicting
the prosecution's evidence.
To the author's knowledge, this rule has not been applied in a reported Massachu
setts case. Unless it abrogates the "prosecution's best case" rules after the defendant's
evidence is presented, however, any "deterioration" must be internal to the prosecution's
Common
case. For example, key evidence might have been stricken in the interim.
wealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 294-97, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1102-04 (1979) (testimony of
prosecution witness who invoked privilege against self-incrimination, preventing effec
tive cross-examination, should have been stricken; without that witness' testimony, di
rected verdict appropriate).
296. 382 Mass. at 7, 413 N.E.2d at 1103 (quoting People v. McGee, 21 Ill. 2d 440,
445, 173 N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961».
297. 21 Ill. 2d 440, 445, 173 N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961).
298. The supreme judicial court's ruling in Commonwealth v. Amado, 387 Mass.
179, 439 N.E.2d 257 (1982), makes it clear that its discussion of the sufficiency of the
Woods identification has not yet been translated into active principle.
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position. 299 The case also demonstrates that judges ought to con
sider, in ruling on motions for bills of particulars and amendments
to indictments, whether the proposed action will assist or undermine
their task of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. In general, the
more narrowly focused and directly contested the factual issues are,
the simpler the sufficiency assessment will be.
The essential teaching of Jackson is that an effective assessment
of the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is a step of funda
mental importance in insuring the fairness and established balance
of the adversary trial.3 oo The judge'S basic responsibility is to insure
that a case is not submitted to a jury unless the evidence presents a
reasonable basis for finding guilt. 30 I The foregoing survey of the
sufficiency assessment process, as it is administered in Massachu
setts, demonstrates the need for and feasibility of several basic modi
fications in this process. The pre-Jackson requirements that the trial
judge invariably view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution is inimical to the Jackson requirements of reasonable
ness, particularly when applied to elemental defensive issues. Simi
larly, the practice of prohibiting the trial judge from making 1) those
weight and credibility judgments necessary to insure that the evi
dence reasonably supports guilty inferences and 2) other weight and
credibility judgments needed reserved to the jury in order to convict
thwarts the Jackson principle by leaving the jury free to make un
supported judgments in those areas.
The proposed modifications would bring the Massachusetts'
sufficiency assessment process in line with constitutional principle
without significantly altering the actual division of fact-finding re
sponsibility between judge and jury. The constitutional policy of
making the jury the primary fact-finders in a criminal case is
designed to protect the accused from the danger of arbitrary or op
pressive prosecution and conviction. 302 The trial judge cannot direct
a verdict of guilty or unilaterally enter a judgment of conviction in a
jury trial, even when the evidence is overwhelming. 303 But while the
trial judge cannot infringe upon the jury's fact-finding discretion to
299. Indications of this kind of prosecutorial misconduct can legitimately be con
sidered relevant to the credibility of the witness and the weight of the witness' testimony.
300. See 443 U.S. at 307.
301. Id. at 317-24.
302. Eg., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373-74 (Powell, J., concurring)
(1972); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185,207-10 (1855).
303. Eg., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977).
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the defendant's disadvantage,304 that limitation does not extend to
actions favorable to the defendant, even if erroneous. 305 The policy
of making the jury the primary fact finders, then, should not be used
to justify submitting to it cases which might result in unjust
convictions.
Present Massachusetts practice regularly involves trial judges in
determining the permissibility of possible inferences and assessing
the possible or likely impact of evidence on a jury. Through jury
instructions, judges commonly influence jurors' views of credibility,
weight and likely inferential relationships between evidence and
legal conclusions. The proposed modification of the judge's view of
the evidence, then, would alter the sufficiency process slightly but
would have little impact on the actual division of fact-finding re
sponsibility between judge and jury in Massachusetts.
III.

WEIGHING EVIDENCE IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE

When the new Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure went
into effect on July 1, 1979, the trial judges of the district and superior
court departments were granted an extraordinary and somewhat
mysterious authority to correct jury verdicts of guilty in criminal
cases. The power is extraordinary-both because its scope is unprec
edented and because it authorizes a specialized kind of decisionmak
ing that is not easily confined to the usual systemic restraints of
standard and procedure. It is a power which can be applied to any
criminal case tried to a jury and is so flexible that it lends itself to
ameliorate any element of unwarranted harshness in the application
of the criminal law to a case.
This remarkable power is contained in a single sentence of Rule
25(b)(2); everything else to be known about it must be derived from
the study of related or analogous provisions. Its place in the system's
repertoire of post-conviction remedies has not yet been clearly estab
lished, but it is possible to begin to characterize this power and locate
it within this context. Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) provides:
If a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on motion set aside
304. This limitation often receives less than full attention where jury instructions
regarding inferences and presumptions are involved. Allen, supra note 7, at 326-39. BUI
see Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (instruction as to credibility of defense
witness unfairly reduced the prosecution's burden of proof).
305. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78 (1978); United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568-76 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141,
142-43 (1962). The application of the Winship standard is not exclusively the province of
the jury. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317 n.lO; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25.
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the verdict and order a new trial, or order the entry of a finding of
not guilty, or order the entry of a finding of guilty of any offense
included in the offense charged in the indictment or complaint. 306

There are no accompanying provisions that state the grounds upon
which relief may be granted, set out the criteria by which it can be
determined that acceptable grounds have been adequately estab
lished, or define standards by which the appropriate form of relief
can be determined.
A.

The Purposes and History

of the Power to Revise Jury

Verdicts

Evidence of the function and purpose of this grant of authority
in Rule 25 can be discerned from its context-it is found in the rule
of procedure governing the trial court's duty to regulate the jury's
fact-finding discretion and it constitutes a form of post-conviction
remedy additional to that provided for in Rule 30. 307 Additionally,
it is similar to the supreme judicial court's section 33E powers. 30B
1.

Purposes

The Reporter's Notes to Rule 25 state that the purpose of the
second sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) is to extend to trial courts the duty
and power to reduce verdicts vested in the supreme judicial court by
section 33E.309 Section 33E in its present form requires the court, in
all homicide cases resulting in a first degree murder conviction, to
review the law and the facts broadly to determine whether the jury's
verdict represents a miscarriage of justice. If the court finds that
there has been a miscarriage of justice, the provision empowers it to
grant a new trial or reduce the jury's verdict by ordering entry of a
finding of guilty of any lesser included offense. 310 Although trial
courts may look to the supreme judicial court's exercise of its section
306. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2).
307. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § II (West 1981)
provides:
If a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty is denied and the case is
submitted to the jury and a verdict of guilty is returned, the judge may on a
renewed motion for a directed verdict of not guilty pursuant to the Massachu
setts Rules of Criminal Procedure set aside the verdict and order a new trial, or
order the entry of a finding of guilty of any offense included in the offense
charged in the indictment or complaint.
308. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981); see infra text accom
panying notes 309-10.
309. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a) reporter's note at 502.
310. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). By virtue of the supreme
judicial court's interpretation of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 6 (West 1970), in
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 371 Mass. 605, 607, 358 N.E.2d 786, 787 (1976), all first de
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33E powers for guidance, section 33E and Rule 25(b)(2) are far from
congruent and the guidance provided by th~ supreme judicial court
is not always clearly expressed. The supreme judicial court itself has
not been guided by any but the most general standards; it has viewed
its section 33E powers as discretionary. An observation the court
recently made about its power to review unpreserved errors of law
could just as easily be made regarding its power to review jury con
victions of first degree murder:
Discretionary decisions by individual judges inevitably produce
variations in result in substantially similar factual situations.
Statements explanatory of such decisions may serve "no sharp an
alytical purpose." At least one Justice of this court has found it
difficult to rationalize our decisions. . " Although we have
sometimes engaged in the dangerous practice of comparing discre
tionary decisions, we have recognized that "§ 33£ review is not
simply a process of "color matching.' "311
Thus, despite the availability of a body of murder cases in
which analogous powers have been exercised, a number of funda
mental questions remain regarding the nature and extent of the trial
court's new Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) powers:
a.

On what basis may the power be exercised?

The supreme judicial court's section 33E power to reduce a ver
dict has been exercised based upon the supreme judicial court's view
in a particular case of the "weight of the evidence."312 Its power to
gree murder indictments must be tried by a jury. Accordingly, section 33E, like Rule
25(b)(2) (second sentence), applies only to jury verdicts.
This function was first codified in 1939. Before that the power to grant a new trial
was considered to be within the court's inherent powers. Commonwealth v. Greene, 17
Mass. (I Pick.) 417, 429 (1822). In 1939 it was enlarged to permit review of the facts as
well as the law. This expansion was attributable at least in part to dissatisfaction gener
ated by the nature of the appellate review given the cases of Sacco and Vanzetti. Com
monwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 168, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120 (1978); see
Commonwealth v. Sacco, 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167 (1927) (convictions in 1921, review
.
completed 1927, executions carried out 1927).
Until 1962 the only remedy authorized by section 33E was a new trial. In that year
the court was further authorized to reduce the jury's verdict. See Commonwealth v.
Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109, 190 N.E.2d 555, 557 (1963). Between 1962 and 1979 the court
reviewed 230 cases, presumably all of the first and second degree verdicts returned in the
Commonwealth during that period. It reduced the verdict in thirteen of those cases. See
Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d 905, 912 n.9 (1981). It
granted new trials in an undetermined number of others. Id.
311. Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 759, 412 N.E.2d 354, 357-58 (1980)
(citations omitted).
312. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E.2d 241 (1944).
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grant a new trial has been exercised on both "weight of the evi
dence" grounds and on the ground that an irremediable trial error
created a "substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice" oc
curred. 313 The court has never had the authority to order entry of a
finding of not guilty in the face of a jury verdict, as trial judges now
do. The trial judges' power is unprecedented and there are no au
thoritative standards or guidelines to govern its exercise.
b.

What function or functions is the power intended to serve?

In all cases the trial judge is required to screen the evidence
before requiring the defendant to defend by evaluating the legal suf
ficiency of the prosecution's evidence before submitting a case to the
jury for a decision. 314 The effectiveness of this "quality control"
function is limited by the requirement referred to in this discussion
as the "prosecution's best case" rule: The judge must interpret the
evidence in every respect in the light most favorable to the prosecu
tion. The effectiveness is further limited, and in some cases elimi
nated, by the operation of a number of procedural and evidentiary
devices that result in shifting the burden of producing evidence on a
given issue to the defendant (affirmative defenses) or that facilitate
proof of the prosecution's case through the use of inferences and pre
sumptions. The use of imprecisely defined terms to express essential
elements of an offense, or the vagueness in the indictment on such
issues as the time, place and manner in which the offense occurred,
also impair the effectiveness of sufficiency evaluations designed to
protect defendants from the mischief of having to defend unfounded
charges.
The location of this power within the structure of Rule 25 and
the uses to which the supreme judicial court has put its section 33E
verdict reduction powers, suggest that this is a primary function of
the trial court's newly acquired "quality control" authority. Unlike
the Rule 30 power to grant a new trial, Rule 25 is to be invoked and
exercised before an appeal, by addressing largely nonappealable
problems and, secondarily, to eliminate the need or impetus for an
appeal. The power is intended to be used or at least should be used
principally to complete the trial court's ability to discharge its duty
in regulating the scope of the jury's fact-finding discretion. Rule 25
313. See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975).
314. Because the Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) power is limited in its application
to jury cases, the factfinder, for purposes of most of this paper, will be a jury. Where it is
not, the general term will be used.
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embodies a recognition that, as properly instructed juries may never
theless convict on insufficient evidence, such juries may also-be
cause of the influence of the devices mentioned above-return
verdicts that are so against the weight of the evidence as to suggest
that either the judgment of guilt or the assessment of the degree of
guilt may have been based upon or has been decisively influenced by
nonevidentiary considerations. The strongest indication of such a
problem is, of course, a case in which the legal sufficiency of the
prosecution's case has not been thoroughly evaluated, is marginal, or
has been artificially enhanced by the effect of one or more of the
aforementioned procedural devices.
c.

On what basis should the appropriate remedy be selected?

The example of the supreme judicial court's exercise of section
33E power is not fully instructive on how an appropriate remedy
may be selected in an exercise of Rule 25 power. The court has
never exercised the full range of remedial powers under section 33E
that is now available to trial judges under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen
tence). A narrow interpretation of the grounds upon which a trial
judge may exercise these powers would eliminate unpreserved, re
versible trial error as a basis, and further limit the trial courts to
grant relief based upon an assessment of the weight of the evidence.
Although it is not central to the inquiry of this paper, it is suggested
that the latter remedy is appropriate only when, in the court's view,
the weight of the evidence leads it to conclude that important, avail
able, relevant evidence favorable to the defendant, has not been
presented to the jury.3lS
The supreme judicial court's discretionary authority to reduce
verdicts based upon its view that the weight of the evidence has pro
duced ample basis for establishing standards, but several characteris
tics of cases in which the court has exercised its power suggest that
care should be exercised not to demand of these cases more than
they can provide. 316 While their homogeneity-all of the section
33E reduced verdict cases are homicide cases-makes them an ideal
reference for degree of guilt issues, most of the cases shed little light
315. Under MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30, such evidence would warrant granting a new
trial only if it were "newly discovered." See Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12,
25, 140 N.E. 470, 475 (1923). Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) is not limited by such
qualifications. Cf. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 607, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827
(1975).
316. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 412 N.E.2d 354 (1980).
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on how a judge should deal with cases in which guilt is the only issue
and the weight of the evidence is inadequate to support the verdict.
The section 33E cases involving reduction of verdicts will be
analyzed first to discover the method used by the court to assess the
weight of the evidence. Second, the cases will be analyzed to dis
cover patterns in the methods used and the elements of the offense in
question.
The section 33E cases fit roughly into three categories. In the
first, the court's view of the weight of the evidence does not involve
any significant revision of the factual findings implied by the jury's
verdict, but the verdict is found by the court to be disproportionate
to those verdicts rendered in similar factual cases. 317 In the second,
the court's view of the weight of the evidence involves substantial
revisions of the factual findings implied by the jury's verdict, and
while the evidence is still legally sufficient to support the verdict, the
verdict is considered to be disproportionate to the facts; it is too
harsh on the revised facts, for example. 318 Each of these two catego
ries account for roughly forty percent of the verdict reduction cases.
In the third category, the court's view of the weight of the evidence
involves a revision of the jury's implied findings and leads the court
to the conclusion that the weight of the evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict. 319
In most cases, the court's primary conclusion that the verdict is
not supported by the weight of the evidence is accompanied by a
secondary conclusion that the court's view of the evidence supports a
verdict of guilty of some lesser included offense. 32o That is, the inad
equacy found is limited to that evidence addressed to a particular
element that defines the distinction, for example, between murder
and manslaughter (malice aforethought). In such a case, the murder
verdict would be revised to a manslaughter verdict. In some cases,
however, the court's view of the weight of the evidence has-led it to
grant a new trial rather than to reduce the verdict. 321 For example,
in insanity cases in which the prosecution relies solely on the "pre
sumption of sanity" to get its case to the jury, the court has found the
jury's guilty verdict to be against the weight of the evidence and or
317. The evidence is, by hypothesis, legally sufficient in this class of cases. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 190 N.E.2d 555 (1963).
318. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833
(1975).
319. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975).
320. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams 364 Mass. 145,301 N.E.2d 683 (1973).
321. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
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dered a new trial.3 22 Another example is a second degree murder
case which involved a defense of accident where the court found no
basis in the evidence for a verdict greater than involuntary man
slaughter (recklessness) and ordered a new trial on that charge only.
In effect the court ordered findings of not guilty on the greater
charges. 323 The proposition will be developed that these types of
cases may provide a basis for developing at least rudimentary guide
lines for the exercise of the trial court's unique Rule 25 power to
order a finding of not guilty based upon its view of the weight of the
evidence.
The second sentence of Rule 25(b)(2) grants the trial court the
authority to provide relief from a jury's guilty verdict by setting the
verdict aside and granting a new trial, ordering a finding of not
guilty, or ordering a finding of guilty on any lesser offense included
in the charge. 324 The rule does not provide guidance for the court in
determining when it is appropriate to exercise this authority or in
determining an appropriate form ofrelief. 325 With regard to the trial
judge's relationship to the jury, Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) ex
tends the authority and duty of the judge to review the jury's verdict
in view of the weight of the evidence and to determine whether the
jury's verdict was based on a careful consideration of the evidence
and not the product of bias, misapprehension or prejudice. 326 In
addition, the trial judge has a broader power to consider whether a
verdict otherwise may represent a miscarriage ofjustice and whether
a lesser degree of guilt would be more consonant with justice than
322. Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975).
323. Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
324. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b}(2}.
325. The rule is not entirely inscrutable, however, because it is similar to that of
two familiar remedial powers found elsewhere in the system: the trial court's statutory
power to grant a new trial under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 29 (West 1981),
which is now codified in MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b); and the supreme judicial court's au
thority to conduct a plenary review of the law and facts in capital cases to insure that
injustice has not been done, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981).
In Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414-15, 378 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1978),
the court noted the limited remedial powers of the trial court under section 29. In Com
monwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 554, 420 N.E.2d 905, 911 (1981), and Common
wealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 316,431 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1982) the court ruled that the
Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) powers of the trial court to reduce a verdict are the
equivalent of the court's section 33E power to reduce a verdict and are to be exercised
similarly.
326. See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243-44
(1944) (describing the nature of the supreme judicial court's review of the facts under
section 33E, which in turn is derived from the section 29 powers of the trial judge).
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that rendered by the jury.327 This assessment of the jury's verdict,
however, is not confined to the narrower limits imposed upon the
trial court when it evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence under the
preceding provisions of Rule 25. Although the power to reduce the
verdict is to be used sparingly, a determination that the verdict was
supported by sufficient evidence is not decisive.328
It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate that the provi
sions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) that authorize the trial court
to reduce the jury's verdict or acquit the defendant are designed and
suited to provide a mechanism for determining the adequacy of the
evidence in two types of cases: those in which the evidence is suffi
cient to require submission to the jury but the verdict returned ap
pears to the judge to be disproportionate to the weight of the
evidence or the result otherwise works an injustice, and those in
which the "prosecution's best case" rule or other procedural or evi
dentiary device prevents any meaningful assessment of evidentiary
sufficiency. The provisions of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) may
also provide a mechanism for review of trial errors and fundamental
defects in the trial process, a proposition which will be addressed
only briefly.
The rule does not on its own terms identify the grounds upon
327. See Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,700-01,335 N.E.2d 660, 683
(1975), for a description of this additional, broader discretionary authority. The supreme
judicial court held in Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543,420 N.E.2d 905 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982), that the trial judge
had authority to reduce the second degree murder convictions to manslaughter convic
tions in each case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence to support the murder verdicts.
Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at 912; Keough 385 Mass. at 319, 320, 431
N.E.2d at 918-20.
Insufficiency, however, appears at times to be an important factor in the court's deci
sion. See Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 316-18, 372 N.E.2d 246, 251-52
(1978); Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 485-88, 265 N.E.2d 496, 498-99 (1970).
In a number of recent cases the court, in enumerating its reasons for not revising the
verdict, has pointed out that the evidence supporting it was legally sufficient. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 79, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (1983); Common
wealth v. Parker, 389 Mass. 27, 33, 449 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1983); Commonwealth v. Nick
erson, 388 Mass. 246, 251-54, 446 N.E.2d 68, 72-73 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Prendergast, 385 Mass. 625, 635-38, 433 N.E.2d 438, 444-46 (1982). In general the suffi
ciency of the evidence will have been established and the court's attention will be ad
dressed instead to the weight of the evidence, a broader subject of inquiry. But this
distinction is not rigidly maintained and a suggestion of marginal sufficiency or even
insufficiency appear to underlie the court's decision in some section 33E cases. See Com
monwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308,372 N.E.2d 246 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bearse,
358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970); see also Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682,
437 N.E.2d 224 (1982) (Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) ruling).
328. Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,431 N.E.2d 915 (1982).
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which the trial court may base its remedial action. The Reporter's
Notes are ambiguous on this point. 329 That is, the notes address only
the power to reduce the verdict but state that the effect of the rule is
to extend to the trial courts a post-verdict power-"a power in all
cases much like that which had previously been reserved to the
Supreme Judicial Court in capital cases under ... [section] 33E (as
amended)."330
The court's authority under section 33E is not limited to the
power to reduce verdicts. 33l Section 33E empowers the court to re
view claims that errors of law were committed but were not
presented to the trial court or otherwise preserved or presented for
appellate review according to the usual course of procedure. 332 The
court has reviewed a variety of claims under the aegis of this provi
sion, most prominently those claims addressed to jury instructions
dealing with the essential elements of the offense, issues of defense or
mitigation, or a central aspect of the fact-finding process such as the
allocation or definition of the burden of proof, or serious misconduct
by the prosecution during the trial. 333
There are strong reasons to support the view that the trial court
has a similar authority under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence). Much
the same authority is available under Rule 30(b), but Rule 30(b) is
designed for post-appellate use. 334 One of the purposes of Rule
25(b)(2) however, is to allow trial judges to eliminate the need for an
329. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) reporter's note. The supreme judicial court has
treated the reporter's notes on this rule as a persuasive but not decisive expression of its
purpose and scope. See Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543, 554-55, 420 N.E.2d
905,912 (1981); Commonwealth v. Keough, 385 Mass. 314,316-18,431 N.E.2d 915, 917
18 (1982).
330. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2) reporter's note at 435.
331. Section 33E provides in pertinent part:
In a capital case as hereinafter defined the entry in the supreme judicial
court shall transfer to that court the whole case for its consideration of the law
and the evidence. Upon such consideration the court may, if satisfied that the
verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of newly
discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require (a) order a
new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt, and
remand the case to the superior court for the imposition of sentence.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981):
332. Id.
333. Commonwealth v. Collins, 386 Mass. I, 11-13,434 N.E.2d 964, 971-72 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 386 Mass. 35, 37-38, 434 N.E.2d 983, 984-85 (1982); Com
monwealth v. Smith, 381 Mass. 141, 143-46,407 N.E.2d 1291, 1292-94 (1980); Common
wealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 756-58, 412 N.E.2d 354, 358-59 (1980).
334. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) reporter's notes at 328; Commonwealth v. Pres
ton, 393 Mass. 318, 321 n.2, - N.E.2d - n.2 (1984).
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appeal. 335 It would be both efficient and consistent with general
practice in Massachusetts to afford trial courts the opportunity to ad
dress and, if appropriate, to correct fundamental defects in the trial
process which would otherwise be addressed only on appeal. 336 The
cases indicate that the supreme judicial court tends, at times, to exer
cise its various forms of authority under section 33E collectively, or
at least without taking care to specify the precise basis upon which it
was acting. 337 These considerations suggest that the trial court is au
335. Commonwealth v. Gaulden, 383 Mass. 543,554 n.8, 420 N.E.2d 905, 912 n.8
(1981).
336. Such issues can be raised in a post-conviction collateral attack by means of a
motion for new trial. Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 320-21, 403 N.E.2d 363,
367-68 (1980) ("If the original trial was 'infected with prejudicial constitutional error,'
the trial judge has no discretion to deny the motion" for new trial under Rule 30(b).);
Earl v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 181, 184,248 N.E.2d 498, 500 (1969).
The court's comment in Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 758, 412 N.E.2d
354,357 (1980), that the 1939 amendment to section 33E gave it "a discretionary author
ity broader than that of the trial judge" could not have been addressed to the power to
consider errors of law, which was not affected by that amendment. Also, in light of
Gaulden and Keough it could not have been addressed to the power to reduce a verdict.
At most, it can be interpreted as a suggestion that the trial court cannot act under Rule
25(b)(2) (second sentence) "for any other reason that justice may require" as the supreme
judicial court can. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981). It may have
been nothing more than a poorly considered remark.
337. This is not surprising in view of the equitable and broadly discretionary na
ture of the authority the court exercises, and in view of the fact that, until the advent of
Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence), there was little reason for the court to focus on the
precedental impact of a particular decision.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972) (reducing
second degree murder verdict to manslaughter where judge failed to give manslaughter
instructions); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967) (reducing
first degree murder verdict to second degree where trial judge failed to give instructions
clearly distinguishing basis of finding one rather than the other), cerl. denied, 391 U.S.
968 (1968).
In Kinney the trial judge had not instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter
although the issue was raised by the evidence. 361 Mass. at 712, 282 N.E.2d at 411. The
court considered manslaughter to be the appropriate verdict but evidently believed it
unlikely that a jury would reach that result in a second trial because of the inflammatory
nature of the circumstances: the defendant, an adult male, had been confronted and
attacked by a group of some twenty angry women and children; he claimed to be in fear
for his life and to have fired five warning shots, supposedly into the air. Two persons
were struck and killed by four of the bullets fired. Id at 710, 282 N.E.2d at 410.
In While the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder, evidently on a
felony murder theory, for a killing resulting from his efforts either to burglarize a restau
rant or rob its owner. The burglary-murder would have been second degree; the rob
bery-murder first, but the trial judge'S instructions did not correctly define either
underlying felony. The weight of the evidence suggested the defendant's purpose had
been burglary and the court ordered entry of a verdict of second degree murder "to
prevent a possible miscarriage of justice." 353 Mass. at 426, 232 N.E.2d at 346.
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thorized by Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) to act on grounds as
broad as those more specifically enumerated in section 33E.
2.

History

The history of the development and use of the supreme judicial
court's section 33E powers and the trial court's section 29 powers to
grant a new trial cast some light on the extraordinarily broad and
equitable nature of the trial court's Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence)
power. The trial judge's authority and duty to grant relief from un
just convictions precedes any explicit legislative grant of authority
and, in some respects, may be derived from the due process guaran
tees ofArticle 12 of the Declaration of Rights. 338 The judge's role in
the exercise of this authority is, like the role assumed in evaluating
evidentiary sufficiency, supervisory vis-a-vis the jury. In contrast to
the court's authority to determine sufficiency of the evidence, how
ever, it is guided by discretion rather than by an articulated legal
standard. 339 Before the enactment of Rule 25, the only remedy the
trial judge could give was to grant a new trial,340 The authority to
grant a new trial could be exercised either on the basis of trial errors
"when a decisive or pertinent point affecting substantive rights has
not been raised by exception at the trial (in order to prevent a mis
carriage of justice)"341 or when, in the trial judge's judgment, the
verdict was" 'so greatly against the weight of the evidence as to in
duce in his mind the strong belief that it was not due to a careful
consideration of the evidence, but that it was the product of bias,
misapprehension or prejudice.' "342 Such a verdict, if allowed to
338. The trial court's responsibility and authority in this respect were acknowl
edged in Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 229-31 (1855); and Common
wealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 514, 550 (1822), where the court suggested that the judge's
supervisory relationship to the jury is concommitant to the Article 12 guarantee of a jury
trial.
339. See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 545, 420 N.E.2d at 913 (citing Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414-15, 378 N.E.2d 429,432-33 (1978».
340. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 375 Mass. 409, 414 n.5, 378 N.E.2d 429,
432 n.5 (1978). This was also true of the supreme judicial court's remedial powers under
section 33E and its predecessors until 1962, when the statute was amended to permit the
court to revise the verdict as well. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. \07, \08-09,
190 N .E.2d 555, 557 (1963). The court has never had the power to enter a finding of not
guilty under section 33E, however.
341. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12,25, 140 N.E. 470, 476 (1923); if.
Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. (1 Pick.) 515, 549-50 (1822) (claim of newly discov
ered evidence reviewed with view toward protection of the innocent).
342. Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1944)
(quoting Scannel v. Boston Elevated Ry., 208 Mass. 513, 514, 94 N.E. 696, 696 (1911)
(standard for grant of new trial on weight of evidence grounds in civil cases».
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stand, would result in a miscarriage of justice. It is not enough that
the trial judge had a reasonable doubt examining the case as a juror,
because the issue is not whether the judge agrees with the verdict but
whether the judge believes that the jury actually confined itself to
deciding the case on the evidence. 343 Until 1939 the supreme judi
cial court was not clearly empowered to act on grounds other than
errors of law in the exercise of its section 33E authority, but the stat
ute was explicitly broadened by amendment that year to open the
facts of a case to the court's consideration. 344 Five years later the
court ruled that, as to the weight of the evidence, the statute con
ferred "the power and the duty exercised by a trial judge upon a
motion for a new trial,"345 and "that the question of whether a ver
dict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is, upon analysis, one of
fact, although commonly spoken of as one of discretion."346
In sum, after 1939, section 33E authorized the supreme judicial
court (in capital cases) to grant a new trial on anyone of four
grounds: (1) that the verdict was against the law; (2) that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence; (3) that there existed newly
discovered evidence; or (4) for any other reason that justice may re
quire. The trial judge had comparable authority in all cases, at least
as to the first three grounds. The supreme judicial court's remedial
343. See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406-07, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243
(1944).
344. 1939 Mass. Acts 341 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278,
§ 33E (West 1981». The amended statute provided that the appeal of a capital case to
the supreme judicial court "shall transfer to that Court the whole case for its considera
tion of the law and the evidence" and authorized the court to "order a new trial if satis
fied that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of
newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require." Common
wealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241,243 (1944).
Until 1939 only the trial court could grant a new trial. The revision transferring this
authority to the supreme judicial court was an effort to streamline the appeals and post
conviction review process. The court had been confined to reviewing questions of law on
direct appeal and reviewing denials of motions for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
Commonewalth v. Sacco, 259 Mass. 128, 134-42, 156 N.E. 57, 58-61, cerl. denied, 275
U.S. 574 (1927); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS., THIRD REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 37-43
(1927), reprinted in 13 MASS. L.Q. I, 37-43 (Nov. 1927); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS.,
THIRTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 28-30 (1937), reprinted in 23 MASS. L.Q. 1,28
30 (Nov. 1937); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASS., FOURTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at
14-167 (1938), reprinted in 24 MASS. L.Q. I, 14-167 (Nov. 1938); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
MASS., FIFTEENTH REP., PUB. Doc. No. 144, at 8-9 (1939), reprinted in 25 MASS. L.Q. I,
8-9 (Dec. 1939); see Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 166-69, 390 N.E.2d 113,
119-20 (1978); Rosenthal, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases in Massachusetts 1927-1949,
34 MASS. L.Q. 45 (Oct. 1949).
345. Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406, 58 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1944).
346. Id. at 405, 58 N.E.2d at 243.
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authority was enlarged in 1962 by legislative amendment to permit it
to direct the entry of a lesser degree of guilt and remand the case to
the trial court for resentencing. 347 After 1962, then, section 33E
functioned as a "safety valve" by conferring upon the supreme judi
cial court the extraordinary power in capital cases to review all as
pects of a case regardless of whether a proper claim of error had
been made. 348 The trial court's remedial powers on a motion for
new trial were not correspondingly enlarged at that time. 349 Those
remedial powers were enlarged in new Rule 25 to include the power
to reduce the jury's verdict and further to authorize a finding of not
guilty.350
B.

Considerations Developed by the Supreme Judicial Court under
Section 33£

Whether Rule 25 transfers the full set of "safety valve" powers
found in section 33E to the trial court in all non-capital criminal
cases is not clear. It clearly does confer upon the trial judge the duty
and authority to review the weight of the evidence.351 The proper
exercise of this extended supervisory responsibility over the jury's
fact-finding function requires the trial judge to consider two ques
tions: first, under what circumstances should it be concluded that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and second, in such
circumstances according to what criteria should the trial judge select
the appropriate form of relief?
It is suggested that in at least two sets of circumstances the trial
judge should grant relief on consideration of the weight of the evi
dence. These two situations overlap substantially, if not completely,
347. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1981).
348. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 168, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120
( 1978).
349. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 701, .335 N.E.2d 660, 683 (1975),
cerro denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 809-10, 323
N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975); Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109, 190 N.E.2d 555,
557 (1963).
350. The trial judge's remedial options are thus broadc;r than those available to the
supreme judicial court under section 33E. The scope of the trial judge's discretionary
authority is comparable to that of the court. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 554-55, 420 N.E.2d at
912. The suggestion to the contrary in Commonwealth v. Grace, 381 Mass. 753, 758,412
N.E.2d 354, 357 (1980), apparently refers to the state of affairs as it was before Rule 25
was promulgated.
351. The "evidence" includes all information available concerning the case and is
not limited to evidence presented to the jury. It may be appropriate to hold an eviden
tiary hearing on a motion for relief from a verdict where the claim depends to any extent
on information outside the trial record. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass.
501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1979).
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with regard to whether relief should be granted. The distinction be
tween them, however, is relevant and should be observed in deter
mining what form of relief is appropriate. As has been demonstrated
earlier in this paper, the limiting effect of the "prosecution's best
case" rule on the sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, and of the use
of long-standing procedural/evidentiary devices-("prima facie evi
dence" rules, presumptions, inferences and "affirmative defenses")
drastically impairs or eliminates the protective function of the provi
sions of Rule 25(a), (b)(l) and (b)(2)(first sentence) in some cases,
especially if more than one of these devices is employed. The alibi
case of Commonwealth v. Woodj352 and the homicide case of Com
monwealth v. JohnsOlz3 53 were discussed as examples,354 and it was
demonstrated that the presumption of sanity severely impaired the
protective functions of Rule 25(a) in all cases which involved the
issue of criminal responsibility.355 These cases must receive careful
attention under Rule 25(b)(2)(second sentence). They are included
in the larger, more general class of cases in which the evidence has
been determined to be legally sufficient but inadequate to satisfy the
court's sense ofjustice. The best sample of this general class of cases
consists of fourteen cases in which the supreme judicial court has
reduced verdicts based upon weight of the evidence grounds356 and
three reported cases in which the supreme judicial court has affirmed
trial court decisions granting relief on this basis.357
The question becomes in what kinds of cases a trial court, fol
lowing the supreme judicial court's example, will grant some form of
relief on the basis of the weight of the evidence. 358 While the court
has not developed a definable standard to be applied in determining
352. 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980).
353. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 326 N.E.2d 355 (1973). The supreme judicial court
expressed disapproval of Johnson in Commonwealth v. Mcinerny, 373 Mass. 136, 145-46,
365 N.E.2d 815, 820-21 (1977).
354. See supra notes 179-206, 277-305 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 207-220 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 317.
357. See supra notes 337-38.
358. The court in Gaulden reports that its survey of the 230 cases in which it con
sidered the weight of the evidence "explicitly or by necessary implication", it granted
relief in thirteen. 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.9. These figures do not
provide much guidance to trial courts for several reasons. First, the court was required
by section 33E to consider the weight of the evidence in all 230 cases, whether the issue
was raised by the defendant or not. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. I, 401
N.E.2d 811 (1980) (appellate counsel for both parties failed to address section 33E issues
in briefs, not an isolated occurrence; court reviewed law and facts nonetheless). Trial
judges do not have this obligation; a defense motion is the predicate to Rule 25(b)(2)
(second sentence) review and, presumably, such motions will be made selectively. See
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whether to reduce a verdict, the court did, in Gaulden, mention some
of the considerations it found to be pertinent in particular cases. 359
The considerations discussed in Gaulden included both the
kinds of information that the court has relied upon as well as some
of the circumstances in which the court has found it appropriate to
act.3 60 The court's discussion in Gaulden suggests, and an examina
. tion of the section 33E and Rule 25(b)(2)(second sentence) cases con
firms, that the power is discretionary. The task of deriving guidance
from these cases, then, is not a quest for a set of rules that can be
applied depending upon the defendant's ability to satisfy one or
more clearly defined standards. Rather, the quest is to survey the
cases in an effort to identify the patterns in defendants' conduct, in
mitigating circumstances and in shortcomings in proof of culpability
that has prompted the court to conclude that justice may not have
been done. Toward this end, it is necessary to examine the underly
ing facts and, frequently, the proof presented at trial in considerable
detail. The trial court is required to state reasons for its exercise of
its Rule 25(b)(2) authority in terms of the considerations that
prompted the supreme judicial court to exercise its section 33E pow
ers; trial counsel must be prepared to approach the court in these
terms as well. 361
l.

Information Relied Upon by the Court

It is necessary to be aware of the kind of information upon
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2). A higher incidence of granting relief by trial judges would
not necessarily reflect more lenient standards.
Second, the qualifier "or by necessary implication" suggests that the review was
more or less cursory in some cases. See 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912 n.9. In
many homicide cases, no doubt the justice of the result seems apparent on the face of
things. Trial judges, being faced with a wider range of offenses, can expect to face a
greater concentration of difficult factual claims such as that presented in Woods, and
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1085, 435 N.E.2d 1053 (1982)(positive
victim identification pitted against convincing alibi defenses, accompanied by apparent
manipulation of evidence by prosecutor or police).
359. 383 Mass. at 554-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13.
360. Id. at 554-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912.
361. "Where we have reduced a verdict, we have stated the reasons for our ac
tions." Id. at 556, 420 N.E.2d at 912. Presumably, the trial court's statement of reasons
will serve to facilitate appellate review, whereas the supreme judicial court's statements
of reasons will serve a guidance function.
The court's own statements of its reason for granting relief have not always been
enlightening. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 597-98, 363 N.E.2d 245,
249 (1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 396,
274 N.E.2d 795, 800 (1971); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 425, 232 N.E.2d
335,345 (1967), cerl. denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968).
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which the court has permitted itself to rely. First, the court has not
limited itself to consideration of the evidence presented to the jury.
In Commonwealth v. Mahnke,362 for example, the court relied heavily
upon a coerced statement made by the defendant and properly sup
pressed at trial, noting that section 33E "requires us to consider the
whole case broadly to determine whether there was any miscarriage
ofjustice" .363 The court has considered a variety of "character" fac
tors, including the defendant's age, lack of serious criminal record,
military service, marital status, number of children and relationship
to the victim. 364 Additionally, the court has also considered back
ground information in the form of published studies not presented
by either party.365 Further, in considering "character" factors, the
court has occasionally inferred, from the absence of evidence in the
record, that the defendant had no earlier criminal convictions. 366
The court has also considered the outcome of co-defendant's cases
and the possibly inflammatory impact of the characteristics of the
victim and/or the circumstances in which the killing occurred. 367 In
a few cases, the court mentioned the sentencing consequences of a
362. 368 Mass. 662,335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
363. Id. at 702 n.47, 335 N.E.2d at 684 n.47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cox, 327
Mass. 609, 614, 100 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1951»; see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass.
601, 607-09, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827-29 (1975)(evidence presented to judge at hearing on
pretrial motion should have been presented to jury).
364. See Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 95, 364 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (1977)
(court noted that defendant was "not a hoodlum or gangster").
365. Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 316, 372 N.E.2d 246, 251 (1978).
366. Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 750-51, 328 N.E.2d 833, 837
38 (1975); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 808,323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975); see
also Commonwealth v. Keough. 385 Mass. 314, 321, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982).
367. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1209
10, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 311,
372 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1978); Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743,749-51,328
N.E.2d 833, 837-38 (1975); Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151-52, 301
N.E.2d 683, 688 (1973). While an inconsistency in verdicts by juries in separate trials is
not sufficient to justify relief, the fact that a co-participant is allowed to plead guilty to a
lower offense in exchange for testimony has some impact. See Cadwell, 374 Mass. at 311,
372 N.E.2d at 249 (woman friend, mother of four-year-old victim of child abuse); Van
derpool, 367 Mass. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 837 (gang member who shot victim, ostensibly at
defendant's command, pleaded guilty to second degree murder).
The inflammatory impact of the circumstances of the killing were discussed in Cad
well, 374 Mass. at 315-16, 372 N.E.2d at 251-52 (defendant delivered fatal blows to child
abused by defendant and child's mother); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,
335 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (defendant killed and hid body of pregnant girlfriend; was har
rassed, kidnapped and gave confession to vigilante group consisting of victim's family
and friends), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709,
282 N.E.2d 409 (1972) (defendant, shooting in panic, killed woman and child); Common
wealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970) ("deadbeat" defendant shot and
killed 16-year-old son under questionable circumstances).
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reduction of the verdict. 368 The victim's character and reputation
are also taken into account when the defendant has claimed self
defense or provocation. 369 Most importantly, however, the court has
taken the liberty of relying upon the defendant's account of the facts
in a variety of circumstances: where the defendant's account was
basically consistent with the accounts of the prosecution's witnesses,
but more detailed or complete;370 where the defendant's facts were
inconsistent with the inferences apparently drawn by the jury but not
contradicted by direct evidence presented by the prosecution;37I and
where the defendant's account was only partially rebutted by the
prosecution's evidence and the unrebutted portion supported a the
ory of excessive force in self-defense or other imperfect claim of
exculpation. 372
2.

Three Methods of Assessing the Weight of the Evidence

The supreme judicial court has developed three distinct meth
ods of developing the version of facts it is willing to rely upon in
assessing the weight of the evidence. In one set of cases, the court
has accepted the prosecution's version of the events and found it to
368. Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159,430 N.E.2d 1198, 1210, cerl.
denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 508, 373 N.E.2d
208,212 (1978); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660, 685 (1975),
cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass. 145, 151,301
N.E.2d 683, 688 (1973). In every homicide case, of course, a reduction in the jury's ver
dict creates at least an opportunity for the superior court to impose a more lenient sen
tence. The reduction of a first degree murder verdict to second degree makes the
defendant eligible for parole after 15 years, the reduction of a murder conviction to man
slaughter eliminates the mandatory life sentence and in addition makes probation and a
suspended sentence a possible disposition.
369. Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83, 95, 364 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (1977); Com
monwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 804, 808, 323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1975).
370. Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 112-15, 190 N.E.2d 555, 558-60
(1963).
371. Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 701, 335 N.E.2d at 683-84; if. Commonwealth v.
Keough, 385 Mass. 314, 320, 431 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982). (Rule 25 relief upheld, reliance
upon defendant's account approved).
372. Commonwealth v. Seit, 373 Mass. 83,94-95,364 N.E.2d 1243, 1250-51 (1977)
(no third-party witness to defendant's having shot victim in front and back of head, claim
of self-defense "deserves consideration" where government did not rebut defendant's
theory that impact of first shot caused victim to tum, causing second shot to strike back
of head, defendant could be held to have used excessive force in self-defense or to have
acted from a "transport of passion upon provocation," or upon "sudden combat"-all
manslaughter verdicts); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 808-09, 323 N.E.2d 726,
729 (1975) (use of knife in defense of attack by victim armed with straight razor, razor
found in victim's pocket; defendant "reasonably apprehensive that victim might use the
razor which defendant knew the victim possessed").
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be sufficient but unsatisfactory, given the crime charged. 373 In a sec
ond set of cases, the court has established a paradigm of the offense
which is less exact than its formal definition and, utilizing either the
prosecution's version or a mixed version of the events, found the evi
dence to be sufficient but unsatisfactory.374 In the third set the court
has, using the paradigm approach, found the evidence to be insuffi
cient. Under each of these approaches it has concluded that relief
should be granted. 37s
a.

Sufficient But Unsatisfactory Evidence

Taking a broad view of the case, the court has focused upon the
adequacy of the prosecution's proof of the elements which distin
guish degrees of culpability in homicides. Except for two cases, the
court has gone no further than reducing the jury's verdict by more
than one "degree" of culpability. In Commonwealth v. Baker,376 the
court conceded that sufficient evidence of malice aforethought and
deliberate premeditation had been presented to support the jury's
first degree murder verdict, but found the evidence too weak on both
points in the face of the uncontradicted evidence that the unarmed
victim and, perhaps one or all of his companions, had been advanc
ing on the defendant, who shot the victim twice. 377 The court or
dered entry of a manslaughter verdict in the belief that 'justice will
be more nearly achieved."378 In Commonwealth v. Bearse,379 the
court found no evidence to support any theory of murder liability in
the prosecution's evidence and ordered a retrial, to be limited to the
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. 380 Between
these extremes of uncontradicted evidence and no evidence lie the
majority of cases in which the evidence, while conflicting, is legally
sufficient to support the verdict. In some, such as Commonwealth v.
IJalton,381 sparse evidence was rendered unsatisfactory by the ab
sence of bolstering evidence, such as that which would establish a
motive for the killing. 382 The evidence demonstrated that an appar
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
possibility

See infra notes 376-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 397-462 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 463-77 and accompanying text.
346 Mass. 107, 190 N.E.2d 555 (1963).
Id. at 118, 190 N.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 119, 190 N.E.2d at 562.
358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970).
Id. at 487-88, 265 N.E.2d at 500.
385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982).
Id. at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209. One disquieting feature of the Da/loncase is the
that the verdict was reduced in part in lieu of ordering further proceedings
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ently intentional killing was committed by the defendant but did not
lend itself to any explanation of the reason. 383 In other cases, the
court acknowledged that the conflicting evidence made the issue of
malice a close question. 384 The decision to grant relief in these cir
cumstances may depend upon one of several factors. The following
cases illustrate the interplay of these factors.
In Commonwealth v. Jones,385 the defendant was the smaller of
two intoxicated men involved in a "violent quarrel. . . undoubtedly
the result of too much drinking."386 The defendant's claim that he
stabbed the victim while defending himself from the latter's attack
with a straight razor was evidently rejected by the jury based, in all
likelihood, on the evidence that the victim died with his razor in his
pocket. 387 Despite the fact that the jury was fully instructed on man
slaughter,388 the court concluded that the defendant reasonably be
lieved that the victim might use the razor.389 Significantly, the court
dealt directly with the inference of malice which may arise from the
use of a deadly weapon in a killing: "We believe, however, that jus
tice will be more nearly achieved by concluding that the intention
... [to attack with a knife] was formed in the heat of sudden affray
which might have resolved some of the doubts in the case. The defendant had moved for
a new trial and unsuccessfully requested, inler alia, appointment of a medical expert to
investigate whether he acted in the throes of an epileptic seizure. The court affirmed this
discretionary trial court ruling, noting the absence of any evidence in the record that
Dalton suffered an epileptic seizure during the shooting. Id at 195,431 N.E.2d at 207
08. In reducing the verdict, however, the court noted in partial explanation that Dalton
"was on medication for the treatment of epilepsy . . . [n)o motive for this killing has
surfaced." Id at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209. The first objection to this implied accommoda
tion, if that is what occurred, is that in some jurisdictions the fact that a person acted in
the throes of a seizure is considered to be either completely or partially exculpatory. See
People v. Grant, 46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 130, 360 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1977), rev'd, People v.
Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551, 377 N.E.2d 4 (1978). The court in Dallon seemed to concede that
such a circumstance would at least negate the element of malice. See 385 Mass. at 193,
431 N£2d at 207. The second objection is that the development of substantive rules
through case law is impaired when such issues are resolved "equitably." Compare Com
monwealth v. Kinney, 361 Mass. 709, 712-13, 282 N.E.2d 409, 411-12 (1972); Common
wealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 395, 397, 274 N.E.2d 795, 802 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 584, 266 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1970); Commonwealth v. Baker, 346
Mass. 107, 119, 190 N.E.2d 555, 563 (1963) (assignments of error regarding motion for
partial directed verdict, complaints about jury instructions not considered in light of re
duction of verdict).
383. See Dallon, 385 Mass. at 197,431 N.E.2d at 209.
384. See infra notes 465-77 and accompanying text.
385. 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975).
386. Id at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 729.
387. See id at 806, 807, 323 N.E.2d at 727, 728.
388. Id at 808 n.l, 323 N.E.2d at 728 n.!.
389. Id at 808-09, 323 N.E.2d at 728.
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or combat
. thus negating the necessary element of malice
. . . ."390 This was a case, then, in which the evidence was sharply
contested and fairly evenly balanced as between manslaughter and
murder; the impact of the "presumption of malice"391 might have
had a decisive impact on the jury's judgment.
The evidence in Commonwealth v. King392 was, in contrast, con
tested only with regard to interpretation: the question of what mens
rea inferences might be drawn from the evidence. The killing re
sulted from a brawl in which both participants were grossly intoxi
cated. 393 The fact that the defendant was unquestionably the
aggressor apparently explains why the court's discussion did not ex
plore the possibility that the killing was manslaughter;394 as in Jones,
the presumption of malice permitted from the intentional use of a
deadly weapon satisfied the sufficiency standard as to that element.
The court justified its reduction of the verdict to second degree mur
der by reference to three factors-the weakness of the prosecution's
evidence, the strong evidence of gross intoxication, and the absence
of jury instructions on a potentially key mitigating factor. 395 The
evidence as a whole was uncontradicted and sufficient but unsatis
390. Id. at 809, 323 N.E.2d at 729 (citations omitted); see also, Commonwealth v.
Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583, 266 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1970) (conflicting evidence precluded
identification of aggressor in scuffle between parties intoxicated by drugs and alcohol;
court found that defendant acted in heat of sudden affray and killing done in heat of
passion; second degree murder verdict reduced to manslaughter).
391. This presumption has been renamed and its mandatory thrust has been elimi
nated in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
392. 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978).
393. Id. at 505,373 N.E.2d at 210. The victim's post-mortem blood alcohol level
was measured at 0.33%. The defendant and the Commonwealth's adult witnesses were
also visibly intoxicated at the scene. Id. at 504-05, 373 N.E.2d at 210.
394. In its only reference to the element of malice necessary to a murder verdict,
the court stated somewhat cryptically:
The knife wounds themselves look like the consequences of an untoward,
foolish introduction of a dangerous weapon in a fight not otherwise at a lethal
pitch. . . but if malice is suggested, it is not the deliberated or purposeful mal
ice of an assassin. The defendant's unsworn statement at trial seems a layman's
assertion that despite the knife he did not intend to inflict mortal injury.
Id. at 507, 373 N.E.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted).
395. Id. at 506-08, 373 N.E.2d at 211-12. The prosecution's evidence (the defend
ant presented none) was presented through witnesses who were so inarticulate that the
court noted the difficulty of constructing a "connected story" from it: "The facts emerge
spottily, with some gaps and inconsistencies." Id. at 502, 373 N.E.2d at 209. From the
facts presented the court found that "[dJeliberate premeditation is ... a dubious conclu
sion ... even if the element of drunkenness is ignored." Id. at 507, 373 N.E.2d at 212.
That element was abundantly present, but was ignored in the jury instructions, which did
not inform the jury of the possible relevance of intoxication to the capacity to deliber
ately premeditate. Id. at 507-08, 373 N.E.2d at 212.
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factory because of the paucity of credibile witnesses and the prosecu
tion's failure to present a complete, connected account of the
killing. 396
b.

The Paradigm Approach: Relaxed Legal Standards

Another type of case involving legally sufficient but unsatisfac
tory evidence appears when the fact pattern does not fit the court's
paradigm of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Of
the fourteen reported cases, those in this group fit most clearly the
"disproportionate verdict" ground identified in Gaulden as the pri
mary basis for granting the section 33E remedy of a reduced ver
dict. 397 Three of the court's decisions reviewing first degree murder
convictions illustrate the different aspects of disproportionality
which have prompted the court to act.
The earliest case was Commonwealth v. Williams,398 the case of a
young prostitute who, with another, robbed and killed a ha~di
capped customer. The evidence supported a first degree murder ver
dict on anyone of the three separate grounds found in
Massachusetts law: felony-murder involving the capital felony of
robbery, participation in a deliberately premeditated killing, and
participation in a killing accomplished with extreme atrocity and
cruelty. The court, noting that the defendant's accomplice had been
convicted of manslaughter in a separate trial, concluded that the
weight of the evidence demonstrated second degree murder. 399 In
the court's view, the robbery and killings occurred spontaneously in
the wake of the struggle which ensued when the larceny attempt
went awry.400
396. Compare the treatment of an even sketchier account by the appeals court,
which was limited to considering the sufficiency of the evidence, in Commonwealth v.
Johnson,3 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 231-33, 326 N.E.2d 355, 359-60 (1975).
397. 383 Mass. at 555 n.9, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13 n.9.
398. 364 Mass. 145, 301 N.E.2d 683 (1973). The victim, who had hired a motel
room for the three, evidently caught the women trying to steal from him and responded
violently. They bound, gagged, and strangled him "and there was some evidence that
other extreme violence had been inflicted on him." Id at 146-47,301 N.E.2d at 685. A
gold ring was taken from him and sold later that day by Williams for $30. Id
399. Id at 151, 301 N.E.2d at 687-88.
400. Id at 152, 301 N.E.2d at 688.
Inferences are warranted that at some instant in the rapid happenings the de
fendant's intent veered from larceny to robbery, and that for a fleeting period of
time she intended to kill the victim. Nevertheless, in our view, her criminal
involvement was not of the nature that judges and juries, in weighing evidence,
ordinarily equate with murder in the first degree.
Id
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A similar conclusion was drawn in Commonwealth v. Cadwel1,401
but through a slightly different analysis. One morning a child died
after the defendant punished him for his difficulties in eating a
doughnut. The pathologist's opinion was that the child was killed by
"multiple blunt force injuries to the head."402 The court found that
the first degree murder verdict rested on sufficient evidence to show
either deliberate premeditation or killing by extreme atrocity and
cruelty.403 It regarded the case, however, as one involving the "bat
tered-child syndrome" in which the typical abuser "tends to suffer
from emotional pressures which are not directly related to the child
himself, [and therefore] focuses his general feelings of frustration
and anger on the one child [the victim here had a sister with Down's
Syndrome, who was evidently not abused] and expresses his emo
tions through an immature and uncontrolled display of physical
abuse of the child. "404 Viewing the case from this perspective, the
court found evidence of deliberate premeditation unsatisfactory.405
The alternative basis for the first degree verdict--extreme atroc
ity and cruelty-was dealt with similarly. The factual basis was
surely present and less easily disposed of because it did not depend
upon any proof of the defendant's mental state, provided the killing
was intentional. 406 The court, noting the pathologist's opinion that
40\. 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978).
402. Id. at 310,372 N.E.2d at 248. There was evidence that the child's mother also
beat him at least occasionally. Id. at 310& n.l, 372 N.E.2d at 248 & n.\. The victim was
four years old, a slow leamer, and undernourished, weighing only twenty-five pounds.
The defendant lived with the victim's mother and was apparently responsible for disci
plining the victim. His method of punishment was to beat the child, and at the time of
his death the child was bruised over much of his body. Id.
403. Id. at 316, 372 N.E.2d at 251-52.
404. Id. at 317, 372 N.E.2d at 252 (emphasis in original) (quoting, People v. Steger,
16 Ca1.3d 539, 549 n.4, 546 P.2d 665, 671 n.4, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 n.4 (1976) (quoting
Note, The Ballered Child.' Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 375
(1971»).
405. 374 Mass. at 316-17, 372 N.E.2d at 252.
Deliberate premeditation in the sense of the statute can perhaps be pieced out
of the evidence, but that conclusion is much harder to reach on the proofs here
than in the run of convictions involving that element. On the whole record, the
surest surmise is that the lethal blows were struck by the defendant in an acCess
(sic) of anger and frustration. There is an irreducible doubt in all the circum
stances whether the defendant consciously formed a purpose that morning to do
the child mortal injury; but if the defendant did, it is still probable that the
resolve lasted for only "a fteeting period of time," as we said of the interval of
premeditation in . . . Williams where we applied § 33E to reduce a murder
verdict to the second degree.
Id. The court then noted parenthetically: "In the present case we need not go so far as to
negate all premeditation in order to apply § 33E." Id.
406. "Our cases have usually looked to the consciousness and degree of suffering
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earlier beatings had not contributed to the child's death, found that
the case was "much less persuasive of extreme cruelty than is com
monly found in convictions on that basis."407
The degree of flexibility the court has permitted itself in arriving
at a new version of the facts in order to act under section 33E is
illustrated by its decision in Commonwealth v. Vanderpool 408 The
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove a pattern of
activity: There was an altercation in a bar between the victim and
the defendant and other members of a "club," the Outlaw Rene
gades; some time later, the defendant and a man named Torres, who
was armed and by his own account "high on acid," found the victim
in another bar and confronted him; the defendant and victim ex
changed blows and Torres shot the victim at the urging of the de
fendant. 409 The defendant's testimony was that at the time of the
killing he was no longer a member of the club, but was in disfavor
with its present members and had interceded in the first altercation
between the victim and other members of the club. The second en
counter with the victim had occurred by chance. The defendant had
approached the victim, who argued with him, and Torres had ap
proached and shot the victim without any urging and to the defend
ant's surprise. 410
of the victim, the disproportion between the means actually needed to inflict death and
those employed, the instrumentalities employed and the extent of physical injury."
Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 362 Mass. 78, 81-82, 284 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1972); Com
monwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 255 N.E.2d 191, 198, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
843 (1970).
407. 374 Mass. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252. "[A] jury might piece a guilty verdict [on
that basis] out of the testimony." Id.
The implication was that the victim's suffering on the day of his death did not pro
vide satisfactory evidence of extreme atrocity and cruelty but that evidence of a slow
death caused by accumulated injuries over a period of days or weeks would have over
come the court's reservations. See id. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252-53.
408. 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 (1975).
409. The evidence was undisputed that all involved were intoxicated by alcohol
and possibly other drugs. Id. at 749, 328 N.E.2d at 837.
Similar fact patterns occurred in Commonwealth v. Nordstrom, 364 Mass. 310, 303
N.E.2d 711 (1973); and Commonwealth v. Pratt, 360 Mass. 708, 277 N.E.2d 517 (1972)
(both first degree verdicts, not reduced); and in Commonwealth v. Rooney, 365 Mass.
484,313 N.E.2d 105 (1974); and Commonwealth v. Deeran, 364 Mass. 193,302 N.E.2d
912 (1973) (both second degree murder verdicts); see a/so Commonwealth v. Jones, 366
Mass. 805, 808, 323 N .E.2d 726, 729 (1975) and cases cited therein. Relief was denied in
Pratt, Nordstrom, Deeran and Rooney because the evidence was that there had been an
initial encounter, followed by a "cooling-off" period during which the defendant left the
scene and armed himself, and then returned and killed the victim. See Jones, 366 Mass.
at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 727.
410. 367 Mass. at 744-45, 328 N.E.2d at 834-35.
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The court reduced the verdict on appeal. 411 Relying upon the
defendant's version of his purpose in approaching the victim, it
found no period of reflection and premeditation. 412 The court also,
apparently accepted Torres' testimony that he shot the victim on the
defendant's instructions. The court noted that Torres-obviously
the central witness against the defendant-had not been tried, at the
time he testified, for his role in the killing and later had been permit
ted to plead guilty to second degree murder. 413 The prosecution's
evidence of premeditation was quite strong, if believed, but the court
acted upon a version of the facts which comprised selected portions
of each party's evidence, and acted much as a jury might act. 414 The
account as constructed apparently accepted the defendant's claim
that his second approach to the victim was to reconcile their dispute,
but also apparently accepted the prosecution's claim that the defend
ant instigated the shooting: an intentional killing is a necessary in
gredient of second degree murder. On this version, the court found
that "the defendant's criminal involvement was not of the nature
that judges and juries, in weighing evidence ordinarily equate with
murder in the first degree."415 The court's reconstruction established
411. Id. at 751, 328 N.E.2d at 838.
412. Id. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 837-38.
413. Id. at 750, 328 N.E.2d at 838. The court also noted that Vanderpool was 22,
married with two children, and suffering from Vietnam war disabilities. Id.
414. The jury could have found that Torres had armed himself on the defendant's
instructions and accompanied the defendant to the second bar, where the defendant ac
costed the victim, determined that the victim intended to press criminal charges based on
the earlier altercation, stated: "We'll get you." He then punched the victim, and yelled:
"Shoot him, Tony, shoot him, Tony," whereupon Torres shot and killed the victim.
Torres' testimony to this effect was, except for the final statement attributed to the de
fendant, essentially corroborated by the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting. Id. at
744-45,328 N.E.2d at 834-35. Torres' explanation of his role was that he was drunk and
"high on acid." Id.
415. Id. at 751,328 N.E.2d at 838 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 364 Mass.
at 152,301 N.E.2d at 688). Compare Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 159,430
N.E.2d 1198, 1210 (defendant admitted killing, contested persuasiveness of evidence of
extreme atrocity and cruelty), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982).
In one other case section 33E relief was granted on the Williams rationale. The
defendant, in Commonwealth v. Pisa, 372 Mass. 590, 363 N.E.2d 245, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 869 (1977), had been convicted of first-degree murder. His codefendant's subse
quent second degree murder conviction by a different jury had been affirmed in 1973. Id.
at 592 n.l, 363 N.E.2d at 247 n.l; see Commonwealth v. White, 363 Mass. 682, 296
N.E.2d 822 (1973). The court based its reduction in Pisaon the ground that the evidence
of first degree murder was "much less persuasive" than that of second degree murder.
372 Mass. at 598, 363 N.E.2d at 251. It is not possible to discern from either opinion
what the basis of Pisa's defense was, what the basis for his section 33E request was or, for
that matter, where the weakness in the prosecution's first-degree murder, either by delib
erate premeditation or capital felony-murder, lay.
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a clear case of second degree murder: an intentional, malicious kill
ing without deliberate premeditation.
This paradigm approach is reflected in the supreme judicial
court's approving review in the first two cases in which it considered
the propriety of trial court orders reducing murder verdicts to man
slaughter under Rule 25. The court in Gaulden and Keough indi
cated that, where the trial court concludes that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence (even if sufficient to support it), the appro
priate form of relief is an order for entry of a verdict reduced to a
level of culpability that has clearly been established. 416 This situa
tion will arise most commonly in section 33E decisions where an
evaluation of the pertinent considerations (the relative strength, con
sistency and credibility of the prosecution and defense evidence, the
treatment of the co-participants, the presence of mitigating factors
such as the prior relationship of defendant and victim, the tenor of
their earlier contacts, the role played by intoxicants or other respon
sibility-impairing influences, and the defendant's character4 17 ) leads
to the conclusion that the case in question does not fit the court's
generally undefined paradigm of the offense for which the defendant
was convicted. 418 The court's paradigm of an offense is usually
closely related to, but less inclusive than, that literally described by
the statutory elements. That is, the court's paradigm of first degree
murder by extreme atrocity and cruelty does not include all cases in
which a rational fact-finder, properly instructed and presented with
legally sufficient evidence, might find that circumstance established
416. See Keough, 385 Mass. at 319-21, 431 N.E.2d at 918-20; Gaulden, 383 Mass. at
554-55,420 N.E.2d at 912-13. It is clear from the terms of Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen
tence) and from analysis of the supreme judicial court's rulings that this form of relief is
available only in cases in which the offense charged includes a lesser offense. In a case in
which no lesser offense is included in the charge, the weight of the evidence analysis will
leave the trial court to choose between ordering either a finding of not guilty or a new
trial.
417. These ordinarily deserve consideration only if not properly presented through
instructions for the jury's assessment. Compare Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501,
508,373 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1978); and Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 745
46,328 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1975); with Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 389 Mass. 626, 633,
451 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (1983); and Commonwealth V. Podlaski, 377 Mass. 339, 350, 385
N.E.2d 1379, 1387 (1979).
Character evidence is most readily available in cases in which the defendant has
testified, but it may be added to the record on appeal as in King, 374 Mass. at 508 n.6, 373
N.E.2d at 212 n.6. In the trial court, such information can be presented in documents or
testimony in support of the motion for relief. Arguably, this is not a factor in the para
digm of the offense, but is a factor in a paradigm of the offender.
418. See Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555-56, 420 N.E.2d at 912-13.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 419 The paradigm in general will consist
of the type of "criminal involvement. . . that judges and juries, in
weighing evidence, ordinarily equate with [the offense in ques
tion),"420 based on the trial judge's experience and judgment. The
court has declined to use this paradigm approach to modify the law,
for example, by recognizing defensive claims that are not otherwise
available. 421 Accordingly, the paradigm will not include factors that
are not relevant in Massachusetts law.
Application of the paradigm to a particular case frequently in
volves some revision of the jury's implied findings as was the case in
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool422 In Cadwell, for instance, the court
noted that only the blows administered to the victim on the date of
his death should have been considered in deciding whether the kill
ing in that case was done with extreme atrocity and cruelty, based on
the pathologist's testimony.423 The jury may have considered (and
properly could have considered, exercising its prerogative to ignore
even the uncontradicted opinion of an expert) the suffering inflicted
in the course of earlier beatings in making its extreme atrocity and
cruelty finding. 424 It was necessary for the court first to establish a
419.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 152, 430 N.E.2d 1198,

1203, cerro denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982), Commonwealth v. Cadwell; 374 Mass. 308, 318,

372 N .E.2d 246, 253 (1978). The court's action in Tavares might be interpreted as being
based on the judgment that the effect of the joint venture doctrine attributing the atro
cious and cruel conduct of Tavares' co-participants to him was undesirably harsh. In
Cadwell, the effect, if not the purpose, of the court's action was to ameliorate the imputa
tion of a mens rea element easily satisfied by formal legal standards, strictly applied
(deliberate premeditation). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d
308 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 366 Mass. 805,323 N.E.2d 726 (1975).
420. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 555, 420 N.E.2d at 913; Commonwealth v. Vanderpool,
367 Mass. 743, 751, 328 N.E.2d 833, 838 (1975); Williams, 364 Mass. at 151-52, 301
N.E.2d at 688.
421. In Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 390 Mass. 722, 726. 459 N.E.2d 98, 101
(1983), the court rejected the argument that the facts supported a finding of manslaughter
because the killing was committed under the influence of an extreme mental or emo
tional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. Such a killing is
manslaughter under MODEL PENAL CODE § 21O.3(1)(b) (Official Draft 1980), and in, for
example, New York. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 199 (1977). It is not recog
nized in Massachusetts law.
422. 367 Mass. 743, 749-51, 328 N.E.2d 883,837-38 (1975). In Commonwealth v.
Therrien, 383 Mass. 537 n.6, 420 N.E.2d 897, 901 n.6 (1981), the court suggested that in
some cases the submission of special verdict interrogatories to the jury as provided for by
Rule 27 might clarify whether an appropriate basis for a reduced verdict is present. De
fense counsel might be wary of the tendency of such structuring devices to encourage
findings of guilt. See United States v. Spock. 416 F.2d 165, 181-83 (1st Cir. 1969).
423. 374 Mass. at 318, 372 N.E.2d at 252.
424. It seems noteworthy that the definitional vagueness of this element gives the
jury a great deal of fact-finding latitude in such cases. Similarly, the doctrine permitting
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narrower factual basis than the jury evidently acted upon before ap
plying its paradigm. This was, of course, an appropriate step in the
exercise of its section 33E powers on its view of the weight of the
evidence.
Even without revising the jury's implicit findings, the court has
found legally sufficient evidence to be of inadequate weight so as to
fit the court's paradigm of an offense, for a variety of reasons. The
prosecution's evidence may fail to satisfy the court because of its lack
of coherence as in King. 425 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Dalton,426
there was little factual dispute; the evidence established the possibil
ity that the defendant had "reflected on his resolution to kill" but
was "by no means overwhelming."427 In these cases, the reference to
a paradigm is less .direct but the nature of the knife wounds in King
and the absence of evidence of motive in Dalton receive prominent
mention in the court's statement of its reasons for granting relief. 428
Where the prosecution's case does not measure up to the court's
paradigm, based on the court's revised findings the verdict is, then,
disproportionate: i.e., it is "markedly inconsistent with verdicts re
turned in similar cases."429 Such a finding has served to justify a
reduced verdict in those cases in which defective jury instructions
have either incorrectly presented the possibility of a lesser verdict to
the jury or have removed that possibility altogether. Ordinarily, the
proper form of section 33E relief in defective-instructions cases is a
new tria1. 430 The rationale for the distinction between a new trial
and a reduced verdict as the appropriate form of relief is well
founded and the distinction is clearly drawn in Commonwealth v.
Kendrick4 31 : "[O]ur concern has not been with the propriety of the
the jury to find deliberate premeditation to have occurred during the most minute time
period creates broad fact-finding latitude. See Commonwealth v. Mcinerney, 373 Mass.
136, 148, 365 N.E.2d 815, 822 (1977).
425. 374 Mass. at 506-07,373 N.E.2d at 211-12; see supra notes 392-96 and accom
panying text.
426. 385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982); see supra notes 381-83 and accompany
ing text.
427. Id at 196,431 N.E.2d at 208.
428. As in all cases in which Section 33E relief has been granted, additional factors
were considered, particularly the role of intoxication: the failure to fully instruct the jury
and favorable character evidence. King, 374 Mass. at 507-08 & n.6, 373 N.E.2d 212 &
n.6.
429. Gaulden, 383 Mass. at 556, 420 N.E.2d at 913. The following cases most
clearly fall into this category: Keough, Gaulden, and Cadwell. The court has consistently
placed Vanderpool in this category, but that classification is questionable.
430. Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 218 N.E.2d 408 (1966).
431. 351 Mass. 203, 218 N.E.2d 408 (1966).
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verdict returned by the jury but with the impropriety of withdrawing
from their consideration another verdict which, although they might
not have reached it, was nevertheless open to them on the evi
dence."432 Where, however, the evidence of the greater offense is
inadequate to satisfy the court's paradigm, there is no need for a new
trial unless some other shortcoming prevented consideration of a le
gitimate theory that might have led to an acquittal or reduced the
verdict even further. 433
This was the approach taken in Commonwealth v. King434 and
Commonwealth v. Kinney.435 In King, the verdict was first degree
murder. There was pervasive evidence that all adults involved in the
incident, including the witnesses to the killing, had been drinking
heavily. The jury was not instructed to consider the possible impact
of intoxication on the defendant's capacity to deliberately premedi
tate. 436 The court reduced the verdict rather than granting a new
trial because the evidence was inadequate to satisfy its paradigm of
deliberately premeditated murder. 437 Similarly, in Kinne, the trial
court failed to instruct the jury on the possible verdict of involuntary
manslaughter. The court found that, on the weight of the evidence,
the defendant had not been the aggressor and had acted out of con
fusion and fear rather than anger when he killed the victims. 438 On
these facts, a finding of malice could not be made and the court con
cluded that justice would be more nearly achieved by not giving the
prosecution an opportunity to submit its second degree murder case
to another jury.439 Thus, even where trial errors are found that
would ordinarily justify granting a new trial under section 33E, the
proper course is to consider the weight of the evidence and reduce
432. Id at 213, 218 N.E.2d at 415; accord Commonwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass.
554, 561-62, 246 N.E.2d 425, 429 (1969).
433. q: Commonwealth v. Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970).
434. 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978).
435. 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972).
436. 374 Mass. at 502-05, 373 N.E.2d at 209-11.
437. Id at 507-08, 373 N.E.2d at 212.
438. 361 Mass. at 712-13, 282 N.E.2d at 411-12.
439. Id at 712-13, 282 N.E.2d at 412. The issue was put explicitly in these terms.
See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 366 Mass. 703, 713, 322 N.E.2d 407, 412 (1975). The
suggestion that, on the weight of the evidence, the prosecution's evidence was insufficient
to support a second degree murder verdict distinguishes this case from the paradigmatic
disproportionality cases discussed above. This third class of cases is discussed in the
preceding section. See supra notes 376-96 and accompanying text. Had the case been
remanded for a trial on proper instructions and the same evidence been presented, a
verdict of second degree murder could have been supported by sufficient evidence.
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the verdict where the only just result of a second trial on the same
evidence would be a finding of guilty on the lesser offense.
In two felony-murder cases, the court has reduced verdicts in
response to defects in jury instructions that would justify no more
than a new trial. 440 Each involved first degree murder convictions
probably reached on felony-murder grounds, although in each case
the court recognized that sufficient evidence of deliberate premedita
tion had been presented,441 and legally sufficient evidence of extreme
atrocity and cruelty was present in one. 442 The first, Commonwealth
v. White,443 involved a defendant who, while attempting either a
breaking and entering of a restaurant or a robbery of its proprietor,
killed the proprietor in a shoot-out. 444 According to Massachusetts
felony-murder doctrine, if the killing occurred during a robbery, it
was first degree murder; if it occurred in the course of a breaking and
entering, it was second degree murder. 445 The jury instructions did
not define either offense, leaving the jury to distinguish between the
two according to their own understanding. During their delibera
tions the jury requested clarifying instructions on second degree
murder. 446
According to Kendrick, decided the previous year, a new trial
was the proper remedy for this trial defect. 447 The White court, how
ever, reduced the verdict to second degree murder "to prevent a pos
sible miscarriage of justice," noting both the "very real possibility"
that the jury had been misled and notice the sentencing conse
quences of one verdict as opposed to the other. 448
440. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 274 N.E.2d 795 (1971); Common
wealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967).
441. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 391, 274 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1971);
Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 421, 232 N.E.2d 335, 343 (1967).
442. Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385,394,274 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1971).
443. 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967).
444. The evidence of White's purpose came in the testimony of two acquaintances
to whom he had described the crime when they visited him together in jail before trial.
According to one, White's purpose was robbery, according to the other it was larceny.
There was evidence of a deliberate premeditation which the court described as "slight":
he went armed, intending to steal. Id. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 346. The suggestion that
these facts evidence deliberate premeditation is at best questionable.
445. Robbery is a capital felony (punishable by life imprisonment or, at the time,
by death). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 17 (West 1970). Breaking and entering a
business establishment (as opposed to a dwelling) is not a capital felony. Id. ch. 266,
§ 16.
446. 353 Mass. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 345-46.
447. 351 Mass. at 213, 218 N.E.2d at 415.
448. 353 Mass. at 425-26, 232 N.E.2d at 346.
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The decision four years later in Commonwealth v. Regif49 in
volved strikingly similar circumstances. 45o The evidence of first de
gree murder by deliberate premeditation was stronger and there was
also evidence of extreme atrocity and cruelty in the manner of the
killing. 451 The same ambiguity in the evidence of the basis for a
felony murder conviction, however, was present and the jury instruc
tions were similarly defective. Citing White, the court reduced the
verdict to second degree murder, again noting the sentencing conse
quences of its action, and stating that the only issue in a new trial
would be whether the defendant committed first or second degree
murder: "We conclude that justice will best be served if guilty ver
dicts of second degree murder are now entered."452
Arguably, Rego can be reconciled with Williams, decided two
years later. There the court reduced the felony murder conviction to
second degree murder because the court viewed the defendant's ac
tions as spontaneous. 453 In Rego the thrust of the evidence was that
the defendants were stealing surreptitiously, were taken by surprise
and responded spontaneously and violently. The intent to kill prob
ably arose spontaneously, immediately before it was acted out, and
the robbery may have followed the killing rather than being the pur
pose behind it. 454 The defendant in White, however, went armed to
the scene of the crime and engaged in a shoot-out with the owner.455
It would be an unusual paradigm of felony murder which did not
embrace this conduct. The basis for the court's choice of relief in
these cases could be efficiency-a judgment that the matter in dis
pute did not warrant expending the resources necessary to conduct a
retrial.
449. 360 Mass. 385,274 N.E.2d 795 (1971).
450. The case for first degree murder on deliberate premeditation or extreme atroc
ity and cruelty grounds was substantially stronger in this case. The victim was a night
watchman who surprised the defendant and his two accomplices as they stole coins from
coin operated machines in a warehouse they had broken into. The watchman was se
verely beaten and died from blows to the head, and there was evidence that money was
taken from his person. Id. at 387-88, 274 N.E.2d at 797-98.
451. Id. at 388, 274 N.E.2d at 797.
452. Id. at 396-97, 274 N.E.2d at 802. The defendant was a young man but no
other evidence of mitigating circumstances was discussed. Although neither defendant
was charged with robbery and each was convicted of breaking and entering, the court
explicitly disavowed this fact as warranting relief in Rego. Id. at 396, 274 N.E.2d at 802.
453. 364 Mass. at 152,301 N.E.2d at 688; see supra notes 398-400 and accompany
ing text.
454. 360 Mass. at 387-88, 274 N.E.2d at 797-98. Compare Williams, 364 Mass. at
152, 301 N.E.2d at 688; see supra notes 398-400 and accompanying text.
455. See 353 Mass. at 425, 232 N.E.2d at 346.
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The court's most recent verdict revision under section 33E both
confirms the foregoing analysis and cautions against the temptation
to view the categories proposed here as being clearly defined or hav
ing firm boundaries. In Commonwealth v. Bellamy,456 the court re
duced a first degree felony-murder conviction to second degree to
hedge against the possibility that the jury might have been misled by
joint venture instructions which were apparently correct when
given. 457 Bellamy was tried for felony-murder for his involvement in
the killing of a variety store proprietor which occurred, by all ac
counts, during the course of an unarmed robbery.458 The jury had
been told it could convict Bellamy of first degree murder if Bellamy
killed the victim in the course of either an armed or unarmed rob
bery, or if his accomplice had killed the victim and Bellamy had not
dissociated himself from the robbery before the killing. 459
Any theory upon which the first degree felony murder verdict
could be sustained required a jury finding that Bellamy either acted
with conscious disregard for the risk to human life created by his and
his accomplice's conduct or that Bellamy knew Bimbo was armed
456. 391 Mass. 511,461 N.E.2d 1215 (1984).
457. In the 1975 trial, the jury was instructed that it could convict Bellamy on a
joint venture (common enterprise) theory if it found that his cohort in the robbery had
killed the victim unless it found "Bellamy dissociated himself from the robbery prior to
the killing." Id. at 513-15, 461 N.E.2d at 1217-18.
458. The prosecution's account relied heavily on Bellamy's purported confession to
the mother of his daughter. According to the mother's account, Bellamy picked up a
knife from the counter and stabbed the clerk when the latter tried to hit him with a
crowbar during an unarmed robbery Bellamy and his cohort "Bimbo" were attempting.
Id. at 512-13, 461 N.E.2d at 1216-17.
Bellamy testified that he went to the store with Bimbo, who unexpectedly reached
into the open cash drawer. The victim swung the crowbar at Bimbo, whereupon Bellamy
left the store and went to Bimbo's car nearby. Bimbo came running out shortly, presum
able after stabbing the victim. Id. at 513, 461 N.E.2d at 1217.
459. Id. Defense counsel objected to the joint venture instruction but not to the
felony murder instruction.
In the interim between Bellamy's conviction and the ruling on his appeal, the
supreme judicial court had refined the felony murder rules to require a finding that the
defendant acted with conscious disregard of the risk to human life created by his conduct
where the underlying felony was not inherently dangerous as with unarmed robbery.
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492,508,436 N.E.2d 400, 410 (1982) (extortion);
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 651, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1982) (unarmed
robbery). It had also refined the rules of joint venture responsibility in such circum
stances to require a finding that an unarmed accomplice knew that the armed accomplice
had a weapon and was going to or was likely to use it. Commonwealth v. Watson, 388
Mass. 536, 544, 447 N.E.2d 1182, 1187-88 (1983). The court found that Bellamy was
entitled to the retroactive benefit of these new legal principles. 391 Mass. at 515, 461
N.E.2d at 1218. Recall that a Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) motion can be filed at
anytime, and there is no procedural prequisite other than a jury verdict. See supra note
16.
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and likely to use his weapon, or both.460 The evidence presented by
both parties indicated that neither proposition was likely; rather, it
indicated that the killing was an unplanned, spontaneous reaction to
an unanticipated situation and that the killer armed himself by sim
ply grabbing an available weapon. The instructions permitted the
jury to convict Bellamy without making either of the presently re
quired findings.
On these facts the court could have concluded, as it had in Wil
liams, King and Vanderpool, that the killing was not of the type that
judges and juries, in weighing evidence, ordinarily equate with first
degree felony murder. There was little evidence that the felony was
armed robbery, that the robbers acted with conscious disregard of a
risk to human life created by their conduct or that, if Bimbo was
armed, Bellamy knew it. Rather than act on this basis, however, the
court ruled that the jury might have been misled into thinking that it
could convict Bellamy of first degree felony murder if Bimbo killed
the victim, whether or not Bellamy knew he was armed. 461 As in
White, this is a case in which the court's articulated rationale would
ordinarily call for a new trial. As in Rego, the additional deficiency
in the weight of the evidence justified revising the verdict instead to
the highest degree clearly supported by the evidence. 462
C.

Insufficient Evidence on Revised Findings

The foregoing survey of the court's section 33E reduced verdict
cases reveals one additional ground for relief, akin to, but distinct
from the Williams form of disproportionality. This ground appears
in cases in which the court's findings, based on its weighing of the
evidence, render the prosecution's case inadequate. 463 These cases
460. The jury might have found that Bellamy used the knife to commit armed
robbery and killed the victim while doing so but the evidence as presented in the court's
discussion was not sufficient to support such a finding. The knife was used in the store's
operation and was kept near the cash register. The armed robbery indictment was not
tried. 391 Mass. at 512, 416 N.E.2d at 1216 & n.2.
46I. Id. at 515, 461 N.E.2d at 1218.
462. A second degree felony murder verdict, on the theory that the robbery was
unarmed and the killing was spontaneous, intentional and malicious, was clearly sup
ported by sufficient evidence.
463. Of course, the evidence in these cases has been found to be legally sufficient to
support the verdict. The court's view of the case after weighing the evidence is, essen
tially, that, as revised, the evidence is not sufficient. The term "inadequate" is applied to
such findings to clarify this distinction in the nature of the judgment which leads to the
finding. Where a court's assessment of the evidence is limited to considering the range of
possible judgments which the evidence might reasonably support, its conclusion that the
evidence is inadequate is a finding of legal insufficiency. This finding constitutes an ac
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differ from the paradigmatic "disproportionality" cases in which the
evidentiary basis for the greater verdict is sufficient but not satisfac
tory to the court's sense of justice. 464 Commonwealth v. Mahnke4 65
and Commonwealth v. Jonest 66 are examples of this category of cases.
In Jones, the court began with the view that the legal sufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence to support the second degree murder
verdict presented a "very close" question. 467 Noting that the jury
had been fully and accurately instructed upon the possibility of a
manslaughter verdict based upon the use of unreasonable defensive
force, acts committed in the heat of passion, provocation or sudden
affray, the court found that the jury could reasonably have con
cluded that the defendant, aware that the victim was very intoxicated
and did not have razor in hand, killed in retaliation for the blow
infiicted. 468 The court's conclusion, based upon an assessment of the
"great weight of the evidence" was that the defendant was reason
ably apprehensive that the victim might use the razor which Jones
knew he had; on this view, the killing was not carried out with mal
ice aforethought. 469 On the facts established by the court's assess
ment of the weight of the evidence, a finding of malice was not
supported by sufficient evidence. The second degree verdict was re
duced to manslaughter. 47o
quittal which is, by operation of federal double jeopardy principles, final. A similar
conclusion based on a court's assessment of the weight of the evidence is not an acquittal
in federal constitutional terms. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). To honor
this distinction the latter judgment is treated in this paper as a finding of inadequacy. Of
course, whether such a finding should be treated under state law as an acquittal barring
retrial is not controlled by the holding in Tibbs.
464. See supra notes 376-96 and accompanying text.
465. 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975).
466. 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975).
467. Id at 807-08, 323 N.E.2d at 728. In fact, the court implied that it considered
the alternative conclusions of "whether there was malice in the defendant's attack on the
victim so as rationally to support a verdict of murder or, in the alternative, whether
justice requires the entry of a verdict of manslaughter pursuant to section 33E" as
equivalent. Id At the time, the difference in terms of relief was probably between a new
trial and a reduced verdict. After Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981), and Greene
v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), of course, a finding of insufficient evidence by an appellate
court or a trial court requires entry of a finding of not guilty on the charge. See Hudson,
450 U.S. at 43; Greene, 437 U.S. at 24.
The undisputed evidence showed that Jones had been assaulted and knocked down
by the deceased, who had a "reputation for his knife and his fight" and was much larger
than the defendant. Jones stabbed him with a fishing knife he routinely carried, claiming
that the deceased had attacked him with a razor. The razor, however, was found in the
deceased's pocket. 366 Mass. at 806, 323 N.E.2d at 727.
468. 366 Mass. at 808, 323 N.E.2d at 728.
469. Id at 808-09, 323 N.E.2d at 729.
470. Id at 810, 323 N.E.2d at 730.
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The basis for reducing the verdict in Mahnke was reached by a
similar process. The defendant was convicted of second degree mur
der, having admitted killing his fiancee, who he believed was preg
nant by another man. There was little direct evidence other than the
defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of the killing.471
The court acted by using the account given by the defendant under
questioning by a vigilante group which had kidnapped him and held
him in seclusion until he admitted the killing. By this account, the
victim had slapped him during an argument and he had responded
by striking her, causing her to fall and strike her head on a curb,
which killed her.472 The court reduced the verdict to manslaughter,
finding that "this version of the events will not support a finding of
malice aforethought. The defendant never formed a specific inten
tion to kill the victim. . . . Nor could death reasonably be expected
to follow the defendant's blow."473 In such a case the verdict is dis
proportionate, not in comparison to the usual judgment of judges
and juries in similar cases, but in terms of the relation of the facts
found by the court on weighing the evidence to the formal require
ments of the elements of the offense. That is, on the weight of the
evidence, the defendant's guilt of the greater offense has not been
established. The court has reduced verdicts in both types of cases,
even those in which fundamental trial errors have occurred which
would otherwise require a new tria1. 474
The supreme judicial court has also been called upon to exercise
its section 33E powers in cases in which the weight of the evidence
justified a finding of not guilty.475 In such cases, the court was con
strained to devise other forms of relief because it lacked the author
ity to order an acquitta1. 476 The trial courts do have such
authority477 but, because this power is sui generis, have little prece
dent to guide them in exercising it.
471. 368 Mass. at 701, 335 N.E.2d at 683. This and similar problems are a com
mon feature in the section 33E reduction of verdict cases. The paucity, spottiness or
largely circumstantial nature of the prosecution's evidence-either on specific issues or
overall-is mentioned in a number of cases. See e.g., Dallon, 385 Mass. at 196, 431
N.E.2d at 208; King, 374 Mass. at 506, 373 N.E.2d at 211; Cadwell, 374 Mass. at 315, 372
N.E.2d at 251; Vanderpool, 367 Mass. at 749,328 N.E.2d at 837; Mahnke, 368 Mass. at
700, 335 N.E.2d at 683; Williams, 364 Mass. at 150, 301 N.E.2d at 687.
472. 368 Mass. at 702, 335 N.E.2d at 684.
473. ld.
474. See King, 374 Mass. at 508, 373 N.E.2d at 212.
475. See, e.g., Mutina, 366 Mass. 810,323 N.E.2d 294 (1975).
476. See, e.g., Bearse, 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
477. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(b)(2).
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Weighing the Evidence To Resolve Unaddressed Su.f!icieny
Issues

It has been demonstrated earlier that in some cases, the suffi
ciency determination conducted pursuant to Rule 25(a) and 25(b)(1)
will result in cases being submitted to the jury on marginal evidence,
on artificially enhanced evidence or on evidence which has not been
assessed for sufficiency.478 Where conviction results, the trial court's
assessment of the case in terms of the weight of the evidence should
provide an essential protection against the injustice of an unwar
ranted conviction or the imposition of an unduly harsh penalty.479
In some cases, however, a reduced verdict is simply not an appropri
ate remedy, and the court should order either a new trial or enter a
finding of not guilty. The purposes of this section are to demonstrate
how the court, freed from the constraints of the sufficiency assess
ment rules, has acted where the shortcomings in the sufficiency as
sessment process appear to have failed to prevent execution of
irrational jury judgments and to suggest some criteria by which the
appropriate remedy can be selected on a principled basis.
The supreme judicial court's section 33E verdict-revision deci
sions indicate that it has been most sensitive to weight of the evi
dence problems where the prosecution's case is legally sufficient but
marginal, and there is evidence indicating that the jury's decision
may not be a "true verdict";480 that is, it may have been influenced
by or based on non-evidentiary considerations. It is a primary func
tion of the sufficiency assessment process to insure that a jury not be
allowed to decide any case in which there is no rational evidentiary
support for a guilty verdict. As we have seen, a court considering the
weight of the evidence is authorized to and must go further to con
sider whether the balance of the evidence of guilt (particularly de
gree of guilt) is proportional to the verdict. The following discussion
478. In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra, Commonwealth v. Sherry,
386 Mass. 682, 699-700, 437 N.E.2d 224, 234 (1982) demonstrates that sufficiency issues
may arise at a point in the process at which no established procedure affords an opportu
nity to raise the issue. The supreme judicial court treated this as a weight of the evidence
problem. The only problem with this treatment is that it might impose a higher burden
of persuasion on the defendant to obtain relief.
479. The supreme judicial court's section 33E decisions reducing verdicts in homi
cide cases clearly illustrate the usefulness of this power to avoid the imposition of
mandatory sentences of imprisonment where such a penalty would be undesirably harsh
and a lesser offense which does not carry a mandatory penalty is included in the offense
charged. Such cases might arise, for example, in cases involving the charge of unlawfully
carrying a firearm or of trafficking in a controlled substance.
480. Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822, 323 N.E.2d 294, 301 (1975).
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will consider how the court has dealt with cases in which it appears
that the sufficiency assessment process has not effectively served its
purpose, and what indications of improper external influence have
prompted the court to take remedial action.
The weight of the evidence problems created by the presump
tion of sanity demonstrate to what extent that device (and to a lesser
extent, other such proof-facilitating devices) creates the possibility of
irrationality in the decision making process; why the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is ineffectual as a protective device when
it is not backed by a duty to produce legally sufficient evidence; and
how the verdict revising authority of section 33E has been used to
supplant the sufficiency assessment mechanism. The court's section
33E treatment of the "accidental homicide" issue in Commonwealth
v. Bearse4 81 demonstrates how the verdict-revising authority should
be used to deal with sufficiency problems which may be masked by
the use of narrowly based common law inferences to satisfy the pros
ecution's burden of production. The court's treatment of the identifi
cation-alibi issue in Commonwealth v. Woods4 82 demonstrates how a
weight of the evidence assessment should be used to protect against
apparently irrational credibility and weight judgments by a jury.483
In each case, apparent shortcomings in the sufficiency process, to
gether with indications that. the jury was influenced by something
other than evidence in reaching its verdict, led the court to order new
trials.
The evidentiary effect given the presumption of sanity in Massa
chusetts works in every case to require the trial judge to submit the
case to the jury even if the prosecution offers no evidence on that
issue. 484 This practice has been characterized by the court as an inte
gral part of its general policy of granting broad fact-finding discre
tion to the jury on the issue. 485 The policy includes encouraging
481. 358 Mass 481,265 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
482. 382 Mass. I, 413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980).
483. See supra notes 262-84 and accompanying text.
484. Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 468 n.7, 457 N.E.2d 275, 278 n.7
(1984); Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 532-33, 350 N.E.2d 444,455-56 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-81,258 N.E.2d 13, 19-21 (1970).
485. Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28,35,453 N.E.2d 437,442-43 (1983).
The other primary components of this policy are (I) broad standards ofre\evancy; (2) use
of the Model Penal Code's definition of criminal responsibility, see id at 34, 37 n.II, 453
N.E.2d at 442, 444 n.II; and (3) imposing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
on the prosecution once the issue is injected into the case. See Kostka, 370 Mass. at 527,
350 N.E.2d at 452.
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each party to present a broad array of evidence. 486 Neither side need
present expert opinion testimony, but the prosecution in particular
has been urged to do so when its evidence is otherwise margina1. 487
Because the presumption of innocence permits the jury to infer san
ity from its own knowledge and experience, not in the particular case
but in human conduct in general, the prosecution can satisfy its bur
den of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt without producing a
scintilla of evidence of sanity.488 In Commonwealth v. Mutina,489 the
court, faced with just such a conviction, treated it as a weight of the
evidence problem; however, the case presented a serious problem of
evidentiary sufficiency if sanity is regarded as an essential element of
the conviction. 490 The court exercised its section 33E "safety valve"
powers to reverse the conviction, without clearly indicating whether
it was employing a sufficiency or weight of the evidence standard. 491
486. The defendant's demeanor in the courtroom, for example, is recognized as
providing such an important source of information as to entitle him or her to appear
before the jury without medication, even if (s)he does not testify. Commonwealth v.
Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1983).
487. Id. at 36-37 & n.9, 437 N.E.2d at 443 & n.9.
488. Arguably, neither the presumption of innocence nor the Winship principle im
poses a burden of producing evidence of sanity on the prosecution because it is not an
elemental issue. But the integrity of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is left ex
clusively to the stewardship of the jury when the prosecution is allowed to satisfy its
burden of persuasion without producing any evidence. In addition, the right to have the
trial judge assess the sufficiency of the evidence may be inherent in the right to a jury
trial. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 73 (1965).
489. 366 Mass. 810,323 N.E.2d 294 (1975).
490. The defendant had shot and killed a woman who had tried to end their ro
mantic relationship. The killing was carried out in an apparently irrational manner. Id.
at 812-13, 323 N.E.2d at 296.
The defendant's evidence at trial included proof of a long history of mental illness
manifested in bizarre speech and behavior, physical ailments and periods of hospitaliza
tion. Two psychiatrists gave their opinions that he lacked criminal responsibility. Id. at
813-14, 323 N .E.2d at 296. The prosecution presented no evidence of criminal responsi
bility other than the circumstances of the killing. It relied on its cross-examination of the
psychiatrists and the "presumption of sanity." Id. at 815, 323 N.E.2d at 297.
An increasing tendency to exploit the presumption of sanity was noted in Common
wealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 35-36, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442-43 (1983). This prose
cutorial practice may eventually lead the courts to conclude that the device imposes
intolerable costs on the system.
491. 366 Mass. at 812-17, 323 N.E.2d at 295-98. The court did not discuss in its
opinion whether the defendant had challenged the sufficiency of the prosecution's evi
dence. Had the issue been raised, however, the ruling required by Massachusetts law had
been clearly stated as recently as 1970: a trial judge is not permitted to direct a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity in any criminal case tried by a jury. This rule is traceable
to Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass. 409, 415, 198 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1935), and was
reaffirmed before Mutinain Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 178-81,258 N.E.2d
13, 19-21 (1970). The court did recognize the questionable validity of allowing the pre
sumption alone to carry the prosecution's burden. 366 Mass. at 815 n.2, 323 N.E.2d at
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The court's statement of its reasons for granting the defendant relief
under its section 33E authority, however, makes it clear that the
prosecution's evidence of sanity was not legally sufficient to justify
submitting the case to the jury. Although it characterized its deci
sion at one point as being based on the "weight of the evidence," the
court's statements of its view of the case are much stronger. It recog
nized that the case had been submitted to the jury despite "the ab
sence of any affirmative evidence of the defendant's sanity"492 and in
the face of "overwhelming persuasive evidence that the defendant
was insane at the time of the killing."493 The imbalance in the evi
dence on the issue of criminal responsibility was so overwhelming
that the court concluded that the verdict "was not a true verdict."494
The court, therefore, set aside the verdict and ordered that the de
fendant be retried. Recognizing that the jury had been placed in an
untenable position, the court held that in future trials involving the
issue of criminal responsibility, the jury may be told-at the defend
ant's request or at the jury's-that the consequence of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity does not result in the automatic re
lease of the defendant. 495
In dissent, Justice Quirico argued that this effort to encourage
the jury to render a "true verdict" itself compromised another aspect
of the fundamental division of responsibility between judge and jury
according to which the judge alone exercises the court's sentencing
297 n.2. Apparently because it granted section 33E relief, the court found it unnecessary
to address the constitutional validity of denying the trial judge the power to evaluate the
.
sufficiency of the evidence on this issue.
492. MUlina, 366 Mass. at 816, 323 N.E.2d at 298.
493. Id. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301. Perhaps it is this type of development that the
court referred to in Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 346 N.E.2d 368 (1976),
when it said: "It is possible, also, that the Commonwealth's position as to proof might
deteriorate between the time that [it] rested and the close of all the evidel!ce. In that
event, the defendant's rights would, of course, on renewal of his motions, be reappraised
in consideration of all the evidence." Id. at 150 n.l, 346 N.E.2d at 370 n.1. Application
of this rule to criminal responsibility, however, is foreclosed by the current working of
the "presumption of sanity."
494. 366 Mass. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301.
Implicit in the jury's verdict was a determination that the Commonwealth
had proven the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. On the record
before us, we have found no rational justification or basis for such a finding,
except the jury's understandable concern for the need to confine an insane and
still dangerous killer for the protection of society. . . . The evidence heard by
them and the law given to them clearly played little part in their final
verdict. . . .
Id. at 822-23, 323 N.E.2d at 301-02.
495. Id. at 823 n.12, 323 N.E.2d at 302 n.12.
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powers. 496 Neither majority nor dissent acknowledged the fact that
the source of this mischief was the "presumption of sanity," which
may (and did in this case) function to allow the jury to act outside its
province. The improper influence perceived to be at work in Mutina
was the jury's ignorance of the sentencing consequences of a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity and its (presumed) fear that such a
verdict would not incapacitate the defendant. 497
Another recognized potential improper influence is the specter
of voluntary abuse of consciousness-altering drugs. 498 A third
closely-related source is improper prosecutorial argument designed
to take advantage of the drug specter. 499 The likelihood that such
external influences will sway the jury is greatest when the prosecu
tion's evidence of sanity is weakest.
The court has responded by employing a weight of the evidence
standard which evokes the spirit of Jackson v. Virginia without the
customary sufficiency of the evidence restrictions. The weight of the
evidence inquiry is whether the issue of sanity was presented "fully
and fairly" to the jury; that is, whether the prosecution's evidence
"adequately rebutted" the defendant's evidence of insanity.5°O
Although in Commonwealth v. Lunde,501 the court discussed the legal
sufficiency and weight of the evidence very much as if they raised
identical issues of assessment,502 its ruling in Commonwealth v.
496. Id. at 824-25, 323 N.E.2d at 302-03 (Quirico, J., dissenting).
497. 366 Mass. at 822, 323 N.E.2d at 301.
498. The difficulty of distinguishing drug-induced behavior, psychotic behavior at
tributable to mental illness but triggered by drug (including alcohol) consumption and
psychotic behavior unrelated to drugs is mentioned in the medical evidence in several
recent cases and has been noted by the court. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass.
464,469-71,457 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (1984); Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28,
39-40,453 N.E.2d 437, 445 (1983); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 381 Mass. 340, 345, 350
n.6, 409 N.E.2d 732, 736, 738 n.6 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 770,
383 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1978).
499. In Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1984), for
example, the prosecution argued that the killing was solely the result of the voluntary use
of drugs. It presented no evidence that the defendant had taken drugs shortly before the
killing and no expert opinion testimony to support its theory. The medical records pro
vided some basis for such a theory. The court commented that "that conclusion is diffi
cult to reach in view ofthe Bridgewater report as a whole and the testimony at trial." Id.
at 469-70, 457 N.E.2d at 278-79.
500. Commonwealth v. Lunde, 390 Mass. 42, 49, 453 N.E.2d 446,450-51 (1983).
Typically, the defense will present expert opinion testimony of lack of criminal responsi
bility, but need not do so to meet its burden of production, particularly where evidence of
a history of mental illness and treatment is presented, e.g., through hospital records. See
Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983).
501. 390 Mass. 42, 453 N.E.2d 446 (1983).
502. Id. at 47-48, 453 N.E.2d at 449-50. The court rejected the defendant's suffi
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Guiliana5 03 makes it clear that the adequacy of the prosecution's san

ity evidence is an issue ofweight.504 Where the defendant's evidence
includes expert opinion testimony, the prosecution may satisfy the
court's weight of the evidence standards by relying upon circumstan
tial evidence of rational, controlled conduct. But where the defense
evidence is strong, and the prosecution fails to present medical ex
pert testimony to support its theory of sanity, the court can infer that
none was available and consider that factor in assessing the weight
of the evidence. 505 Unless a strong circumstantial case for an infer
ence of sanity has been made, the prosecution's evidence is
inadequate. 506
These cases confirm that it is necessary and appropriate to as
sess the weight of the prosecution's evidence of sanity as a substitute
for the sufficiency assessment, which is never undertaken on this is
sue. The focus should be upon whether the prosecution's evidence
"adequately rebuts" the defendant's evidence; that is, whether a rea
sonable evidentiary basis for conviction has been presented to the
jury. At this point, the presumption of sanity should not be given
any evidentiary weight. The purpose of this assessment is to insure
that some alternative to an irrational (Mulino) conviction is available
to the jury; a major effect of the presumption is to create the possibil
ity that the jury will convict without evidence and defeat the purpose
mockery of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of persuasion. 507
ciency claim based on the argument that the prosecution's position had "deteriorated" in
the course of the defense case. The prosecution had offered no expert testimony in its
rebuttal case, choosing to concede the mental illness issue and argue that the defendant
could nevertheless substantially conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The
defendant argued that, in face of the evidence of his 20 year history of mental illness and
the unrebutted opinion testimony of three experts, the prosecution's evidence was insuffi
cient. The court responded that the prosecution's evidence that Lunde was oriented as to
time, place and persons and that he behaved calmly and rationally before and after the
killing "adequately rebutted" the defense evidence. 390 Mass. at 49, 453 N.E.2d at 450
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 37-38, 402 N.E.2d 55, 60 (1980».
The court referred to the same state of the evidence in rejecting Lunde's weight of
the evidence claim. Id
503. 390 Mass. 464, 457 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
504. See id at 469-71, 457 N.E.2d at 278-79.
505. Id at 470-71, 457 N.E.2d at 279 (quoting Kostka, 370 Mass. at 540, 350
N.E.2d at 460 (Hennessey, c.J., dissenting in part».
506. In Giuliano a circumstantial case "might have been pieced together" by selec
tively reading "internally inconsistent, conflicting medical records which were contra
dicted by the testimony at trial." 390 Mass. at 470 & n.9, 457 N.E.2d at 279 & n.9. The
sufficiency of such evidence in the face of the defense case would present a problem
similar to that presented in Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 413 N.E.2d 1099
(1980).
507. The court's ruling in Giuliano makes it clear that evidence of improper outside
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Commonly utilized inferences or similar proof-facilitating de
vices may also create a risk that the jury will be improperly influ
enced by non-evidentiary considerations. As with the presumption
of sanity, an inference drawn from an artificially limited factual ba
sis may permit a jury to reach a verdict on less than adequate evi
dence. The common law "presumption of malice"508 had that
impact in Commonwealth v. Bearse,509 prompting the court to exer
cise its verdict revising powers in the interest of justice.
The defendant in Bearse had shot his sixteen year-old son Ricky
at close range with a rifle he owned. In a pretrial statement to police,
he said the rifle "discharged accidentally. His wife, who had been in
a room above that in which the shooting occurred, reported that she
heard her son say "Don't do it, Dad" a second or two before she
heard the shot. The prosecution's theory was that this statement sup
ported inferences that the shooting was intentional and malicious
(the verdict was second degree murder).510
Bearse's assignments of error on appeal included the denial of
his motions for directed verdicts on so much of the indictment as
charged first and second degree murder. 5lI The court found "no re
versible error" in anyone of his claims, but did not discuss them in
detail "[i]n view of [its] ultimate conclusion."512 It granted section
33E relief because it could not fairly conclude that the jury, "unaf
fected by considerations other than the evidence, were satisfied be
yond a reasonable doubt that Ricky made the statement" and "could
infer beyond a reasonable doubt from the fact of the statement that
Ricky was prompted to make it because he saw that his father was
intent upon shooting him."513 The court set the verdict aside and
remanded the case "to stand for trial on so much of the indictment as
charges involuntary manslaughter."514
The formal inference of malice from the intentional use of a
deadly weapon, together with the trial judge's disability on the credi
influence is not a prerequisite to relief where the verdict is otherwise against the weight of
the evidence. See 390 Mass. at 471, 457 N.E.2d at 279.
508. After Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the term "presumption" is
no longer favored and has been replaced by the term "inference." While inferences must
be "permissive" when presented to the jury via instructions, in either form the device has
the effect of diluting the prosecution's burden of production.
509. 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970).
510. Id. at 486, 265 N.E.2d at 499.
511. Appellant's Brief at 8-9, Bearse.
512. 358 Mass. at 485, 265 N.E.2d at 498.
513. Id. at 487, 265 N.E.2d at 499.
514. Id. at 488,265 N.E.2d at 500.
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bility and weight issues, worked to ease the prosecution's evidence
past, rather than through, the sufficiency assessment. To prove
either voluntary manslaughter or murder, the prosecution had to es
tablish an intentional shooting; to prove murder, it would also have
to prove malice. If the killing were shown to have been intentional,
sufficient evidence of malice could be inferred solely from the use of
a deadly weapon to bring it about. 515 The key issue, then, was
whether the evidence that Ricky said, seconds before he was shot,
"Don't do it, Dad," would support an inference beyond a reasonable
doubt that the killing was intentional and malicious.
Whether Ricky uttered those words was a question of Mrs.
Bearse's credibility which for sufficiency purposes must be taken for
granted. 516 Assuming the statement was made and was subject to
conflicting interpretations, the question of whether it would be taken
as evidence that Ricky perceived that the defendant intended to
shoot him is likewise an issue falling exclusively within the jury's
fact-finding discretion. 517 If it is conceded that the inference is a
possible one, it stands as sufficient evidence unless considered to be
"too remote according to the usual course of events."518 The most
logical interpretation of the court's action in Bearse, particularly in
light of its explicit ruling that it found no reversible error among the
defendant's assignments of error for appeal, is that it viewed the in
ference as being sufficient, if barely SO.519 Its later rejection of that
inference is couched in terms suggestive of a weight of the evidence
evaluation; the court further concluded that the jury's verdict was
probably influenced by the prosecutor when he told the jury that he
would prove the defendant remarked, shortly before the shooting
(no such evidence was offered): "I'm going to kill that kid."520
In Part Two it was argued that a trial judge may not constitu
tionally give conclusive effect to such an inference in assessing the
sufficiency of the evidence. If that is done, however, and the infer
515.

See Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203, 209-10, 218 N.E.2d 408, 413

(1966).
Cj; Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928).
517. Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81, 375 N.E.2d 693, 699 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 355-56, 140 N.E.2d 140, 160 (1957).
518. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373, 162 N.E. 729, 731 (1928).
519. This was a pre-Jackson v. Virginia ruling. It seems unlikely that, given the
ambiguity of the declaration and lack of evidence to provide a basis for choosing what
inference to draw from it, this evidence would be considered sufficient under present
standards.
520. 358 Mass. at 487, 265 N.E.2d at 499. The possibility that the jury's verdict
was based on considerations outside the evidence is, of course, one of the central con
cerns of the court in considering whether to exercise its section 33E power.
516.
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ence also is suggested to the jury in an instruction, any remaining
interest the jury may have in evidence on this issue may have to be
satisfied by considering stricken evidence or improper argument. As
the Bearse decision indicates, the trial court should ignore the formal
inferences and be alert to indications that extraneous information
has influenced the jury in assessing the weight of the evidence.
Finally, it is essential to recognize that trial judges will face
claims under Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) that are essentially suf
ficiency claims, necessarily involving weight of the evidence issues.
The most common is likely to be identification-alibi cases. In some
jurisdictions these types of cases, which involve "elemental de
fenses," are treated as belonging to a special category of sufficiency
cases to which the "prosecution's best case" rule does not apply.52\
This is because even where no other procedural device is employed,
designation of an issue as an "affirmative defense" may eliminate
effective sufficiency evaluation.
The "alibi" defense offers an illuminating illustration because it
is likely to be asserted in cases involving either equivocal eyewitness
identification or marginal circumstantial evidence that the defendant
was a perpetrator of the crime. Massachusetts procedure is designed
to produce a direct confrontation between the evidence of the oppos
ing parties on this issue. Rule 14(b) of the Rules of Criminal Proce
dure requires the defendant, in response to a pretrial demand by the
prosecution, to both plead the issue and disclose to the prosecution
the names and addresses of the witnesses who will be called to estab
lish the defense. 522 The prosecution must then respond by disclosing
its rebuttal witnesses. 523
One purpose of Rule 14(b) is to focus the dispute on a reason
ably precise date, time and place so that the prosecution's evidence
tending to show that the defendant perpetrated the crime and the
defendant's evidence of alibi are focused. 524 That is, the proof of one
should specifically negate the possibility that the other might also be
true. 525 To the extent that Rule 14(b) succeeds in bringing about the
521. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 416 F.2d 823, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Farrar
v. United States, 275 F.2d 868, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1952); People v. Gardner, 35 Ill. 2d 564,
571-73, 221 N.E.2d 232, 235-37 (1966); People v. McGee, 21 Ill. 2d 440, 444-45, 173
N.E.2d 434, 436-37 (1961). Compare Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. I, 7-9, 413
N.E.2d 1099, 1103-04 (1980).
522. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(I)(A).
523. Id. 14(b)(I)(B).
524. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b) reporters notes at 307.
525. Thus, the prosecution is required, as a foundation for its motion, to state the
time, date and place at which the alleged offense was comInitted. The defendant's re
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direct joinder of the factual issues of time, date and place, the proce
dural device of designating "alibi" as a "defense" serves little pur
pose in terms of the original rationale upon which it rests. That is, it
leaves little room for the possibility that the prosecution will be
called upon to prove a negative of unknown dimension.
Even when the prosecution's evidence that the defendant perpe
trated the crime rests on the testimony of one who claims to have
been an eyewitness, the task of determining the sufficiency of such
evidence may be very difficult. It is now widely recognized that ju
ries are likely to be misled in judging what weight to give this kind of
evidence, which is among the least reliable of the types of direct evi
dence commonly used in criminal litigation. 526 Nevertheless, the
supreme judicial court has applied a lenient standard in determining
the sufficiency of eyewitness identification evidence. 527 When one or
more eyewitnesses identifies the defendant in court and places him
or her at the scene of the crime near the time it occurred, that evi
dence will justify submitting the case to the jury in the face of an
alibi defense, even where the identifying witness' testimony is "con
fusing and uncertain."528 Even where a witness was unable to make
an in-court identification and stated that the defendant was not the
person who robbed him, the court has found the testimony of a po
lice officer that the person in a photograph selected by the witness in
an out-of-court identification procedure was the defendant to be
both admissible as substantive evidence and sufficient by itself to
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sponse must similarly state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to
have been at the time of the alleged offense. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(A).
While there is no explicit link established between this provision and those gov
erning amendment of the indictment and requiring a bill of particulars, the failure to
acknowledge the relationship between these procedures can defeat this crucial "issue
joining" purpose of Rule 14. The result is clearly illustrated in Commonwealth v.
Woods, 382 Mass. 1,413 N.E.2d 1099 (1980), an alibi case in which the prosecution was
inexplicably permitted to amend the indictment to allow it to show that the offense oc
curred on a different date than originally alleged. Consequently, as the court noted, the
prosecution's case depended in that crucial respect on the vagueness of its own evidence.
Id. at 6 & n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 & n.7. See supra text accompanying notes 277-95 for a
detailed discussion of the Woods case.
526. E.F. LOFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
527. See Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 372 N.E.2d 1267 (1978); Com
monwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978).
528. Commonwealth v. Clifford, 374 Mass. 293, 297, 372 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (1978)
("The defendant contends that his alibi defense is as plausible as the confusing and un
certain testimony of the Commonwealth's two principal witnesses. . . . But it was for
the jury and not the judge to determine whether the defendant's explanations should be
believed.").
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the robber. 529
The supreme judicial court's assessment of the evidence in Com
monwealth v. Woods6 30 illustrates how the weight of the evidence
should be assessed in such cases. The court should be sensitive to
the possibility that the "prosecution's best case" rule has worked to
present a case to the jury in which it is necessary for the jury to make
an arbitrary judgment to convict. Similarly, the court should con
sider whether any prejudicial external influence has affected the
jury's consideration of the evidence. On this point, Woods suggests
yet another source of concern: the contrivance of evidence by the
prosecution in response to the defendant's defensive pleading. 531
Finally, in some cases, a sufficiency claim may have to be enter
tained for the first time as a weight of the evidence claim. For exam
ple, in Commonwealth v. Sherry,532 the prosecution presented legally
sufficient evidence to convict each of three defendants of having
raped the victim individually as well as having acted as joint ventur
ers. The prosecution did not ask for, and the judge did not give,
joint venture instructions. Accordingly, when the jury convicted
529. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 458-61, 381 N.E.2d 582, 600-01
(1978). The witness had testified that he was certain of his photographic identification
when he made it. Id. at 458,381 N.E.2d at 600. But, where the evidence does not clearly
establish that the witness actually identified the defendant's photograph in the out-of
court session, it is not sufficient to support such a finding. Commonwealth v. Amado,
387 Mass. 179, 187,439 N.E.2d 257, 261 (1982). The fineness of this distinction is cap
tured in the court's characterization of Vitello as evidenced in a later case:
Neither Johnson nor any of the three police officers who were present at this
interview testified that Johnson had identified the photograph of the defendant
as that of the assailant. The testimony of these witnesses tended to prove only
that Johnson picked the defendant's photograph, gave a description of the as
sailant, gave the name of the assailant as "Bugsy," and "associated" the name
of Bugsy with the photograph he had selected. . . . The missing fact, i.e., that
Johnson had identified a photograph of the defendant as depicting the assailant,
could not properly be inferred from this testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.
Certainly a defendant can not be convicted on the basis of nothing more than
inferences suggested by the sequence in which the questions were put to the
witnesses.
Id. The court considered the defendant's alibi evidence to be irrelevant to the sufficiency
issue. Id. at 181 n.l, 439 N.E.2d at 258 n.!.
530. 382 Mass. I, 7-9, 413 N.E.2d 1099, 1113-14 (1981). Although this case in
volved a ruling on a motion for a new trial., the court discussed the sufficiency of the
evidence and applied the standard of whether there was a serious risk that a miscarriage
of justice had occurred. Id. It therefore represents an appropriate example of how the
trial court's verdict revision authority should be exercised on its view of the weight of the
evidence.
53!. Id. at 6 n.7, 413 N.E.2d at 1102 n.7; see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,42
45 (1982).
532. 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E.2d 224 (1982).
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each defendant of all three charges, it appeared for the first time that
the evidence was legally insufficient to support two of the three ver
dicts as to each defendant. 533 In this situation the weight of the evi
dence assessment also serves the function of the constitutionally
required sufficiency assessment.
D.

Selection ofRemedies: New Trial, Reduced Verdict or
Acquittal

The trial court's choice of remedies must acknowledge federal
constitutional double jeapordy principles which require acquittal
where the court concludes that the conviction rests upon evidence
that is either legally insufficient or totally lacking on any essential
element. 534 Where the court decides to exercise its authority based
on the weight of the evidence, double jeopardy principles do not re
strict the judg'e choice of remedies. 535 This dichotomy suggests that
it is appropriate for the court, when it exercises its authority to weigh
the evidence, to distinguish those cases in which the sufficiency of the
evidence has actually been assessed in the usual course of the pro
ceedings from those in which the actual sufficiency of the evidence is
being assessed under the rubric of considering its weight. Any find
ing actually grounded on insufficiency should be given the effect of
an acquitta1. 536
The supreme judicial court's standards and methods for deter
mining whether to act to grant a new trial or reduce a verdict under
section 33E, for the most part, can be adopted directly by trial judges
seeking guidance in the exercise of their Rule 25(b)(2) (second sen
tence) powers. Two points regarding flexibility and discretion
should be noted. The general principle that flaws or mistakes in the
533. Id at 699-700, 437 N.E.2d at 234. On the theories presented to the jury there
was no evidence that each defendant was a principal in any more than one rape. Jd The
proper remedy was required findings of not guilty as to each of these two. Id at 700, 437
N.E.2d at 234-35.
534. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1981) (legally insufficient); Thomp
son v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1960) (no evidence). "Acquittal" in this sense
includes a reduced verdict where that reduction is based on a finding that the prosecu
tion's evidence was legally insufficient as to the greater degree of guilt.
535. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,42-45 (1982). Given the constitutional impact
of the weight versus sufficiency distinction it is important to honor the distinction scrupu
lously. Where, for example, the court conducts a weight of the evidence assessment and
grants relief on a finding that an element of the offense is unsupported by any evidence,
the remedy must be an acquittal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 386 Mass. 682, 699-700,
437 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1982). See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 40-41.
536. See Commonwealth v. Guiliana, 390 Mass. 464, 469, 457 N.E.2d 275, 278
(1984); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 822-23,323 N.E.2d 294, 301-02 (1975).
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trial process should be remedied only by a new trial, and inadequa
cies in the evidence remedied only by a reduced verdict is subject to
two exceptions. The first exception is that where the two problems (a
mistake and inadequate evidence) appear together, a reduced verdict
may be an appropriate remedy.537 The second exception is that
where the defendant's case has been so inadequately presented; that
is, where available evidence on a critical issue has not been
presented and no tactical or strategic justification appears, a new
trial can be granted in the interests of justice.538
Overall, the supreme judicial court's exercise of its section 33E
authority has been marked by considerations of expediency and fair
ness in the pursuit of the proportional justice of a particular case.
The court has reduced the jury's verdict in cases involving degree of
guilt issues where the prosecution's evidence, viewed as the jury's
verdict implies, was legally sufficient, but not adequate, because the
case presented on those facts did not satisfy the court's paradigm of
the offense. 539 The court also has reduced the verdict after revising
the jury's implied findings according to the court's view of the weight
of the evidence, when the court's revised findings similarly did not fit
its paradigm. 540 Additionally, it has reduced the verdict when its re
vised findings led the court to conclude that, as revised, the facts
were insufficient to support the verdict. 54l Finally, in Commonwealth
v. Bearse,542 the court combined its verdict reduction and new trial
537. See Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 391 Mass. 511, 516,461 N.E.2d 1215, 1218
(1984); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 394, 274 N.E.2d 795, 801 (1971); Com
monwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 426, 232 N.E.2d 335, 346 (1967).
538. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 607, 321 N.E.2d 822, 827 (1975).
The court found two shortcomings in the presentation which it felt required a new trial:
first, the jury had not been informed that Daniels had spent at least half his life in an
institution, nor that his IQ was 53, nor that he was regarded medically as being mildly to
moderately "retarded;" and second, no evidence--expert opinion or fact-was presented
in either the motion to suppress or the trial to aid the judge and jury in evaluating the
impact that custodial interrogation might have had on Daniels' ability to act voluntarily
in the circumstances under which he was questioned. The shortcomings in the adjudica
tion process required a new trial because "a substantial injustice may have been done."
Id. at 608-09, 321 N.E.2d at 827-28.
539. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dalton, 385 Mass. 190,431 N.E.2d 203 (1982);
.Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 501, 373 N.E.2d 208 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pisa,
372 Mass. 590, 363 N.E.2d 245, cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kin
ney, 361 Mass. 709, 282 N.E.2d 409 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rego, 360 Mass. 385, 274
N.E.2d 795 (1971); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335 (1967), cerl.
denied, 391 U.S. 968 (1968).
540. See, e.g., Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 (1975).
541. See, e.g., Jones, 366 Mass. 805, 323 N.E.2d 726 (1975).
542. 358 Mass. 481, 265 N.E.2d 496 (1970).
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powers to overcome institutional limitations to ensure that its sense
of justice would be satisfied in that case.
The court in Bearse ordered a new trial of the defendant's sec
ond degree murder conviction but limited the new trial to only that
part of the indictment that charged involuntary manslaughter. 543 In
effect, it acquitted the defendant of second degree murder and vol
untary manslaughter. While the court's disposition of this case
might at first blush appear to have involved an unwarranted exercise
of its section 33E powers, a closer look at the evidence and the law
prevailing at that time supports its correctness and demonstrates its
ingenuity. The criticism of unwarranted exercise of power might be
founded upon the argument that the basis of the court's order was
that the prosecution's evidence on the critical elements of intent and
malice were legally insufficient. If that were the case, the proper
course of action would have been to reverse the trial judge's order
denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on second de
gree murder, an issue which had been properly presented for appel
late review. 544 Two considerations appear to underlie the court's
decision to act upon section 33E grounds. First, the defendant's
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial did not extend to
the voluntary manslaughter charge. 545 Second, by acting pursuant to
section 33E the court was able to exercise a form of control over the
post-appellate proceedings, a control it could not achieve by exercis
ing its ordinary appellate review powers. If it found the evidence to
be legally insufficient, the proper remedy under Massachusetts law,
as it then stood, was a new tria1. 546 Nor could the court instruct the
prosecutor to proceed only on so much of the indictment as charged
involuntary manslaughter. 547 The remedy ordered a hybrid exercise
of the court's reduction of verdict and new trial powers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rule 25 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure
543. Id. at 488, 265 N.E.2d at 500.
544. This motion was made and denied at the close of the prosecution's evidence,
the ruling was excepted to and assigned as error for appeal. It did not address the volun
tary manslaughter issue. Summary of Record at 2-3, 5-6, Bearse.
545. See 358 Mass. at 488, 265 N.E.2d at 500.
546. It was not until 1978 that the Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy prin
ciples prevent retrial following appellate reversal on insufficient evidence. See Greene v.
Massey, 437 U.S. 19,24 (1978).
547. The courts in Massachusetts cannot order the prosecutor to dismiss or file an
indictment or part of it unless it suffers from some defect in law. See generally A. GOLD
STEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY (1981).
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equips the trial judge to meet the demanding, ongoing challenge of
overseeing the process of proof in criminal trials to ensure that no
defendant is convicted upon evidence which does not provide some
reasonable factual basis for the judgments essential to a finding of
guilt. To the extent that this task involves the judge in evaluating the
legal sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, it is a federal constitu
tional duty. The new federal due process standard promulgated in
Jackson v. Virginia5 48 requires the judge to assess the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to determine whether the evidence might support the
conclusion of a reasonable factfinder that each essential element of
the crime charged has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 549
This constitutional imperative is founded upon a recognition that the
presumption of innocence imposes a burden of production on the
prosecution and that enforcement of this burden of production is es
sential to maintaining the integrity of the Winship burden of persua
sion. 550 To effectively serve this purpose, the standard of proof and
the burden of production must be satisfied before the defendant may
be required to respond to the prosecution's evidence by either de
fending or submitting to the jury.551
This newly articulated level of constitutional protections alters
the division of fact-finding responsibility between judge and jury. It
requires the judge to ensure that the prosecution's evidence provides
a reasonable basis for the choice of inferences, as well as for the
weight of the evidence and credibility judgments the jury must make
to convict. Customary rules governing the sufficiency assessment
process prohibit the trial judge from inquiring into the reasonable
ness of such judgments. Other rules and practices used to facilitate
the process of proof often operate, singly or in combination, to dilute
or defeat the trial judge's ability to use the customary sufficiency pro
cess to effectively vindicate the Jackson principles. 552
One way to reconcile the old process to the new principles is to
modify the customary rules that define the division of fact-finding
responsibility between judge and jury and to limit the use of prac
tices and proof-facilitating devices which relieve the prosecution of
548. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
549. Id. at 324.
550. Id. at 323-24.
551. Id. at 324.
552. Examples of these other rules and practices include designation of issues as
affirmative defenses, assignment of the burden of production on elemental issues to the
defendant, and the application of proof-facilitating devices to the sufficiency
determination.
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its burden of producing evidence in the manner suggested by this
article. The overall division of fact-finding responsibility between
judge and jury would change little and no unfamiliar responsibilities
would be imposed upon the judge. Any new restraints imposed on
the jury's fact-finding discretion would tend to protect the accused
and thus would pose no constitutional problems.
An alternative to modifying the operating rules of the present
sufficiency assessment process would be to extend that process by
utilizing the trial judge's postconviction authority as a supplemen
tary device. Rule 25(b)(2) (second sentence) grants to trial judges
the discretion to exercise an equitable power to revise jury verdicts in
the interests of justice. This power is akin to the supreme judicial
court's section 33E equitable verdict revision authority and is to be
exercised similarly. The supreme judicial court has exercised its sec
tion 33E authority in ways that, in effect, have remedied evidentiary
inadequacies similar to those that may result from the incongruities
between the new Jackson standard or rationale and the customary
rules and practices of the sufficiency assessment and general process
of proof.
The trial judge's equitable authority under Rule 25(b)(2) (sec
ond sentence) is meant to extend beyond the function of supplement
ing the sufficiency assessment process. This authority grants the
judge the power and responsibility to review the evidence and the
issues in a case broadly, without regard to procedural technicalities
and to take corrective action when it appears that justice may not
have been done. 553 The trial judge is to exercise this authority in the
manner and according to the standards developed by the supreme
judicial court in the exercise of its section 33E powers.
In discharging its section 33E responsibilities, the supreme judi
cial court has ordered a new trial when shortcomings in fundamental
aspects Of the process of proof cast doubt on the integrity or accuracy
of the verdict. It has reduced guilty verdicts when the verdict ap
peared to be disproportionate to the evidence evaluated on the
weight of the evidence. The court has employed three identifiable
approaches in assessing the proportionality of a verdict to the evi
dence. One approach is to assess the evidence, accepting the prose
cution's best version of the events. When this view of the evidence
553. When it appears that there is a substantial risk that a miscarriage of justice
may have occurred, the trial judge may order a new trial, order entry of a verdict of
guilty on any lesser included offense or order entry of a finding of not guilty. MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 25.
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presents an account which is incomplete or unsatisfactory in some
major aspect (such as in failing to supply a motive, or where the
evidence on a key issue is only technically sufficient), the court has
reduced the verdict. A second approach is to assess the weight of the
evidence, utilizing a version of events extracted from all that is
known about the case, against a paradigm of the offense that is
somewhat less extensive than the formal definition of the offense.
When the evidence, though legally sufficient, falls short on this ac
count, the verdict has been considered disproportionate and reduced.
Finally, the court has reduced verdicts when, on its version of events
as measured against a paradigm of the offense, the evidence is insuf
ficient to support the verdict.
Overall, the court has combined its concerns of basic fairness
with a degree of expediency to achieve a rough sense of proportion
ality that addresses two relationships: that between the evidence and
the verdict in a given case and that between the case before the court
and the court's paradigm of the offense indicated by the verdict. In
its choice of remedies, the court has similarly combined an approxi
mate sense of fairness with expediency, particularly where judicial
resources may be conserved.
Recent developments in federal double jeopardy doctrine re
strict the court's alternatives by requiring entry of an acquittal when
ever a court determines that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support a conviction. The court's choice of remedies should be made
with considerations of finality in mind. If the weight assessing au
thority of the trial courts is to be used to supplement the sufficiency
assessment process, remedies that are the functional equivalent of a
required finding of not guilty should be given conclusive effect.
In sum, the trial judge's task of regulating the quality of the
evidence in criminal cases is as complex as the process of proof itself
and often requires the judge to carefully balance conflicting policies
and rules. The judge's overriding concern must be to ensure that the
principle of Jackson v. Virginia is fully vindicated in the trial court,
preferably through the sufficiency assessment process. Rule 25 em
powers the judge to do whatever is necessary to discharge this consti
tutional obligation and to go beyond the due process minimum to
ensure that injustice is not done in the trial court.

